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Who is Policing the Police? 
Role of Parliament in 
Police Governance
1 
Introduction
In a democratic society, the police plays an important role in ensuring 
public order and safety. Governed by the rule of law and guided by 
the principles of human rights, the police is mandated to abide by and 
implement the laws produced by the duly constituted authorities. On 
the other hand, an elected parliament is another important feature 
of a democratic polity. It has a mandate to represent the people and 
dutifully pursue matters of public interest. As democratically elected 
representatives of the people, among its many mandates, parliament 
is tasked with overseeing the state apparatuses authorized to bear 
weapons for the protection of the state and its people, more specifically 
the military, police, intelligence services, and militias. It is parliament’s 
role to ensure that the security sector is effective and accountable. 
As the primary agency for law enforcement, the police operates at 
close proximity to the public and exerts significant influence over 
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the security of individuals and communities through its behaviours 
and performance. Therefore, ensuring accountability of both the 
individuals and institutions of the police is a fundamental condition 
for good governance of the security sector in democratic societies.1 
The parliament, as the highest representative body in a democratic 
system, and its committees play a significant role in maintaining police 
accountability. This has been emphasised in international and regional 
conventions and code of conducts.2 Indeed, in many countries, as this 
publication will demonstrate, parliaments apply their generic functions 
of law-making, oversight and budget control to the organisation and 
functioning of the police. While parliament is not the only external 
accountability mechanism, outside the executive and outside the police, 
it is one of the most important forum for public accountability of the 
police. 
Despite this recognition of the importance of the role of parliament 
in police governance, the topic has received little attention in 
academic studies, and only a few scholarly articles briefly explore 
police accountability to parliament. This publication will contribute to 
fill the knowledge gap by exploring the role of parliament in police 
governance in Asia and Europe, which provide comparisons across a 
variety of cultural, political and legal systems for police governance as 
existing in Asia and Europe, as will be further detailed in the section on 
“Context Matters” below. 
Furthermore a factor for deciding on comparing countries of these two 
continents, was provided by the specific request of the European Union 
(EU) to  the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed 
Forces (DCAF) to address police governance as part of a broader project 
of the EU to “Support to Reform of the Myanmar Police Force in the 
Areas of Community Policing and Crowd Management.” As part of its 
mandate, among other areas of work, DCAF assisted local authorities in 
Myanmar to ensure greater parliamentary accountability of the police 
in 2014-2015. 
In this context, the objective of this publication is to collect, compare and 
analyse good practices, as well as legal and institutional frameworks, of 
parliamentary oversight of the police, including parliament-police liaison 
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mechanisms. To achieve this objective, the mapping study analysed the 
role of parliament in police governance in eight European and Asian 
states: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. For each country case study, 
a local expert conducted field research and analysis on the basis of a 
terms of reference, which was uniformly applied to all case studies. In 
order to capture the good practices, as well as existing institutional and 
legal frameworks, the authors examined the role of parliament in police 
governance (i.e. legislative, oversight and budget control functions of 
parliament), and how it is exercised through parliamentary committees. 
The case study authors also reviewed the wider framework of police 
governance, in which various actors play a role in addition to parliament 
(i.e. the executive, judiciary, independent oversight bodies, and internal 
police management). Note that the case studies were written in 2014. 
This book presents the findings of the different case studies. It likewise 
compares and analyses their relevant findings as a thematic whole 
to gain deeper insights into the dynamics of police governance and 
parliament’s role in police governance. Furthermore, it highlights best 
practices. To situate the case studies as a coherent whole, the concept of 
security sector governance (SSG) in general and the role of parliament 
in SSG, more particularly in police governance are discussed in the 
succeeding section.
Security sector governance
Security sector governance (SSG) is a relatively new paradigm and has 
made, since its inception in the 1990s, an extraordinary progression in 
both policy and academic discourses. It broadened the narrow spectrum 
of civil-military relations to cover the entire security sector, including 
the armed forces, police, intelligence services, border security, private 
security companies and militias. Along with the security sector, the need 
for democratic accountability and civilian control of the security sector 
has also widened and currently includes all management and oversight 
institutions, such as the executive, legislature, judiciary, independent 
oversight bodies and civil society.  
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While there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach, good SSG is based on the 
idea that the security sector should be held to the same high standards 
of public service delivery as any other public sector. If the security 
sector is well governed, it can be characterised as an effective and 
accountable sector capable of fulfilling its mandate to protect society 
against internal and external threats while respecting the rule of 
law and human rights. On the other hand, a poorly governed security 
sector is characterised by multiple security and accountability deficits, 
including: over-inflated security establishments that are difficult to 
support financially, but frequently constitute a major political and 
economic force; lack of transparency and accountability; inadequate 
defence planning, poor management and budgeting capacity in both 
civilian and military institutions; a long history of human-rights abuses 
by security forces and a tendency for security forces to act with impunity; 
corruption; an insufficient number of civilians capable of managing and 
providing oversight of security matters; and inadequate professional 
development. Furthermore, political interference by the security forces 
and politicisation of security forces by civilian actors are two sides of 
the same coin, reflecting major deficiencies in a security sector.3
Democratic accountability can be achieved through a plurality of 
methods. Mechanisms of democratic control vary according to a 
number of factors, such as the country’s historical context, cultural 
traditions, form of government (i.e. monarchy, parliamentary republic 
or presidential system), constitutional-legislative framework, and 
socio-economic conditions. Across this diversity of political systems, 
it is possible to identify numerous actors performing similar types 
of oversight activities. They traditionally include various executive, 
legislative, judicial and independent state bodies, along with non-
state actors from civil society. The table below provides an indicative 
overview of possible oversight actors and activities, which might take 
place in a given country.
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Table 1: Indicative overview of the security sector oversight levels, 
actors and activities
Level of oversight Oversight actors Oversight activities
Executive Head of state, ministers and 
their ministries, security-
coordinating executive 
bodies, and specialized 
executive oversight bodies 
for the security sector
Ultimate command authority, 
setting policies and 
priorities, promulgating 
subsidiary legislation 
and regulation, budget 
management, investigation 
powers, appointment of main 
commanders, proposing laws 
and arms procurements, and 
international negotiation
Legislature Parliament, parliamentary 
standing committees, ad 
hoc inquiry committees, 
parliamentary staff units, and 
research services
Law-making and amending, 
budget control, oversight and 
scrutiny, and confirmation 
and election of top security 
sector officials
Judiciary Civil, criminal and military 
courts and tribunals 
Adjudicating cases against 
security institutions/
staff, reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws, 
safeguarding the rule of law 
and human rights, monitoring 
special powers, and 
reviewing security policies in 
the context of prosecutions
Independent oversight 
bodies
Ombuds institutions, human 
rights committees, and audit 
offices
Receiving complaints and 
investigating abuses and 
failures, raising awareness on 
human rights, and verifying 
compliance with the law and 
correct use of public funds
Civil society Advocacy organisations, 
research institutes and think 
tanks
Informing the public, 
investigative reporting, 
providing in-depth analysis 
and expertise, dissemination 
of alternative views, 
recommendations, lobbying, 
monitoring, and addressing 
issues through the judiciary 
and the media
Security sector Internal management 
of security-providing 
institutions (such as armed 
forces, police, intelligence 
services, and border security)
Internal mechanisms 
of supervision, review, 
monitoring, complaints, 
discipline, codes of conduct, 
freedom of information, and 
human resources
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Role of parliament in security sector governance
Since effective governance and civilian oversight of the security sector 
are essential for peace, democracy and development, members of 
parliament, as representatives of the people, play an important role in 
the good governance of the security sector through its three generic 
functions: legislative, oversight and budgetary control.4 Table 2 gives 
an indicative overview of the possible application of these functions to 
the security sector.
Table 2: Indicative overview of the application of the three generic 
functions of parliament to the security sector
Function Application to the security sector
Legislative Initiating new laws pertaining to the security sector, reviewing 
and amending laws proposed by the executive, existing laws and 
secondary legislation, and reviewing if international obligations 
related to the security sector are reflected in domestic law 
Oversight Conducting routine oversight activities of the security sector, 
including hearings, inspections and visits to headquarters, stations, 
exercises, deployments abroad, and ad hoc oversight activities, 
including inquiries
Budgetary control Reviewing executive budgetary proposals pertaining to the security 
sector, scrutinising past expenditures of the security sector and 
costly security projects, and conducting security oversight related to 
procurement 
The effective application of these functions to the security sector is 
hindered by various legislative challenges. Some of the most urgent 
issues are related to the secrecy of information in the security sector, 
including classified parts of the security sector budget and procurement 
details. While some parliaments have set up mechanisms for dealing 
with classified information, others are still determining how to deal 
with secrecy. A second challenge is the lack of expertise on SSG-related 
matters among members of parliament and parliamentary staff. Some 
parliaments have remedied this problem by exposing members of 
parliament and staff to capacity-building activities and specific training 
programmes, as well as international experience-sharing. A third 
challenge is party politics, which prohibits or complicates effective 
parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Other parliaments, in 
particular ‘young’ parliaments of countries in democratic transition, are 
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still in the process of establishing committees and accountability and 
liaison mechanisms for effectively dealing with the security sector. In 
these emerging democracies, parliaments are also facing the political 
prerogatives of the security sector that are often negotiated during the 
democratic transition, which excludes parliamentary and sometimes 
even executive civilian oversight of the security sector. 
Therefore, the reality on the ground is that not all parliaments equally, 
if not effectively, perform all of the three generic functions in relation to 
SSG. The strength of democracy in a particular country appears to have 
an overall impact on the role of parliaments in the governance of the 
security sector. There is clearly no ‘blueprint’ for the role of parliament 
in SSG. Generally, it is the prerogative of each individual parliament 
to take up the challenge, with consideration of its own strengths and 
weaknesses, as well as the specific political environment in which it 
operates.
Role of parliament in police governance
Police governance involves actors across multiple layers of the 
democratic system, including first the police itself, as well as executive, 
judicial and legislative bodies and independent oversight bodies.5 Only 
a few publications discuss parliamentary oversight and focus on its 
particular missions regarding the police. The IPU-DCAF Handbook on 
Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector (2003) offers practical 
guidelines for parliamentary oversight of the security sector, and 
allocates a few pages to further introduce practical instruments and 
tools for parliamentarians.6 Gareth (2006) presents an overview of the 
parliamentary oversight committees and their roles, followed by a case 
study of Policy Integrity Commission and its role in police accountability 
in Australia.7
Some policing scholars study the role of the parliament within 
the framework of police accountability. Marina and Marenin (2004) 
introduce the role of parliament in police accountability as “passing 
laws that regulates the police and their power, as well as parliamentary 
ombudsmen or commissions who may launch investigations into 
complains by the public.”8 Boer and Fernhout (2004) present various 
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models of parliamentary police oversight in several European countries.9 
Punch (2010) discusses the police’s use of fatal force and accountability 
issues, and argues for a more robust role of parliament in policing the 
police. In this context, Punch highlights the demarcation line between 
the professional autonomy of the police for operational decision-
making and the rights and powers of the executive and legislature 
within a democracy. In the context of the police’s use of force and 
firearms, he pleads for close parliamentary scrutiny, while not exposing 
operational policing to political interference.10 The demarcation line 
between professional autonomy of the police and accountability to 
political institutions is also highlighted in the Patten Report on the 
role of policing in Northern Ireland, which states that:
In a democratic society, all public officials must be fully accountable 
to the institutions of that society for the due performance of their 
functions, and a chief of police cannot be an exception. No public 
official, including a chief of police, can be said to be ‘independent.’11
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2005) and United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime Handbook on Police Accountability (2011) 
each allocate a short chapter for police accountability to parliament. 
They emphasise parliament’s legislative, budgetary and oversight 
powers, as well as the importance of parliamentary committee for 
ensuring police accountability.12
Lastly, the journal Police Practice and Research published a special 
issue on the subject of civilian oversight of police. While the editors 
of this special issue acknowledge that oversight of the police, in terms 
of external scrutiny and judgement, can be conducted by various 
institutions, including the courts, parliaments, financial auditors, 
and human rights organisations, most of the attention in the volume 
is given to civilian oversight in the sense of citizen oversight or 
external oversight as carried out by oversight agencies such as an 
ombudsman, commission, office, authority or citizen review board. While 
no systematic attention was given to the role of parliament in police 
governance, it transpires that parliament plays an important role in 
legislating, supervising and evaluating these special police oversight 
and complaints bodies, as is the case in the United Kingdom (UK).13 In 
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the case of Canada and South Africa, Parliament decides on the remit 
and powers of police complaints bodies through the enactment of 
legislation.14 In New Zealand, the annual reports of the police oversight 
body are presented to Parliament.15 Therefore, from this special issue, 
it can be concluded that in many countries parliament has defined the 
mandate, powers, functioning and accountability of police oversight and 
complaints bodies. 
Framework for understanding the role of 
parliament in police governance 
Based on the discussion on the role of parliament in SSG and the brief 
literature overview, we can distinguish that parliament can fulfil three 
generic functions in the governance of the police: legislative function, 
the oversight function and the budget control function. While not each 
parliament will fulfil these functions exactly the same, in the table 
below, an indicative overview is given of those functions in relation 
to police governance (Table 3), which will be addressed in the country 
case studies. 
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Table 3: Indicative Overview of Parliament’s functions in police 
governance
Parliament’s generic 
functions in police 
governance
Description of activities
Legislative function •  Reviewing the comprehensiveness of the legal framework 
relevant to the police; 
•  Enacting and amending laws relevant to the police, including 
police service laws, legislation on the authorization and use 
of special powers by the police, states of emergency laws, riot 
control and crowd management; and
•  Legislating the remit, powers and accountability of police 
oversight and complaints bodies.
Oversight function • Conducting parliamentary oversight of the following aspects 
of the police: police vision, doctrine, government white paper 
on the police; organisation and size of the police; and the 
authorisation and use of special powers; 
• Scrutinising top appointments within the police service; 
• Scrutinising the rules of engagement of the police, especially 
the use of deadly force and fire arms; and
• Conducting special parliamentary inquiries into policing and 
its oversight.
Budget control function • Approving, rejecting or amending the budget of the police 
service; 
• Scrutinising the effects of changes of government funding for 
the police; 
• Scrutinising the effectiveness and efficiency of the police and 
if the police is properly funded; and
• Receiving and reviewing audit reports on the expenditures of 
the police.
In most countries, parliament has set up special committees or sub-
committees to deal with police affairs and exercise the functions 
mentioned above. Apart from the plenary, the committee system, 
including staff support, is the most important institutional arrangement 
for parliament to perform these functions. Various types of committees 
that are relevant for police governance can be distinguished: 
• Committees with a broad mandate, for example, bills, public accounts, 
foreign affairs, justice, and human rights;
• Committees broadly covering the security sector, for example, security 
policy, and defence and security; and
• Committees specifically covering the police. 
11Who is Policing the Police? Role of Parliament in Police Governance
Typically, the laws and/or rules of procedure of parliament or of 
these committees specifically would regulate the mandate, powers, 
chair, membership and functioning. They would answer the following 
questions: What it is the mandate of the parliamentary committee/s 
mandated to deal with policing? Who and how are the chair and 
members appointed? Do committee members have access to classified 
information? How are visits to police stations organised? To what 
extent, and how, can the committee rely on committee and research 
staff? Is the committee entitled to receive complaints from the public? 
Are committee meetings open or closed? 
In addition to the generic functions of parliament applied to police 
governance, as well as the committee as the primary institutional 
arrangement in parliament to carry out those functions, it is important 
to address the relationship between parliament and other overseers. 
As mentioned, in many countries, parliament plays an important role in 
legislating, supervising and evaluating other oversight bodies, including 
police oversight and complaints bodies, ombuds institutions and human 
rights committees. 
Context matters
The countries included in the case studies come from different regions, 
with different legal and political backgrounds. Good practices of 
parliamentary oversight of the police do exist in all countries, but they 
need to be carefully assessed and adapted to local situations. Table 1 
below gives an overview of the wide variety of states from Asia and 
Europe that are included in the study. Some notable contextual factors 
will be discussed that may impact upon the role of parliament in police 
governance. These contextual factors are: the centralised/decentralised 
structure of the state and the police; the nature of the political system; 
the structure of parliament; and the recent history of democratisation 
of the state.
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Table 4: Structural elements of the political system influencing the 
role of parliament in police governance
Country Continent Centralised/
decentralised 
state structure 
Political 
system
Parliamentary 
structure
Belgium Europe Federal Parliamentary Bi-cameral
Germany Europe Federal Parliamentary Bi-cameral
India Asia Federal Parliamentary Bi-cameral 
Indonesia Asia Centralised Presidential Bi-cameral
Netherlands Europe Centralised Parliamentary Bi-cameral
Philippines Asia Centralised Presidential Bi-cameral
Thailand Asia Centralised Parliamentary Bi-cameral
United Kingdom Europe Mixed Parliamentary Bi-cameral
The level of de-/centralisation of the state impacts the role of 
parliament in police governance. Some of the countries in the sample 
have a federal state structure (see Table 1), in which the police is set up 
as a federal service with substantial autonomy for the police services 
of the regions and cities. Other countries have a centralised state 
structure, and the police is set up accordingly, i.e. with decision-making 
powers over the police centralised in the capital. It is expected that 
parliaments in a centralised state structure have a bigger role in police 
governance than in federal or decentralised states, where the role of 
parliament is limited because the power over the police rests with the 
local authorities.
The type of political system (presidential versus parliamentary systems) 
impacts the role of parliament. It is expected that parliaments in a 
parliamentary political system have a bigger role in police governance 
than parliaments in a presidential system. Most likely, ceteris paribus, 
in a parliamentary system, the continuity of government depends on 
a majority in parliament, and, therefore, the government will closely 
follow the politics in parliament. Furthermore, in a presidential system, 
the president has more leverage to govern by executive decree than in 
parliamentary system, which might decrease the role of parliament. 
Furthermore, the structure of parliament itself influences the role of 
parliament in police governance. In parliaments with a bi-cameral 
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system, as is the case in all countries in this study, both houses of 
parliament have committees dealing with home affairs and police 
matters, leading to a complex political situation of parliamentary 
committees with overlapping mandates. 
Lastly, the recent history of democratisation impacts the role of 
parliament in police governance. During periods of authoritarian regime, 
parliament was suspended or played only a rubber-stamp role, as it was 
only allowed to approve the policies and laws of the authoritarian rulers. 
In particular, in matters of internal security, parliament would have no 
power. After the transition to democracy, parliaments need to build up 
new structures, procedures and practices in order to fulfil their new 
constitutional duties in the area of SSG and security sector reform. This 
is time-consuming. In addition, e.g. in Indonesia and the Philippines, 
the police was subordinated to the military during the dictatorship, 
resulting in a military style of policing and with no role of civilian 
government in the governance of the police. After democratisation, 
the police needs to reform as well in order to become responsive and 
accountable to the public instead of only to the government. Therefore, 
with regards to strengthening the role of parliament in police 
governance, democratising states are faced with the double challenge 
of a) establishing a civilian government with an effective parliament, 
and b) demilitarising the police, including separating the police from 
the military. 
Chapter Overviews
The contributions to the volume are organised in three parts: the 
introduction, which includes this chapter, with sections on the 
conceptual overview and important context on the role of parliament 
in police governance; part two, composed of eight chapters, presents 
the different country case studies; and the concluding chapter which 
thematically analyses the eight case studies, weaving together the 
lessons learned in improving police accountability to parliament.
Composed of eight chapters, this publication presents the case studies 
on the role parliament in police governance in Belgium (Marleen 
Easton, Jeffrey Vincent, and Arne Dormaels), Germany (Hartmut Aden), 
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the Netherlands (Peter Dillingh), the United Kingdom (Vic Hogg), India 
(Arvind Verma), Indonesia (Aditya Batara Gunawan), the Philippines 
(Mario “Mayong” J. Aguja), and Thailand (Srisombat Chokprajakchat). The 
country case studies highlight the good practices and the institutional 
and legal frameworks of the police. They use the following terms of 
reference as a basis:
• Role of parliament within the broader framework of police governance; 
• Three generic functions of parliament applied to the police (i.e. 
legislative, oversight and budget control functions of parliament); 
• Role of parliamentary committees, including their mandate, powers, 
procedures, functioning and committee support structures and staff;  
• Independent police oversight bodies; and 
• Parliamentary-police liaison mechanisms. 
Each chapter concludes with good practices for accountability of the 
police to parliament. 
The concluding chapter of the book, ‘Role of Parliament in Police 
Governance in Europe and Asia: Insights from Comparative Analysis,’ 
integrates the relevant findings of the case studies and brings together 
the lessons learned from Asia and Europe with regard to the above-
mentioned terms of reference. For improving accountability of the 
police to parliament, the following seven lessons learned were drawn 
from the cases studies:
1. An effective system of police accountability includes at least one 
civilian body that is independent of both the police and executive.
2. Parliament involves the public in adopting and amending the legal 
framework of the police.
3. For parliament to be successful in its inquiries, it must be granted 
subpoena and contempt powers to compel witnesses to appear or 
submit documents needed to shed light onto the subject of inquiry.
4. It is common practice for parliament to provide members of 
parliament access to all information relevant to the police budget.
5. It is common practice for parliament to establish a parliamentary 
committee or a sub-committee dealing with the police. 
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6.  For police to be accountable, it is subjected to independent 
oversight bodies, including independent police complaints bodies, 
and ombuds and national human rights institutions. as well as anti-
corruption/financial audit bodies.
7.  Parliament-police liaison takes place in order to assure that 
parliament receives all information needed to fulfil its constitutional 
duties, including data on policing, crime statistics (in particular 
crimes against women), government policies and priorities for the 
police and any other requests of parliament to the police.
The findings of the cases studies can be taken into account when 
considering options for improving the accountability of the police to 
parliament. However, it must be emphasised that these good practices 
always need to be adapted to the exigencies of the local context.
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Introduction
India’s parliamentary system of government is based on a constitution 
that empowers every citizen to vote irrespective of gender, ethnic or 
caste differences. There is no other example of enfranchising millions of 
illiterate, poor and exploited people in such a manner. “India’s democratic 
experience has been a prodigious act of faith”,2 an unprecedented 
revolution that has set the country on an extraordinary adventure. 
While India’s democratic institutions have performed reasonably well, 
the overall impact has been disappointing. There are major failures on 
human development and governance indicators such as human rights, 
child mortality, hunger, illiteracy and accountability on the part of public 
institutions. In particular, the functioning of the police has been an issue 
of significant public concern and condemnation. People have little faith 
in its organisation and ability to provide basic services and security. 
The police have also gained notoriety for not following due process, 
for the misuse of force and for indifference to citizen complaints. Such 
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indifference to citizen woes seems incompatible with the processes of 
accountability and checks and balances in a democracy. 
In this chapter, the parliamentary system and its mechanisms to 
hold the police accountable are examined. The structure, powers 
and functions of standing committees and other functions of the 
Parliament are discussed, and it is sought to understand why elected 
representatives and democratic institutional provisions have failed to 
control police excesses and violative behaviour of police personnel. On 
a more positive note, the chapter analyses the role of Indian courts, 
which have begun since the 1970s, via the so-called Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL) system, to address human rights abuses and hold the 
police accountable. The PIL has developed into a powerful procedure 
to rectify administrative, economic and political problems concerning 
citizens and are not handled by public officials. The chapter concludes 
that the central problem of Parliamentary oversight of the Indian police 
does not originate in the methods and systems, but in the people who 
execute them. 
Police accountability framework 
Policing is a state subject under the constitution, and provincial 
governments administer the recruitment, training and functions of 
police officers. The Federal Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) controls all 
central police forces and some special units, including the Indian Police 
Service (IPS). The IPS is an elite leadership cadre that holds all senior 
ranks in every police organisation, including those of the individual 
states. It is an “All India Service,” but its members are allotted to different 
states to manage the police. The Home Minister is responsible for all 
police functions and accountable for their actions to Parliament and, at 
the state level, to the Assembly. The police are beholden to the judiciary 
for their functions, while the media helps keep the police accountable 
to the people. 
There is no Citizen Accountability Bureau, Ombudsman3 or body that 
can directly hold the police accountable to the citizens. The system 
seeks accountability through the Home Minister and Standing 
Committees of the Parliament and State Assemblies. At the local level, 
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the Superintendent of the Police (SP) provides direct accountability. 
The SP has the power to initiate internal inquiry into any citizen 
complaint and to take action against any delinquent subordinate officer. 
However, such an internal inquiry by a police supervisor is inherently 
prejudicial and lacks objectivity.4 The Police Act has further placed the 
district police under the “control and general guidance” of the District 
Magistrate (DM), who is a civilian bureaucrat belonging to another 
“All India Service” called the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). The 
IAS forms the backbone of Indian bureaucracy and also controls the 
Home Ministry. Such a system of dual control compounds the issue of 
accountability of the police and leads to management conflicts amongst 
the various stakeholders. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) 
audits police accounts and checks against misuse of funds. Although 
it is an independent statutory body, it is unable to provide a robust 
accountability mechanism for the police. 
Serious complaints against police officers are sometimes handled 
through judicial inquiry or by Commission of Inquiry. In both of these 
cases, the review is for some specific matter, and there is no institutional 
arrangement that automatically inquires into citizen complaints. The 
judiciary is trusted more in comparison; but the procedures of the bench 
are cumbersome and slow, and only government directives can initiate 
special commissions. Few Commissions of Inquiry have been able to 
prosecute guilty police successfully. 
However, the Supreme Court of India has been extremely vigilant in 
addressing citizen complaints.  Article 32(1) of the Constitution empowers 
a citizen to directly approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of 
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III Articles 14-32 of the 
document. The Supreme Court and State High Courts are authorised 
to take cognisance of any such a complaint and issue orders as a writ. 
This provision was creatively utilised for extended judicial action by 
Justices Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati and is now called the Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL) System. These judges even accepted a letter written by 
some aggrieved or concerned citizen to initiate judicial intervention in 
the case. Since the 1970s, Indian courts have begun this unique form of 
judicial activism that has addressed human rights abuses and held the 
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police accountable.5 The PIL has developed into a powerful procedure 
to rectify administrative, economic and political problems that concern 
citizens and are not handled by public officials. Police officers who are 
abusing their power, violating citizen rights, and not following the due 
process have all been reprimanded and taken to task through simple 
letters written to the judges. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the PIL on holding the police accountable 
has been limited. Despite a large number of judgments and even direct 
monitoring of specific cases, various governments have not faithfully 
implemented the court’s directives. Epp (1998) labels this as the 
weakness of India’s support structure for legal mobilisation.6 Galanter 
(1989) points to the incapacity of the Indian legal system to pursue 
strategically planned litigation.7 PIL has “largely been a matter of 
individual concern, conducted on an ad hoc basis with no broad policy 
oriented thrust.”8 The Central Information Commission (CIC) is another 
statutory body that ensures that the police function in a transparent 
manner. The CIC enforces the Right to Information Act and helps citizens 
seek information from police authorities about several functions related 
to licensing, inquiries and investigations. The National Human Rights 
Commission is another organisation with powers to inquire into any 
allegations of human rights violations by police personnel.
Functions of parliament
Legislative function
The Police Act V (1861) is the basic framework that defines and 
establishes the police’s organisation, responsibilities, functions and 
powers in the country. The Code of Criminal Procedure (1973) describes 
the various ways that a police officer can record crimes, investigate 
criminal cases and execute the powers of arrest, search and seizure. 
The Indian Penal Code (1860) is the basic law defining the nature of 
crime and its punishment. A plethora of other laws cover a variety of 
social deviance that has been criminalised. The legislatures have been 
concerned about public disturbances and mass protests that remain 
the hallmark of the Indian polity. As early as 1950, the first Preventive 
Detention Act was passed by Parliament.9 As independent India faced 
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growing threats from organised violence, various laws governing the 
police’s use of force to deal with riots and manage crowds were enacted. 
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act was enacted in 1958 to control 
the growing Naga unrest in the Northeast, which was followed by the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act and other preventive detention 
acts such as the Disturbed Areas Act and the National Security Act. The 
infamous Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) was enacted 
to control violent militancy and insurgency in Punjab. The Essential 
Services Maintenance Act was passed in 1981 to deal with the threat 
of militant labour in the country. The democratic Government of India 
has retained not only a strong coercive police apparatus but has also 
strengthened its powers by special legislations. 
Parliament periodically evaluates some central laws applicable nation-
wide (e.g. the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Indian Penal 
Code, and the Evidence Act) for their effectiveness and impact. For 
instance, growing complaints against police officers for abusing their 
authority and power of detention recently led the Parliament to pass 
an amendment to Section 41 the Code of Criminal Procedure (1973). 
The Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill (2010) was introduced 
in the Parliament of India (Lok Sabha)10 and restrains the police from 
arresting a person for criminal offences for which the maximum 
sentence is seven-year imprisonment and mandates the police officer 
to record in writing the necessary evidence and reasons when making 
an arrest. Further, as per Section 41A, instead of arresting the accused, 
the police is obliged to issue him/her a “notice of appearance” for any 
offence punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years. There was 
considerable opposition from the police leadership and apprehension 
that this may restrict police officers’ ability to deal firmly with offenders, 
but the sentiments against the misuse of police force were high and the 
Parliament easily passed this amendment. Additionally, the Government 
has been sensitive to the abuse of executive authority that was the 
backbone of British colonial rule in the country. Judicial functions were 
separated from the executive by the passage of the new Code of Criminal 
Procedure in 1973 (Act Number 2 of 1974). By this amendment, the 
power was given exclusively to the judiciary to supervise the coercive 
powers of police. 
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The Parliament has constantly supported governmental action in order 
to deal with threats to national integrity and stability. When terrorism 
assumed dangerous proportions in the state of Punjab, the majority 
of Parliament voted to enhance police powers. Thus, Section 25 of the 
Evidence Act (1873), prohibiting admissibility of a confession made 
before a police officer, was diluted in the 1980s to enable the police 
to deal effectively with terrorists. The government added a clause in 
TADA that makes confession before a senior police officer admissible. 
Incidentally, even the Supreme Court upheld this provision in the Kartar 
Singh versus State of Punjab 1994 judgment, perhaps an indication that 
in matters of internal security all branches of government tend to 
cooperate with each other. 
The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) functions as an independent 
apex vigilance institution. It has been further empowered by a new 
bill passed by both the Houses of Parliament in 2003 authorizing the 
Commission as the “designated agency” to receive written complaints 
for disclosure on any allegation of corruption or misuse of office and 
recommend appropriate action. The CVC supersedes the functions of 
the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) when an issue relates to the 
investigation of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act (1988). 
By exercising control over the CBI, the CVC now asserts vigilance over 
all the country’s top officials and has the power to inquire about any 
alleged malpractice in the public and police administration. 
India is a member of INTERPOL, and the Director of the CBI is the nodal 
contact for international cooperation relating to matters of crimes, 
human trafficking, missing children and financial offences. India is 
a signatory, along with a number of countries, on matters of mutual 
assistance, and criminal investigations are handled through established 
laws. Section 166A of the CrPC authorises the outgoing requests for 
assistance, while Section 166B authorises the police to process incoming 
requests. Judicial magistrates have powers to issue letters rogatory 
(letters of request) to the competent authority in a foreign country to 
provide assistance to the Indian police for criminal investigation. The 
laws also provide for bringing accused offenders or fugitives to trial 
through the Indian Extradition Act of 1962, for which treaties have been 
signed with many countries.
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Oversight function
As mentioned above, the Home Minister, on behalf of Parliament, 
oversees the functions of the central police forces. Policy formulation, 
organisation, the strength of various police units, top appointments 
within the organisation, and their service rules are all within the 
purview of the Home Ministry. As mentioned above, Indian Police 
Service (IPS) officers lead all the country’s police forces and administer 
all operational policies and supervision. The Federal Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MHA) controls the IPS cadre, in turn, and all the service 
conditions, assignments, evaluations and postings are in the hands of 
the Home Minister. There are a number of IPS officers posted within the 
Ministry who assist the IAS secretaries in developing the police policy 
vision, determining policing priorities, and strengthening the police 
apparatus through augmenting its personnel and material resources. 
Rules of engagements and stationing of additional forces for order 
maintenance are handled by the Ministry. The MHA is also responsible 
for improving police capabilities by establishing and developing training 
centres and supplementing operational capabilities through technology 
applications. For example, to properly equip police forces combating the 
left-wing Maoist threat in Central India, the Ministry opened a special 
training school to train the personnel in counter-insurgency operations. 
A women’s battalion has also been established to engage the growing 
number of women participating in public protests. 
The Central Government maintains a large number and variety of 
police forces. For example, the Border Security Force patrols the long 
borders, and the Central Industrial Security Force ensures security at 
public sector activities. The Central Reserve Police Force handles order 
maintenance in the country, and its special unit, the Rapid Action Force, 
deals with riotous situations. Almost a million personnel serve in these 
police forces. Since policing is a state subject, maintenance functions 
are handled by provincial police forces, with the central police providing 
assistance and back-up. While the Central Government has the power 
to deploy its forces in any disturbed area of the country, the major 
responsibility is with the State Government. This introduces problems 
of harmonious cooperation, particularly when different political parties 
rule at the centre and state levels. Article 263 of the Constitution of 
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India outlines the establishment of an institutional mechanism to 
coordinate centre-state relations, and the Inter-State Council has been 
set up by Presidential Order in 1990. This Council meets regularly and 
has evolved many policies governing preparedness of states in meeting 
natural disasters and preventing atrocities against the weaker sections 
of society.
In a similar arrangement, five zonal councils have been established, 
which are statutory bodies under the States Re-organisation Act (1956) 
that provide a mechanism for resolution of inter-state and zonal 
problems, foster balanced socio-economic regional development, and 
build harmonious centre-state relations. These councils have chief 
ministers and other ministers of the respective states as their members, 
with the Union Home Minister as the Chairman of each council. These 
councils have led to important initiatives in regard to “internal security, 
coastal security, mega city policing, sharing of information on crime and 
criminals by the concerned states, prison reforms, communal harmony, 
preparations for disaster management and implementation of the Right 
to Information Act.”11
The Home Ministry provides financial assistance to the states under 
police modernisation schemes to strengthen local police forces. 
Under these schemes, assistance is provided for procurement of 
modern equipment for surveillance, communications, forensic science 
laboratories, weaponry, vehicles, computerisation, training infrastructure 
and construction of police infrastructure (e.g. housing, police stations, 
outposts and barracks). The Internal Audit Unit of the Home Ministry 
undertakes “risk-based audits” of various modernisation schemes.12 
The Standing Committee on Home Affairs of the Parliament and the 
Comptroller and Auditor General also maintain oversight over such 
police reform projects. 
Budget control function
Preparation of the budget for the approval of the legislature is a 
constitutional obligation of the government, both at the centre and 
the state levels. Legislative prerogatives of taxation and control over 
expenditure and executive initiatives in financial matters are some 
of the fundamental principles of Parliamentary financial control. For 
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example, no expenditure can be incurred without the authorisation of 
the legislature (Article 266 of the Constitution). The annual financial 
statement, presented at both Houses, describes the estimated receipts 
and expenditure of the Government of India for the financial year. The 
Lok Sabha votes on the estimates of expenditure in the form of “demands 
for grants.” These demands are arranged by ministry and provide detailed 
estimates. The demands of grants of various ministries/ departments 
are also considered by concerned Standing Committees (Rule 331G).13 
After the reports of the Standing Committees are presented, the House 
proceeds to the discussion and voting on the demands for grants. Motions 
on the reduction of demands are made in the form of “cut motions.” After 
the general discussion, the Government introduces the Appropriation 
Bill, which grants the Government the authority to incur expenditures 
from the Consolidated Fund of India. Finally, the Council of Ministers, 
headed by the Prime Minister, is collectively responsible to Parliament. 
Each minister dealing with formulating departmental policies is 
individually responsible (as part of that collective responsibility) to 
oversee and ensure the implementation and efficient functioning of 
his or her respective administration. Moreover, individual ministers 
are responsible to the legislature for actions of their respective civil 
servants, and their accountability is ensured by a complex set of 
organisational and procedural mechanisms.
The Finance Division within each ministry is responsible for formulating, 
operating and controlling the budget of the ministry and other matters 
pertaining to expenditure control, monitoring and financial advice. 
In the government account system, there are two components of 
expenditure: plan and non-plan. Plan expenditures are estimated after 
discussions between each of the ministries concerned and the Planning 
Commission.
Non-plan revenue expenditure is accounted for by interest payments, 
subsidies (mainly on food and fertilisers), wage and salary payments 
to government employees, grants to states and union territory 
governments, pensions, police, economic services in various sectors, 
other general services (such as tax collection and social services), and 
grants to foreign governments. Since the police is placed under the 
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non-plan category, all of its functions and services are accounted for 
in ad hoc manner. Only a limited number of specific projects, largely 
covering buildings, modernisation and particular resources, are handled 
in a planned manner. For instance, the budget for the Delhi police for 
the 2012-13 period was ₹3665.33 crores,14 of which ₹2740 crores (74 
per cent) was spent on the salaries of personnel. Additionally, ₹210 
crores were sanctioned for planned expenditures, largely to construct 
office and residential buildings for personnel. 
The Ministry is silent on the topic of the budget as a tool of accountability. 
Thus, decisions to reject or amend the police budget and on if the police 
is properly funded are not mentioned in its annual reports, which the 
Standing Committee has pointed out in some of its reports. However, 
utilisation of funds is examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General’s 
Office, and its various reports suggest mis-utilisation of sanctioned 
resources. 
Parliamentary committee/s
Ad hoc and standing committees
In India, there are two kinds of Parliamentary committees: Ad Hoc 
Committees and Standing Committees. Ad Hoc Committees are 
appointed for a specific purpose and a limited period until the report 
is submitted. The principal Ad Hoc Committees are the Select and Joint 
Committees on Bills. Other committees (e.g. the Railway Convention 
Committee, the Committees on the Draft Five Year Plans and the Hindi 
Language Equivalents Committee) were appointed for specific purposes. 
Apart from Ad Hoc Committees, each House of Parliament has Standing 
Committees, such as the Business Advisory Committee, the Committee 
on Petitions, the Committee of Privileges, and the Rules Committee.
Other committees
The committees that act as Parliamentary “watch dogs” over the 
executive are of special importance for oversight. They include the 
Committees on Subordinate Legislation, Committee on Government 
Assurances, Committee on Estimates, Committee on Public Accounts and 
Committee on Public Undertakings and Departmentally Related Standing 
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Committees (DRSCs). The Committee on Estimates, the Committee on 
Public Accounts, the Committee on Public Undertakings and DRSCs play 
an important role in controlling government expenditure and policy 
formulation.
Composition and functions of the committees
Select and joint committees
When a bill comes up before a house for general discussion, it can be 
referred to a Select or a Joint Committee in the two Houses. Members 
of the Committee can move amendments to various clauses. The 
Committee can also examine evidence provided by associations, public 
bodies or experts who are interested in the bill. After the bill has 
thus been considered, the Committee submits its report to the House. 
Members who do not agree with the majority report may append their 
minutes of dissent to the report.
Departmentally-related standing committees
Seventeen department-related Parliamentary Standing Committees 
were established in 199315, each consisting of 15 members from 
Rajya Sabha and 30 from Lok Sabha to strengthen the Parliamentary 
accountability of the government. With the addition of seven more 
committees in July 2004, albeit with reduced membership of 10 from 
Rajya Sabha and 21 from Lok Sabha, the number of department-related 
Parliamentary Standing Committees was raised to 24. The membership 
includes eight within the jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Rajya 
Sabha and 16 within the jurisdiction of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. 
Rules 268 to 277 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in 
the Council of States  (2010) govern the Constitution and functioning 
of these committees.
Each of the Standing Committees are related to ministries/departments, 
as specified in the Third Schedule of these Rules and provided that 
the Chairman and Speaker may occasionally alter the Schedule in 
consultation with each other. Each Standing Committee constituted 
under Rule 268 consist of not more than 31 members (10 members 
nominated by the chairman from members of the Council, and 21 
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members nominated by the speaker from members of the House). 
Parties are allocated seats based on their strength in Parliament. The 
final membership is decided based on each member’s area of interest, 
as well as their party’s decision on allocating the seats.
The Chairman of each of the Committees, specified in Part I of the 
Third Schedule of these Rules of Procedure (2010), is appointed by the 
Chairman of the Council from members of the respective Committees, 
and the Chairman of each of the Committees specified in Part II of the 
Schedule is correspondingly appointed by the Speaker. A member of a 
committee holds office for a term not exceeding one year. The Chair is 
from the respective House. Political parties are allocated chairs based 
on their strength in Parliament. A senior member of an opposition party 
customarily chairs some committees, such as home affairs, finance and 
external affairs. Committee reports are not decided by voting, but by 
trying to form a consensus while preparing the report. However, if some 
members do not agree on any point, they may add a dissent note.
Each of the Standing Committees has the following functions: 
• To consider the demands for grants of the related ministries/
departments and report thereon; 
• To examine bills pertaining to the related ministries/departments, 
referred to the committee by the chairman or the speaker;
• To consider the annual reports of the ministries/departments; and 
• To consider national basic long-term policy documents presented to 
the Houses.
The Standing Committees do not consider matters of day-to-day 
administration of the related ministries/departments. The reports 
of a Standing Committee have persuasive value and are treated as 
considered advice given by the Committee. While their recommendations 
are not binding on the Ministry or the Government, the formation of the 
Committee was based on the recognition that Parliament lacks time for 
detailed examination of and public feedback for all bills. Parliament, 
therefore, delegates this task to the committee, which reports back 
with its recommendations. It is the role of all members of Parliament 
in each house to examine the recommendations and move suitable 
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amendments. Following this, Parliament can vote on these amendments 
and finalize the bill.
As the committee proceedings are recorded on video, there is an 
objective consideration of the subjects discussed, and the members 
perform their duties in a non-partisan way. The members get a lot of 
time to speak in committees. There is an opportunity to hear experts/
witnesses in Parliamentary committees and get their expert advice, 
which is not available in Parliament. The committees adopt the 
procedure for seeking opinions on various bills, and large numbers of 
people submit their memoranda to the committees. Each committee has 
its own mini-secretariat drawn from the secretariat of the Parliament, 
which does a lot of research and provides vital input to the members. 
The Standing Committee for Home Affairs has six persons in its mini-
secretariat. Another big advantage of Parliamentary committees is the 
high quality of debates, as discussions are on non-partisan. Following 
the deliberations, committees present their reports to both houses. 
In the Indian Parliament, 99.9 per cent of reports are unanimous, and 
dissent notes are appended very seldom. Parliament and the government 
generally accept most of the amendments suggested by Standing 
Committees. The government has “accepted about 57 [per cent] of the 
recommendations of the Departmentally Related Standing Committees 
so far.”16
The police are covered by the Committee on Home Affairs, which also 
combines supervision of the development of the troubled Northeastern 
region. This committee, housed in the Rajya Sabha, presently comprises 
nine members from the Rajya Sabha and 20 from the Lok Sabha. The 
Chairperson is from the main opposition party, and there are a ten from 
the ruling party. From 2011 to April 2014, this Standing Committee held 
96 meetings, averaging roughly 2.5 meetings per month. The Committee 
covered subjects ranging from security of vital infrastructure to women’s 
rights, disaster management, functioning of the police and complaints 
against officers. 
The effectiveness of this Committee in holding police accountable is 
questionable. According to the annual report,17 there is little evidence of 
any thorough examination of various budgetary provisions. For instance, 
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despite finding that a large quantum of unspent balances are lying 
with State Governments under major schemes, such as Modernisation 
of State Police Forces, the Committee did nothing except for asking for 
utilisation certificates or surrendering the unspent amount. Such an 
approach is observed in all parts of the report. The vast proportion of the 
report consists of tables and figures submitted by the ministry with little 
evidence of in-depth scrutiny of the data. This is also seen in another 
report on the functioning of Delhi police that is directly under the 
control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This is a significant first attempt 
by a Parliamentary committee to critically evaluate the performance of 
the largest metropolitan force in the country and provide evidence of 
some attempts to hold police accountable. As an unprecedented action, 
the Committee invited memoranda from the people of Delhi and called 
the Commissioner of the police to explain the deteriorating law and 
order situation in Delhi. Again, a significant proportion of the report 
is simply a summary of the basic information regarding the history, 
mission, organisation and crime statistics submitted by Delhi police. 
There seems little attempt to seek additional information even about 
unusual trends in reported crime18 and complaints filed against police 
personnel. 
Observation on the evaluation by the standing committee
The report of the Committee suggests that the evaluation of the 
Delhi police touched upon every aspect of police functions and 
administration. While at places the Committee expressed criticism of 
police performance, little attempt was made to examine the larger 
problems affecting the country’s police. Almost all political parties 
have demanded that control of the Delhi police be given to the 
State Government of Delhi, but the Ministry has resisted this, and the 
Delhi police bears no accountability to the elected representatives of 
Delhi. As mentioned before, the police continue to operate under the 
archaic colonial laws, and every recommendation and directives to free 
police from political interference has been ignored. It seems that the 
ruling as well as opposition parties are not interested in diluting the 
political control over the police apparatus. The Indian police continue 
to suffer from serious organisational and structural problems.19 Yet, 
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the Committee did not examine any of these foundational problems. 
Nevertheless, the Standing Committee of the Parliament has started a 
process to hold the Delhi police accountable. 
One needs to accept that there are many structural problems in the 
functions of the Standing Committee. First, committees are constrained 
to consider only those bills referred to them by the Parliament. The 
Government hence decides on the legislation that is reviewed by the 
Committee. Furthermore, the ministers cannot be questioned directly, 
limiting the ability of the Committee to scrutinise the proposed legislation. 
Committee meetings are not open to the public, and notes circulated 
during the meetings are deemed as “official secrets,”20 Moreover, the 
Government has completely ignored many recommendations of these 
committees, and the bills have been carried through in their original 
form, completely disregarding the non-partisan recommendations on 
the bill.21
Parliament-police liaison mechanism
The formal mechanism for Parliament and police interaction is 
through the Minister for Home Affairs, which is one of the top four 
cabinet posts in the government. The annual report is placed before 
Parliament and the budget has to be voted on by a majority of the 
members. The departmentally-related Standing Committee for Home 
Affairs examines the annual report and other administrative matters. 
Through these mechanisms, Parliament asserts some supervision over 
the police forces to hold them accountable for their action. Yet, as the 
reports of the Standing Committee reveal, most of this supervision 
is superficial and done cursorily. There is little attempt to critically 
evaluate the functioning and ways policing of the country is conducted. 
It must be admitted that Parliament is limited in this role, as respective 
state governments control the police. However, through modernisation 
schemes, management of central forces and assistance to the states 
in maintaining order the Parliament has (limited) power to scrutinise 
police functions.
Question hour at Parliament is another path for members to hold the 
police accountable. Members have the right to ask any question and 
the respective minister must answer them in the House. Furthermore, 
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live telecasts and all proceedings being placed on the web provide an 
opportunity to demand accountability from the Government. Current 
practice suggests, however, that members rarely seek accountability and 
address citizen complaints against police officers.
Relationship with other overseers 
The Indian Constitution has created various mechanisms to keep 
checks and balances on the functions of the government and to make it 
accountable to the citizens. 
Judiciary
The judiciary is an independent institution that conducts strong 
oversight of the police organisation. The Supreme Court, through its 
public interest litigation system, has reached out to the weaker sections 
of society and asserted its authority in creative ways to protect citizen 
rights. The attempts by the ruling party to amend the Constitution 
through its Parliamentary majority were successfully blocked by the 
Supreme Court. It held in the famous Keshvanand Bharti22 case that the 
Parliament has no power to alter the basic structure of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, in the Minerva Mills23 case, the power of judicial review 
was also made a part of this basic structure so that Parliament cannot 
amend the Constitution and deny judicial review of any act promulgated 
by it. This basic structural doctrine is a novel principle evolved by Indian 
courts that have shown independence and determination to check the 
executive.24
Comptroller and Auditor-General
The Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG) is another institution 
mandated by the Constitution of India to promote “accountability, 
transparency and good governance through high quality auditing and 
accounting and provide independent assurance to the Legislature, the 
Executive and the Public, that public funds are being used efficiently 
and for the intended purposes.”25 Chapter V of the Constitution stipulates 
that the:
“Comptroller and Auditor-General of India shall be appointed by 
the President and [who] could only be removed from office on like 
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grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. The CAG performs such 
duties and exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the 
Union and of the States and of any other authority or body as may be 
prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament.”
The reports of the CAG relating to the accounts of the Union are 
submitted to the President, who presents them to each House. Similarly, 
the reports relating to the accounts of a state are submitted to the 
governor of the state, who presents them to the state legislature. In a 
country beset by corruption scandals of growing magnitude, the CAG 
has provided strong checks against blatant political misconduct.26
National Human Rights Commission 
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established on 12 
October 1993. Its statute is contained in the Protection of Human Rights 
Act (PHRA) (1993), as amended in the Protection of Human Rights 
(Amendment) Act (2006). The Chair of the Commission has to have 
served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India. The protection 
of civil liberties is the central preoccupation of the Commission, and 
it seeks to ensure the implementation of its statute in true spirit. The 
statute, in essence, requires the Commission to simultaneously function 
on two tracks: a fast track to protect and provide immediate relief to the 
victims or their kith and kin for wrongs committed against them; and a 
more measured track to strive for the development of a culture of human 
rights over the entirety of the country. The Commission has been actively 
involved in matters relating to civil and political rights, including the 
protection of human rights in areas affected by terrorism and militancy, 
and custodial violence and torture. The Investigation Division of the 
Commission carries out “on the spot” investigations all over the country 
on behalf of the NHRC. Furthermore, it facilitates the collection of facts 
from all areas of the country relating to varied complaints made to 
the Commission, scrutinises reports received from the police and other 
investigation agencies, and investigates reports of custodial violence or 
other misdemeanours. In addition, the Investigation Division analyses 
the intimations and reports from state authorities regarding deaths in 
police and judicial custody, as well as deaths in police encounters. While 
inquiring about complaints under the PHRA, the Commission has all the 
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powers of a civil court during a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 
(1908).27
Evaluation of NHRC in holding police accountable
The Commission has powers to receive complaints or investigate on its 
own about “violation of human rights or abetment thereof or negligence 
in the prevention of human rights violations by public servants.”28 These 
powers have helped the NHRC to work in a preventive and penetrative 
way, particularly in situations involving individuals or groups belonging 
to the marginalized sections of society and who do not have the 
financial or social resources to lodge individual complaints. The NHRC 
has regularly made use of these suo moto powers to take cognisance 
of media reports and comments from foreign news agencies to focus 
on human rights issues (such as custodial deaths, fake encounters, 
and police atrocities, including torture, disappearances in insurgency-
affected Kashmir valley, and violence against women). According to the 
last published annual report (2010), the total number of cases registered 
by the Commission from 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 was 82,021. Out of 
these cases, 25 were police-related alleged disappearances, 109 were 
false implications, 10 were custodial violence, 639 were illegal arrests, 
1,012 were unlawful detention, 47 were alleged false encounters, 
and 1,374 were other alleged excesses.29 In several instances, the 
Commission took it upon itself to conduct inquiries and recommended 
specific cases to be investigated by the CBI, as state police were seen to 
be ineffective and compromised. 
However, the NHRC has limited mandatory powers, and it takes a very 
narrow view on human rights. The main defect in the complaints 
redressal mechanism appears to be the approach of dismissing cases 
without providing reasoning to complainants. Thus, out of 8,2021 
complaints, the NHRC dismissed 60,041 cases in limini.30 It seems to have 
become “the victim of its legal formalism.”31 This is a serious concern, 
because an over-commitment to the legalism of human rights leads to 
passionless pedantry of the law and dilutes activism governed by ethics 
and morality.32 Moreover, Indian armed forces are excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the NHRC, and it cannot inquire about complaints against 
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them. It has to seek a report from the Central Government and send its 
recommendations on such a report to the Government. 
There are also a variety of organisational weaknesses, such as a lack 
of coordination between the NHRC and other national commissions to 
follow up on group complaints from minorities, scheduled casts and 
tribes, and women. This is a serious limitation because the NHRC Act 
does not clearly delineate jurisdiction between national and state 
commissions and no hierarchical relationship has been mandated. Thus, 
the Commission does not have the power to inquire into any matter 
pending before a state or any other commission. State governments 
are known to have appointed their own commissions to preclude 
an inquiry by the NHRC.33 The NHRC lacks an efficient complaint 
mechanism, and, to file complaints, citizens incur costs and must pass 
through bureaucratic impediments. A victim’s perspective of judging its 
effectiveness is singularly missing. Nevertheless, the real significance 
of the Commission is advocacy in order to build constant pressure and 
act as reminder of the state’s obligations towards the rights of citizens. 
Economic, social and cultural rights have acquired constant public 
discourse in evaluating the effectiveness of the Indian state, and this is 
a significant contribution of the NHRC. 
Central Information Commission 
The Right to Information Act (2005) grants every citizen the right to 
seek information, subject to provisions of this Act, from every public 
authority (including the police) about their tasks and activities. The 
Central Information Commission (CIC) is empowered to implement the 
provisions of this Act. The CIC prescribes two approaches to achieve 
these objectives: an appellate mechanism for adjudication and review 
of functioning of public authorities, and penal provisions to check 
and contain intentional and wilful non-disclosure of information. This 
also has an elaborate code of disclosure of information comprised of 
streamlining record maintenance (including in digital mode), proactive 
disclosure, and effective dissemination among the citizenry. The Act 
also empowers the CIC to obtain reports from every public authority 
on specific issues to enable it to analyse and discern the status and 
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emerging pattern of the Act’s implementation. According to the CIC, in 
the year 2012, the Delhi police received 34,384 citizen requests for 
information. The Act stipulates that a specific officer within each public 
office, including the police department, should be designated as the 
Information Officer responsible for providing desired information to 
the citizen. The Right to Information Act has been an extraordinary 
success in the country. It has exposed corruption in public offices and 
provided relief to a large number of citizens. One unfortunate impact of 
the Act was that citizens who filed for information against malpractices 
in government offices were murdered for their pursuits.34 As a result, 
the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Informers) Bill (2010) was 
introduced in the Lok Sabha on August 26 2010. The Bill is still pending 
for final vote. 
Conclusion
The constitution and various mechanisms provide a strong framework 
to hold the police accountable to Parliament and citizens of the country. 
The constitutionally-guaranteed fundamental rights of the citizens, an 
independent judiciary, and the media ensure against the excesses of 
police authority. Several other institutions (e.g. the CAG, NHRC, CIC and 
various Parliamentary Standing Committees and State Assemblies) also 
provide accountability mechanisms. All these mechanisms generally 
work, though ineffectively. The problem is not in the methods, but in 
the people who execute them. The elected representatives do not act 
on behalf of the citizens and fail to pursue citizen complaints. Indeed, 
the elected representatives themselves have acquired notoriety for 
such behaviour. The term “criminalisation of politics” has taken roots in 
Indian discourse: 
“This phenomenon involves not just charge-sheeted criminals 
entering legislative assemblies, but also the fact that a significant 
number of MPs are beholden to criminal elements. There is good 
reason to believe that criminals are entering politics in order to use 
political power to stymie investigations against them.”35
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Another example is the lack of seriousness exhibited by members in the 
proceedings of the House. Discussions on substantial issues, and even 
deliberations about the bills introduced in the House, are not taking 
place. At times, the Government has simply pushed four to five bills and 
had them voted on amidst the “din and furor” of the House. Parliament 
is becoming ineffective in holding the executive responsible for the 
administration of the country. Most members of Parliament seem to look 
upon their responsibilities primarily as distributors of patronage rather 
than as policy-makers. This may explain the apparent contradiction that 
members of Parliament spend a lot of time in their constituency and on 
their constituents, but not nearly enough time on policies. 
The Home Affairs Ministry is heavily burdened and covers far too many 
subjects. There is little time for strategic policy formulation and the 
Ministry has also shown complete indifference to external expert 
opinion. Despite appointing a large number of commissions, the 
Ministry has rarely followed their recommendations. Police managers 
posted within the Ministry are also side-lined and never given major 
policy-making responsibilities.   
While the effectiveness of the Parliament is declining, other institutions 
have seen resurgence and acted to repose the faith of people in Indian 
democracy. The courts, through the PIL system, have provided immense 
and immediate relief to a large number of citizens. The PIL provision 
certainly provides an effective instrument for citizens seeking justice 
for their grievances. The Right to Information Act is another mechanism 
that has been widely used to expose corruption and poor performance. 
While it has not been very effective in seeking police accountability, 
it has played a major role in curbing corrupt practices amongst 
public officials. As citizens learn to wield this instrument, there is 
the strong possibility of checking police abuse of power and lack of 
accountability in their functions. The NHRC is another institution that 
has highlighted human rights issues and pursued the misuse of force by 
police personnel, even in terrorist affected regions. It has the power to 
investigate complaints against the police, and, to a certain extent, this 
has helped in curbing police misbehaviour. However, the NHRC has not 
pursued issues related to police culture, supervision and management 
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that lead to abuse of authority. It has also had a limited impact due to 
the indifference of governments towards its recommendations.
There are two other subjects that have not been discussed above, but 
help keep police accountable to the people in India. The first is the 
independent media, which has played a major role in drawing attention 
to the mischief of police agencies. Determined journalists have brought 
the dubious role of the police in killing suspects in staged “encounters” 
in communal riots and even blinding them to terrorise the law-breakers 
to national attention. India today has the largest print-media and TV 
channels operating 24/7 at a number of more than 300. The news 
and information is transmitted in regional languages in order to help 
reach the millions of citizens across the country. This independent and 
vociferous media plays an important role in forcing police accountability 
and transparency. 
The other group is composed of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and citizen activists that have mushroomed everywhere and cover every 
conceivable public interest subject. According to an estimate, there is 
one NGO per 600 people.36 Many of these NGOs are working on police-
related issues, particularly human rights, and have been active in 
highlighting abuse of authority by police personnel. This has enlarged 
democratic participation by citizens and empowered them to protect 
their rights and seek accountability from the police.
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Indonesia
3
This study1 explores the dynamics of establishing and maintaining 
effective parliamentary oversight of the police in Indonesia after the 
collapse of 32 years of a military-supported authoritarian regime. While 
the military reform agenda has increasingly gained attention in scholarly 
articles, there is little work on police reform issues in Indonesia. More 
importantly, the impact of the newly-institutionalised accountability 
of the Indonesian National Police/ Polri (Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia) to the Indonesian House of Representatives/ DPR (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia) is yet to be thoroughly explored. 
Therefore, the central inquiry of this study is on how the DPR has 
performed its constitutional and political role for the advancement of 
Polri accountability in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Furthermore, this 
study draws on examples of good practices in parliamentary oversight 
of the police as references for other new democracies. 
The study is structured in several sections. The first section discusses 
the police accountability framework in Indonesia, and briefly explains 
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the manner and form in which various institutions are directly or 
indirectly responsible for holding the Polri accountable. From this point, 
the analysis turns to the role of the DPR as part of the state mechanism 
for Polri accountability by first identifying the core functions of the 
DPR. Subsequently, the analysis moves into the dynamics within 
Commission III (Law and Legislation, Human Rights, and Security Affairs) 
of the DPR that deals with policing issues on a daily basis. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with an analysis and offers recommendations 
for Parliament’s general role in police accountability based on the 
Indonesian experience. The main conclusion is that, while Parliament 
played a crucial role in establishing a civilian police independent from 
the military in the early 2000s, the current role of Parliament in police 
accountability in Indonesia is still limited. 
Police accountability framework
During the military-supported authoritarian regime, the Polri was part 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the so-called ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia), together with the military. Although it was highly 
militarised, law enforcement remained the main responsibility of the 
police.2 After the authoritarian regime collapsed, the DPR passed Law No. 
2/2002 on the Indonesian National Police as the new legal framework 
for police institutions. Within the new law, the Polri was asserted as a 
state instrument responsible for maintaining security, order and law 
enforcement, as well as for providing protection services to uphold 
domestic state security. Unfortunately, in relation to accountability, 
the law did not further identify the institutions responsible for police 
accountability, except for the mandate of the President to directly 
supervise the Polri. Nevertheless, the following discussion attempts 
to explore the Polri accountability framework from three perspectives: 
internal, external, and state mechanisms. 
Based on its current structure, internal accountability within the 
Polri is a shared responsibility between the General Oversight 
Inspectorate/ Itwasum (Inspektorat Pengawasan umum), and the Internal 
Division of Profession and Security, so-called Propam (Divisi Profesi 
dan Pengamanan). In practice, the mandates of these two bodies are 
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different. The Irwasum is tasked with oversight and implementation 
of policy, as well as budget review, while the Propam deals with public 
complaints on police misconduct and maladministration. 
In terms of external control, there are several independent state 
institutions that do not exclusively deal with Polri accountability, 
but their legal mandates also incorporate the Polri as part of wider 
governance institutions. Among the most influential institutions are the 
National Human Rights Commission/ Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak 
Asasi Manusia), the National Ombudsman, and the Corruption Eradication 
Commission/ KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi). Even though mandated 
by law as independent bodies, the substantial power of Komnas HAM 
and the National Ombudsman to deal with Polri misconduct is limited. 
Both institutions are only able to submit public complaints on human 
rights and public service issues to the Itwasum or Propam without legal 
mandate to follow up or push the complaints handling.3 In contrary, 
KPK, as an anti-graft body, has substantial power to prosecute public 
corruption cases and monitor the state administration, including the 
Polri.4 Indeed, KPK is also authorised to wiretap communications, 
impose overseas travel restrictions and request financial transaction 
reports from all state officials.5
Another external monitoring institution is the National Police 
Commission/ Kompolnas (Komisi Kepolisian Nasional), which is specifically 
mandated to monitor Polri policy performance. Polri law mandated the 
establishment of Kompolnas to support the president in formulation 
of general policies for Polri and providing inputs on the nomination 
of police chief candidates. The Commission was granted the authority 
to investigate public complaints and participate in the disciplinary 
court and ethic court procedures.6 It also has the authority to request 
additional investigations or re-investigations of Itwasum or Propam 
investigations. Although its oversight tools appear to be influential, 
Kompolnas is far from being an entirely independent oversight body, 
since it is still under the direct supervision of the President, to whom 
it reports.7 Furthermore, the current membership composition of 
Kompolnas is also dominated by government authorities and former 
high-level police officials. 
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At the state level, the police accountability framework is exercised by 
the President and the DPR. The President directly supervises the Polri, 
and the Polri Chief (similar to the Indonesian Military Commander-in-
Chief) is equal to a ministerial position.8 However, the appointment of 
the Polri Chief is not formally a prerogative of the President. According 
to Polri law, the President must obtain written consent from the DPR to 
appoint a new Polri Chief.9 In the process, the responsible commission 
in the DPR would evaluate the candidate(s) nominated by the President. 
In addition to the nomination of the Polri Chief, the President also 
directs police policy, as stated in Polri law.10 Finally, the subsequent 
state level mechanism for police accountability is the DPR. The 
legislative institution plays an important role in approving or rejecting 
the presidential nomination for Polri chief, as well as possessing the 
legal mandate to legislate, oversee and approve the Polri budget. 
Further dynamics of this parliamentary body on police accountability 
are specifically analysed below.
The core functions of the Indonesian Parliament 
In order to provide general descriptions of DPR measures to hold 
the Polri accountable, this section explains several vital institutional 
arrangements and functions of the DPR. The National Constitution 
structures the current Indonesian legislative body as a presidential 
system.11 The detailed functions of the legislative body are further 
regulated by Law No.27/2009, which divides Indonesian legislative 
institutions into two chambers: the Indonesian Regional Council (DPD/
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) and the Indonesian House of Representatives 
(DPR/Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). The DPD is a legislative chamber that 
consists of provincial representatives akin to the Senate in United States 
Assemblies. Each province is equally represented by four members 
in the DPD. Members of this institution are non-partisan and elected 
through a national election every five years. DPR members are also 
elected nationally every five years, but, unlike their peers, are partisan. 
The joint session of the two Chambers is called the People Consultative 
Assembly (MPR/Majelis Pemusyawaratan Rakyat), which is responsible for 
amending the Constitution and appointing or impeaching the President 
and Vice President.12
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Although the Indonesian Parliament is divided into two Chambers, in 
practice, the DPR holds substantially more power in legislation, oversight 
and budget control than the DPD.13 The DPD can propose legislation, 
joint oversight and budget control sessions limited to decentralisation 
issues; yet, these all need to gain DPR approval.14 In addition, there is 
no obligation for the DPR to accommodate DPD’s input according to 
existing law. Under such conditions, the DPR plays a more significant 
role as a legislative body in the daily politics at the national level. 
Legislation function
The DPR has the capacity to pass bills into laws after reaching consensus 
with the president.15 The legislative process starts with the submission 
of proposed bills by DPR members or the President. To create an 
efficient process, a national legislation programme is agreed upon by 
the DPR and the government on an annual basis; the programme or 
prolegnas (Program Legislasi Nasional) lists a number of priority bills. 
Every bill must be approved at a DPR plenary session in order to enter 
a subsequent legislation process, or rejected.16 If the bill is approved, 
it must enter two legislative stages. In the first stage, the designated 
commission (or Joint Commission) discusses the bill with government 
representatives (ministers). At this stage, the commission may use some 
of its legislative instruments (see Box I) to reach a consensus, after 
which the agreed draft is brought into the plenary for approval.17 It 
should be noted that securing plenary approval is largely ceremonial, 
as the institutional design of the DPR grants more legislative power to 
the commission.18
Box. I. Commission Legislation Tools
To support its legislation task, a commission is equipped with several 
instruments. 
• A commission can invite other government bodies, state-auxiliary bodies, 
academia or NGOs to provide inputs on the bill through the mechanism 
of public hearings (rapat dengar pendapat umum). 
• It is also able to perform an on-site visit (kunjungan kerja) at the local 
level to gather more inputs.
• If necessary, a commission may also propose an overseas study (studi 
banding luar negeri) to the DPR leadership in order to compare similar 
legislation products.
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Oversight function
The DPR has the authority to summon any person and official, in the 
form and manner of a hearing, when relevant to its oversight functions. 
Hearings within the commission are divided into two categories: 
government hearings (rapat dengar pendapat) and public hearings (rapat 
dengar pendapat umum). There are also inter-commission hearings 
(rapat gabungan komisi) intended for issues that involve different 
government branches or areas. Government hearings can be called for 
with the initiative of the commission or at the request of respective 
ministries. In these hearings, the government is represented by high-
level public officials. Meanwhile, in a public hearing, the commission 
can invite academia, think tank or non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) representatives to share and gather information related to 
legislation and oversight. Another important instrument for oversight is 
the working meeting (rapat kerja), usually attended by the minister since 
more strategic issues such as the budget or general policy are discussed 
at the forum. To increase transparency, every hearing or meeting in the 
DPR is basically open unless commission members decide otherwise.19 
The schedule for upcoming DPR hearings and meetings, together with 
the some agenda reports, is accessible through the institution’s website.
As a follow-up to hearings or public complaints, Articles 54 and 55 
of DPR Standing Orders authorise the commission to establish a 
team or working committee (panitia kerja). The objective is to explore 
emerging problems in depth and provide solutions for the respective 
commission.20 Subsequently, the result of the team and working 
committee investigation is reported to the government. There are 
Box. II. Summary of DPR Oversight Tools
Commission Level: 
• Regular hearings (government or public)
• Working meeting (government on budget or general policy direction) 
• Working Committee (special inquiry or follow-up from hearings)
Inter-Commission Level: 
• Inter-commissions hearing
• Special committee
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unclear differences between the team and the Working Committee in 
the DPR Standing Orders. Yet, in some cases, the DPR team is mostly 
established as a quick response to a demanding situation. In addition, 
when the issues involve other state agencies (thus demanding the 
involvement of other commissions), the DPR leadership can create a 
special committee (panitia khusus) for a specific duration, consisting of 
inter-commission parliamentarians and mandated with a specific task.21 
Budget function
In the budget function, the DPR has substantial power to scrutinise 
detailed state budget proposals from the government. Article 15(3) in 
Law No.17/2003 on state finance mandates that the DPR may propose 
amendments to state budget revenues and spending proposed by the 
government. Furthermore, it also stipulates that the DPR approves 
the state budget, which is classified according to organisational units, 
functions, programmes, activities, and types of expenditure.22 Since the 
budget is drafted by the government and then reviewed by the DPR, the 
DPR’s deliberations on the bill are simultaneously of a legislative and 
an oversight nature.23
The budget process starts with a pre-deliberation stage (pembicaraan 
pendahuluan).24 In this stage, the government submits budget proposals 
for the next fiscal year to the DPR plenary session by the end of May. This 
proposal consists of a macroeconomic framework, fiscal assumptions, 
budget priorities, and detailed descriptions of programmes, activities 
and budget units. Each party caucus responds to the government 
proposal, followed by subsequent government responses in a plenary 
session. The budget proposal is then distributed amongst respective 
commissions, which arrange meetings with respective ministries to 
discuss the proposal. The results of the commission budget meetings 
are then brought into the budget committee meeting for discussion 
with the government representative, after which the budget committee 
delivers the meeting result to the plenary session. This pre-deliberation 
stage should be completed by the end of July. In August, the President 
submits the State Budget Bill (RUU APBN/Rancangan Undang-Undang 
Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara) to the DPR plenary sessions, and the 
next stage of budget legislation process begins. The commissions and 
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Budget Committee of the DPR play influential roles in this budget 
legislation stage. First, the budget request from the ministries will be 
discussed with their respective commissions in hearings. During the 
commission budget hearings, government agencies usually report on 
the progress of current budget use (penyerapan anggaran), followed by 
the detailed budget proposal for next year. If the commissions and the 
ministries reach an agreement on the budget proposal, the proposal will 
be discussed within the Budget Committee meeting with government 
representatives (Ministry of Finance).25 Finally, the agreed budget 
proposal in the Budget Committee meeting is passed into law in the 
plenary session. In spite of the Budget Committee’s position in the final 
agreement of the budget, it should be noted that the Commission plays 
a more significant role in influencing the budget since each commission 
appoints their members as representatives to the Budget Committee.26
In response to the complexity of its function, the DPR has been 
supported by expert staff (tenaga ahli) at commission, committee and 
individual levels since 2009. At the commission and committee levels, 
there are seven and two expert staff respectively for each individual 
parliamentarian.27 All expert staff must have at least a master or 
bachelor degree and a minimum of two-year work experience in a 
relevant field.28 In addition, each parliamentarian is supported by 
one administrative assistant/secretary. The expert and administrative 
staff, which currently stand at approximately 1,680 in total, are not 
public servants but contract workers paid from the parliamentary 
operational budget. It should be noted, however, that current support 
of parliamentary staff has created a paradoxical problem. Members of 
Parliament keep demanding a higher number of expert staff. Some argue 
that each commission and committee should be ideally supported by 20 
expert staff, while individual parliamentarians should be supported by 
five expert staff.29 Apart from the demand, professionalism issues have 
been raised on recruitment of staff for individual parliamentarians.30 
Recently, the current vice chairman of the DPR admitted that some of 
the expert staff for the individual parliamentarians include their friends, 
relatives, and even children.31 In addition, some of the expert staff have 
been investigated or even convicted in corruption cases involving their 
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bosses.32 Thus, these cases highlight that there is still a substantial 
problem with the function of parliamentary staff.
In essence, the commission is the main working body of the DPR. 
Every bill or oversight tool must be deliberated and approved in the 
respective commission before being presented in a plenary session. The 
subsequent sections evaluate several key achievements and constraints 
that support or hinder the ability of specific commissions to perform 
their role in police accountability.
Commission III of DPR and Polri accountability
Commission III (komisi III) of the DPR is the principal organ tasked 
with the oversight of the Polri. There are currently 49 parliamentarians 
within Commission III, which deals with the government institutions 
responsible for law, human rights and security issues. Commission III on 
Law and Legislation, Human Rights, and Security Affairs is considered as 
one of the most strategic commissions for the executive, and the ruling 
party usually selects one of its members as its chair. The Commission’s 
dynamics in holding the Polri accountable are explained below.
Commission III and the legislation function
Though the Commission plays a more central role in legislation 
compared to the plenary session, this does not automatically translate 
into a more efficient legislation process at the commission level. This 
situation is evident in terms of policing issues. Commission III has only 
passed a number of police-related laws since the Polri law in 2002 
(e.g. Law No. 15/2003 on Anti-Terrorism and Law No. 9/2013 on the 
Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Financing). In February 2012, the 
DPR plenary session established a Joint Commission (pansus) consisting 
of members from Commissions I, II and III to work on a controversial 
national security bill; nonetheless, there are still deficiencies in terms 
of progress.33
Recently, the revision of Polri Law No. 2/2002 is scheduled in the 
National Legislation Program 2014, and Commission III initiated 
several public hearings, for which a Polri law revision is expected to 
be accomplished before the current DPR term 2009-2014 ends in 20 
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September 2014. The revision is critical, because existing law did not 
offer any clarity on aspects such as police use of force, off-budget 
sources or the legislative role in policy implementation. However, the 
revision process is potentially hampered by the reluctance of the Polri 
Chief to agree to the proposal to submit the police to the supervision 
of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs.34 Such resistance impacts the future 
of a bill, which is highly significant since the executive’s informal veto 
is pervasive in DPR legislation sessions. As previously mentioned, the 
Constitution states that every law must be agreed upon by both the DPR 
and the President.35 In practice, the executive frequently exercises its 
“informal veto” by delaying the legislation process, especially on DPR-
initiated bills. The President may delay the naming of a minister to act 
as government representative in the deliberation process, or officials 
delay their official response to the DPR’s revised draft, resulting in a 
legislation stalemate.36 Furthermore, the legislative election in April 
2014 and the presidential election in July 2014 have also diverted 
attention away from the Polri law revision debate to a focus on elections. 
Unless the stake is high enough to revise the Polri Law like the Military 
Law in 2004, there is still weak incentive for the DPR to accelerate the 
revision. 
Commission III and the oversight function
Commission III has conducted various hearings with the Polri. Regularly, 
hearings were used to facilitate an inquiry into progress of the Polri’s 
Grand Strategy 2005-2025.37 The Grand Strategy document divides the 
improvement process of the Polri’s public service into three phases: 
Phase I Trust Building (2005-2010); Phase II Partnership Building (2011-
2015); and Phase III Service for Excellence (2016-2025). These are 
pursued through structural, instrumental and cultural reform policies.38 
Apart from regular policy review, hearings were also conducted to 
respond to extraordinary issues, such as the handling of protests, 
terrorism investigations or corruption allegations.  
Unfortunately, in practice, government officials have been regularly 
“refused” to attend commission hearings. Similar to the expansion 
of the “informal veto,” government officials undermine legislative 
oversight through absenteeism. As a consequence, the effectiveness of 
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parliamentary oversight of the Polri is unsurprisingly low, especially in 
recent times. Commission III, for example, had planned to summon the 
Polri Chief to clarify a controversial report published by TEMPO magazine 
on several generals’ suspicious bank accounts on July 26 2010.39 The 
Polri Chief cancelled his attendance only a few hours before the hearing, 
which raised concerns among the parliamentarians.40 Legally, there is a 
formal tool for parliamentarians to forcefully summon (panggilan paksa) 
public officials.41 Yet, it has never been applied in practice since there 
is no clear legal mandate on which state apparatus may be asked to 
assist the DPR to perform such a tool.42 Another problem that creates 
frustration is the effectiveness of the delivery of material to hearings. 
Since there is no legal obligation for government officials to submit 
written answers or hearing materials to the Commission maximum two 
days before the schedule, hearings are mostly focused on government 
material presentations rather than on substantial debate.43
In terms of establishing working committees, Commission III is 
adequately responsive. For example, a land dispute between a palm oil 
plantation and residents in Mesuji, Lampung Province, erupted in 2011 
into a deadly riot that involved police officers.44 A few days after the 
incident, Commission III sent a fact-finding-mission team to Mesuji to 
gather more evidence as references to summon the Polri chief.45 In May 
2010, Commission III created the Law Enforcement Working Committee 
(Panja Penegakkan Hukum) in response to the controversial detention of 
the former Polri Chief of Criminal Investigation for alleged corruption.46 
The detention case triggered vast public suspicion, because he was 
detained after the existence of case mafia (mafia kasus) within the Polri, 
involving several high-ranking Polri officials, was publicly revealed. 
Many regarded the detainee as a whistle-blower in need of protection. 
The Working Committee was mandated to investigate the detention 
procedures and explore more information on the alleged case mafia 
within the Polri. Regardless of the fact that these working committees 
sent their reports with police recommendations to the President and 
Kapolri, there is no obligation for the Polri to follow up on their work. It 
appears that, unless the issues of police accountability provide strong 
electoral incentives from the public, there is no interest on behalf of the 
DPR or the President to oversee the direction of Polri policy. 
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Commission III and the budget function
Commission III has been supportive of the Polri’s budget requests by 
gradually increasing the allocation of its budget from 10.9 to 45.9 trillion 
IDR (Indonesian rupiah) from 2004 to 2013. However, the Commission’s 
budgetary oversight remains weak, especially with regard to the police’s 
non-tax revenue allocation (Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak). According 
to Government Decree No. 31/2004, the Polri may support up to 90 per 
cent of its operations with certain non-tax revenue from retributions, 
such as driver’s license registrations, car license registrations, driving 
courses, criminal record letters and arms ownership licenses. The 
amount of non-tax revenue is significant. In 2013, an NGO revealed 
that the Polri failed to report 97.8 billion IDR worth of the non-tax 
revenue allocation derived from parking retribution, security training, 
the police hospital and protection of vital objects to the Ministry of 
Finance.47 Based on the audit report by the National Audit Board (Badan 
Pemeriksa Keuangan), the money was used for various purposes such 
as police chief activities, incentives for police chief expert staff, and 
ceremonial activities not included in the annual budget programme.48 
The problem of non-tax revenue transparency culminated in 2012 after 
the KPK arrested the former Police Chief of Traffic Coordination. The 
active two-star Police General was arrested as the main suspect in the 
controversial driving simulator procurement graft case that amounted 
to losses of 10.4 million USD.49 An investigation on the case revealed 
that non-tax revenue was the funding source for the driving simulator 
project, and Commission III admitted that it rarely controls this type of 
budget use.50
Generally, the budget function of the DPR is still limited in enhancing 
police accountability. In terms of the official formulation of the state 
budget, DPR commissions are influential. Yet, in specific context of non-
tax budget funds, the Commission provides ineffective accountability. 
This problem results from loopholes in state financial regulations that 
fail to specify a mandate for the DPR to oversee allocations of non-
tax revenue. Despite this limitation, members of the DPR can still use 
reports from the National Audit Board to investigate budget allocation 
misconduct and leverage their position vis-à-vis the Polri. However, 
in practice, this alternative has never been performed, which could be 
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explained   by a recent revelation of the driving simulator procurement 
graft case that non-tax revenue was distributed to several members of 
Commission III.51
The DPR-Polri headquarter liaison mechanism.52
On a daily basis, the interaction between the DPR and Polri 
headquarters is significantly supported by the Polri Liaison Office (LO). 
Polri headquarters mandates the LO to maintain communications with 
Commission III. It currently consists of one high-ranking officer (Brigadier 
General) and two middle-ranking officers (Senior Superintendent and 
Superintendent of the police). They were assigned by and are responsible 
directly to the Polri Chief with a one-year term subject to extension. As 
an informal body, it is not included in the current formal structure of 
the Polri headquarters. The LO’s duties include coordinating visits of 
Commission III activities relating to police issues (e.g. visiting a police 
station, exchanging information, preparing a hearing and monitoring 
police issues in the DPR’s debate). Significantly, its informality allows 
members of Commission III to face less bureaucratic mechanisms in 
obtaining information and data related to Polri policies and its budget. 
Although the Polri LOs are crucial for the information exchange 
mechanism between the Polri and the DPR, their function remains 
limited as administrative support. 
The relationship between DPR with local 
assemblies, independent oversight institutions and 
civil society 
The DPR is the main legislative body responsible for police accountability 
and rarely involves local assemblies in oversight since security 
and law enforcement matters are legally mandated to the central 
government.53 In addition, the Polri is, more importantly, organised into 
a centralised structure according to Presidential Rule No. 52/2010 on 
the Organisational Structure and Working Mechanism of the Polri.  
Commission III has established a mutual relationship with independent 
oversight institutions, especially on information for public complaints 
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and corruption investigations. Since Komnas HAM, KPK and PPATK are 
counterparts of Commission III, it is relatively easy for the Commission to 
invite these independent oversight institutions to hearings. Commission 
III regularly requests updates on investigations of several human rights 
violation cases involving Polri personnel from the Komnas HAM.54 
Indeed, Komnas HAM has also regularly reported public complaints 
on police violence to the Commission.55 Meanwhile, Commission III 
regularly demands updates on the general progress of several cases that 
involve Polri personnel from the KPK. Commission III also maintains 
relations with PPATK/ Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan 
(Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center/INTRAC), 
though limited in scope.56 For example, as a reference for the “fit-and-
proper” test of the new Polri Chief candidate in 2013, the Commission 
held a preliminary hearing with PPATK to discuss the candidate’s 
financial transactions.57 While they are not government counterparts, 
Commission III also occasionally counts on Kompolnas and the National 
Ombudsman to provide information on police performance. 
Finally, current relations between Commission III and civil society 
communities have deteriorated on police oversight issues. The corrupt 
public image of parliamentarians hampers the mutual relationship 
between Commission III and the majority of civil society organisations.58 
Furthermore, after the protracted Polri-KPK conflict in 2009, Commission 
III has been increasingly regarded by the public as a Polri supporter.59
Conclusion
Overall, the post-authoritarian Indonesian DPR has become increasingly 
stronger in performing its legislative, oversight and budget functions due 
to several reasons. The foremost reason is the removal of parliamentary 
seats reserved for the military and police (fraksi TNI/Polri) in 2004 
through constitutional amendments. This transformed the Parliament 
into a fully civilian institution, with every seat won in an open and 
fair election process. Following this re-institutionalisation, the DPR is 
now legally equipped with substantial tools, such as hearings, working 
meetings, working committees and special committees, to perform its 
core functions. In addition, the DPR has also been supported by expert 
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staff at the commission, committee and individual levels. Outside of the 
DPR, the existence of several state-auxiliary institutions and a vibrant 
civil society has since complemented the DPR’s functions, especially on 
alternative sources of information. 
Although the DPR has been institutionally improved, there are several 
important considerations on its ability to provide effective oversight of 
the police. With regard to its legislative functions, the DPR’s mandate 
to pass laws is frequently undermined by its own decision-making style 
and the government’s “informal veto.” Thus, it takes more time for the 
DPR to pass laws or responsively tackle regulation loopholes. In its 
oversight function, the DPR has exercised its oversight tools. Yet, these 
tools have been exclusively effective in raising public awareness on 
Polri accountability, rather than in dictating direction and providing 
alternative policies for the Polri. In addition, the tendency of executive 
absenteeism also significantly contributes to a less effective and 
efficient oversight mechanism. Meanwhile, the state budget process has 
made the DPR’s commission as one of the core actors in budget approval. 
Nonetheless, its effectiveness in controlling expenditure remains weak, 
as illustrated by the case of non-tax revenue accountability in the 
Polri. With regard to parliamentary support units, the DPR still needs 
to improve its expert staff recruitment process in order to enhance the 
quality of parliamentary expertise support, especially for individual 
parliamentarians. Furthermore, the DPR must also provide stronger 
regulation on the functions of parliamentary staff to avoid misconduct. 
Meanwhile, the current liaison mechanism between the DPR and Polri 
still needs to be formalised and possibly improved on the strategic 
level by, for example, involving the expert staff of Commission III and 
Polri chief expert staff. The DPR has had only partial success with other 
independent oversight institutions since its current fragile relationship 
with civil society communities has significantly deteriorated public 
trust of the legislative body in dealing with police issues. 
In conclusion, the above analysis shows that the role of Parliament in 
increasing police accountability in Indonesia is still limited. Yet, there are 
lessons learned from the Indonesian DPR that can be used as references 
for other countries’ effort to improve their parliamentary oversight 
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of the police. Above all, the Indonesian experiences emphasizes that 
parliamentary functions must be regulated by clear legal mandates. In 
order to be effectively performed, these mandates should be supported 
by significant parliamentary instruments and supporting structures, 
such as parliamentary staff and the liaison mechanism. Developing 
networks and good relationships with other oversight institutions and 
civil society communities is vital to aid parliamentarians in performing 
their duties, especially to gather alternative sources of information on 
police performance. Finally, as a representative body, parliament needs 
to gain popular legitimacy. A parliament with a corrupt image and 
biased behaviour towards specific agencies decreases public trust and 
inhibits its oversight ability.
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The Philippines
4
The present Philippine National Police (PNP) emerged from the dark 
shadows of the Marcos dictatorship. It was indistinguishable from 
the military, as it was under the Philippine Constabulary (PC), one of 
the major commands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It 
was more feared than respected and perceived as militaristic, abusive, 
corrupt, and a violator of human rights. 
The adoption of the 1987 Constitution after the people’s power revolution 
paved the way for the passage of laws aimed at reforming the police. 
For many critical observers, the police continues to be a poor model of 
integrity, competence and discipline.  While far from ideal, the PNP is 
considerably better than its predecessor, as there are now varying police 
oversight roles for the branches of government, especially Congress.
This study1 aims to provide an understanding of congressional 
oversight power on the police, its extent and the mechanisms by which 
it is exercised. It focuses on the role of Congress within wider police 
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accountability and specifically examines the roles and workings of 
congressional committees, and its relations with other oversight bodies.
Section 1 presents the framework of accountability of the PNP. Section 
2 discusses the roles of Congress in exacting accountability from the 
police. Section 3 focuses on the congressional oversight function and 
examines congressional committees. Section 4 delves into the nature 
of the congress-police liaison mechanism. Finally, section 5 details the 
relationship between Congress and other independent oversight bodies 
such as the Commission on Audit (COA), the Office of the Ombudsman, 
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and local government units. 
This paper concludes with a discussion of practices, procedures, and 
institutional frameworks that contribute to the strengthening of police 
accountability by Congress. The key conclusion is that the legal mandate 
for police oversight and the laws aimed at professionalizing the police 
are in place. However, challenges continue to tarnish the image of 
the PNP, including corruption, abuse of power and unprofessionalism. 
Nevertheless, the situation would have been worse without the 
important reforms undertaken.
Police accountability framework
The Philippines is a democratic and republican state, with a presidential 
system of government. There are three co-equal branches of government: 
the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. Executive power 
is vested in the president2, who exercises control over all executive 
departments, bureaus, and offices tasked to implement laws. Legislative 
power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives.3 Judicial power is vested in 
one Supreme Court and in lower courts established by law.4 There is a 
system of checks and balances among the various branches, which is 
reinforced by independent constitutional bodies. 
The role of the executive
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), an attached agency to 
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),5 is mandated 
to provide “administrative control and operational supervision”6 over 
the PNP. NAPOLCOM is composed of the secretary of the DILG as ex-
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officio chairperson,7 four regular commissioners and the chief of the 
PNP as ex-officio member, all of whom are appointed by the President 
of the Philippines.
NAPOLCOM is empowered by law to provide and prescribe policies, rules, 
regulations, guidelines and standards for the efficient organisation, 
administration and operation of the PNP. It is also monitors and 
investigates police anomalies and practices.8 The Disciplinary Appellate 
Boards, which are organized at national and regional levels, serve as 
the formal administrative disciplinary mechanism within the PNP. The 
National Board has jurisdiction to decide appeals from decisions of the 
PNP chief, imposing penalties of demotion or dismissal from the service. 
The Regional Appellate Boards have jurisdiction to decide on appeals 
from decisions of the mayors and the People’s Law Enforcement Boards 
(PLEB).9
Disciplinary powers over minor offenses are lodged with duly designated 
supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP.10 The Internal Affairs 
Service also has disciplinary powers over PNP personnel and units and 
is mandated to “investigate complaints and gather evidence in support 
of an open investigation”11 and ”conduct summary proceedings on PNP 
members facing administrative charges.”12
The local chief executives of municipalities and cities also have 
“operational supervision and control”13 over the police. They have the 
power to deploy, appoint eligible candidates and discipline erring 
police14 within their jurisdiction. The law automatically deputises them 
as representatives of NAPOLCOM.15
PLEB serves as an independent central receiving entity of citizens’ 
complaints against the police. It is duly organised in all cities and 
municipalities16, and participatory in its membership.17 Subject to the 
provisions of Section 4118 of RA 6975, PLEB shall be cognisant of or 
refer the complaint to the proper disciplinary or adjudicatory authority 
within three days upon the filing of the complaint.19
The role of the judiciary and other independent bodies 
The Office of the Ombudsman20 is tasked with prosecuting graft and 
corruption cases committed by civil servants, including the police, 
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before the Special Appellate Court (Sandiganbayan)21 or any court of law. 
To ensure speedy disposition of administrative cases against police 
officers and avoid overlapping jurisdictions, the NAPOLCOM, the PNP 
and the Ombudsman executed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
outlining their specific jurisdictions. The September 25, 2012 tri-partite 
MOA manifests the high level of cooperation among the three agencies 
in effectively holding erring police accountable.
The Commission on Audit (COA) is mandated to check that all government 
revenues and expenditures are duly accounted for and public funds are 
used in accordance with appropriations.22 It is empowered to disapprove 
expenditures of public funds on post-audit. Auditors are assigned to all 
government departments and subdivisions, including the PNP.  
The role of Congress
The Philippine Congress exercises power over the police through 
enactment of laws governing the police in particular, and civil servants 
in general. It scrutinizes and approves the annual budget23 of the 
NAPOLCOM and the PNP. Congress confirms appointments of top police 
officials through the Commission of Appointments (CA). Congress 
likewise receives COA’s annual audit report on the PNP and NAPOLCOM’s 
annual report on the state of the police, with proposals for remedial 
legislation. Congress also has the power to conduct inquiries in aid of 
legislation, with full subpoena and contempt powers. 
Functions of Congress 
Legislative power is vested in the bicameral Congress - the Senate and 
the House of Representatives - except for the power reserved to the 
people by the Constitution for initiative and referendum. The Senate 
is composed of 24 members elected nationally, while the House 
of Representatives is composed of 28924 members elected through 
congressional districts (81 per cent) and the party list system (19 
per cent). Congress has the power to pass laws, subject to the veto 
power of the president; confirm top level appointments through the 
powerful joint Commission on Appointments25; conduct inquiries in 
aid of legislation26; declare the existence of war27 and grant powers 
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to the president in times of war or other national emergency28; pass 
appropriations bill29; and the exclusive power to impeach the president, 
members of constitutional commissions, and the justices of the Supreme 
Court.30 Given its vast powers as a “representative of the people”, it 
oversees the police through legislative, oversight and budget control 
functions.
Legislative function 
The Constitution provides for a police force, national in scope and civilian 
in character,31 and that Congress shall promulgate a comprehensive 
policy governing the police. On December 13, 1990, President Corazon 
Aquino signed into law Republic Act (RA) 6975, establishing the PNP 
under the reorganized DILG. It was later amended with RA 8551 on 
February 25, 1998 and RA 9708 on August 12, 2009. These laws serve 
as the foundations of police governance in the Philippines. Congress 
has likewise passed general laws prescribing rules of conduct for 
civil servants, which also affect the police. These laws are listed and 
explained below: 
RA 6975, or the “Department of Interior and Local Government Act 
of 1990,” provides the general policy on the nature of the police, 
its governance structure, professionalism, welfare and benefits, 
administrative disciplinary machinery and participation of local 
executives. It is a landmark legislation that defines the new civilian 
character and national administration of the police after the fall of the 
Marcos dictatorship. 
The law created the PNP by bringing together police forces formerly 
with the Integrated National Police, officers and enlisted personnel of 
the former Philippine Constabulary, technical personnel of the armed 
forces assigned in the PC, and the civilian operatives of the Criminal 
Investigation Service. The police, formerly under the AFP, is now 
consolidated in one national police command under NAPOLCOM. 
NAPOLCOM exercises administrative control over and operational 
supervision32 of the police. It is mandated to develop policies for the 
efficient organisation, administration and operation of the police; 
develop performance standards; evaluate the efficacy and efficiency 
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of the police; investigate police anomalies; and serve as an appellate 
tribunal for administrative cases against police officers.  It prescribes 
the minimum standards for arms, equipment and uniforms, including 
insignia of ranks, awards and medals of honour, which is “clearly distinct 
from the military and reflective of the civilian character of the police.” It 
assesses compliance of the PNP with manpower allocation, distribution 
and deployment, and monitors the performance of the local chief 
executives as deputies of the commission. Most importantly, NAPOLCOM 
advises the president on all matters involving police functions and 
administrations.
The law also created PLEB, a quasi-judicial body for administrative 
cases filed by citizens against police personnel. A decision of PLEB 
is final and executory, except when the penalty imposed is demotion 
or dismissal from the service. These decisions are appealable to the 
Regional Appellate Board; failure of the RAB to act on the appeal within 
60 days of receipt of the appeal notice renders PLEB’s decision final and 
executory. However, this is, without prejudice, to the filing of an appeal 
by either party to the DILG Secretary.
With the constitutional policy on local autonomy,33 the law granted 
local government executives (provincial governors, city and municipal 
mayors) the power of “operational supervision and control”34 over the 
police, including the power to direct the employment35 and deployment36 
of units or elements of the PNP, and discipline the police.37 Local 
government executives also have the power to choose the head of 
police in their jurisdiction from a list prepared by the PNP. They are 
likewise representatives of NAPOLCOM in their respective territorial 
jurisdictions, with authority to inspect police forces and units, conduct 
audits, and exercise other functions as authorized by NAPOLCOM.38
RA 8551, or the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization 
Act of 1998” amended important provisions of RA 6975, such as those 
defining the relationship of the DILG and the Department of National 
Defence (DND) on the suppression of insurgency; matters relating to 
the structure, powers, and organization of NAPOLCOM; reorganisation 
of the PNP and general qualifications for appointment and promotions 
in the PNP; upgrading of salaries and benefits; creation of the Internal 
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Affairs Service; disciplinary mechanisms; creation of women’s desks in 
all police stations and the formulation of a gender sensitive program; 
and the enhancement of the participation of the local government 
executives in the administration of the PNP. The amended law also 
strengthened PLEB.  
RA 8551 mandates NAPOLCOM to reorganise the PNP based on clearly 
defined criteria;39 Congress will approve this reorganisation in a joint 
resolution. The law also delegates the powers to develop policies and 
promulgate a police manual that prescribes the rules and regulations 
for the efficient organisation, administration and operation of the 
PNP to NAPOLCOM. This includes rules of engagement relating to riot 
control and crowd management and standards for arms and equipment 
of the police.40
Finally, RA 9708 amends provisions of RA 6975 and RA 8551 by 
expanding the five-year compliance period for the minimum educational 
qualifications for appointment to the PNP (a baccalaureate degree) and 
adjusting the promotion system. It further states that a criminal action 
or complaint against a police officer shall not hinder promotion unless 
it involves human rights violations and crimes punishable by reclusion 
perpetua or life imprisonment. It also provides for the continuing 
education of police officers in coordination with the Civil Service 
Commission, Commission on Human Rights, and Commission on Higher 
Education (CHED).
Congress also enacted other laws which contributes in the 
professionalization of the police: RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring 
Forfeiture in Favour of the State Any Property Found To Have Been 
Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing 
the Proceedings Thereof); RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices 
Act); RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials 
and Employees); RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of 
Plunder); RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act); and RA 9485 
(Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007).
The Senate has the exclusive power to ratify international treaties and 
instruments. It has ratified numerous international human rights and 
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international humanitarian law instruments, which have an impact on 
the rules of engagement of the police. Recently, the Senate ratified 
extradition treaties with the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (UK), 
Spain and India to help the government’s war against transnational 
crimes. Existing extradition treaties are in place with Australia, Canada, 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Micronesia, Switzerland, Thailand, 
and the United States. 
Oversight function
Congress possesses significant investigative powers to conduct inquiries 
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published Rules of 
Procedure.41 The rules in both chambers42 provide detailed procedures 
for the professional conduct of congressional inquiries.  Congress is 
granted subpoena powers for witnesses and documents, and contempt 
powers against those who disobey their orders. Except on matters of 
national security or for public interests, congressional inquiries are 
open to the public.
Concomitant with the power of congress to conduct inquiries in aid 
of legislation is the granting of parliamentary immunity43 to protect 
members of congress from possible prosecution for words spoken during 
debates, committee hearings and privilege speeches. Parliamentary 
immunity enables members of congress, in the exercise of their privilege 
of speech and debate, to speak freely on and evaluate the issues at 
hand. This may lead to inquiries in aid of legislation; laws, both novel 
and remedial, may then be enacted to provide for necessary reforms. 
The Constitution likewise grants congress the power to confirm top-
level appointments of the president through the bicameral Commission 
on Appointments.44 Congress confirms the Secretary of the DILG, who 
also serves as the ex-officio chairperson of NAPOLCOM. The appointment 
of the director general and deputy director generals of the PNP by the 
president is taken upon the recommendation of NAPOLCOM.
Budget control function
Congress exercises the “power of the purse.” Every year during the 
month of September, government departments venture to congress to 
present their plans and programs, and defend their budget, as endorsed 
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by the president. The budget deliberations take place in the Committee 
on Appropriations in the House of Representatives, followed by the 
Committee on Finance in the Senate. Aside from annually appraising the 
performance of the police, congress meticulously reviews its plans and 
programs, scrutinises its budget and checks its financial performance 
through the submitted COA audit report. While congress cannot increase 
the agency’s proposed budget, it can decrease it. This serves as leverage 
over the police. 
Parliamentary committees 
House and Senate committees perform congressional oversight. Their 
powers range from legislation, inquiries in aid of legislation, budget 
allocation, to appointments. The number of congressional committees 
demonstrates that oversight is expansive. The House of Representatives 
has 58 standing committees and 11 special committees, while the 
Senate has 39 standing committees and thirty 31 ad hoc and oversight 
committees. Each chamber has its own house rules and rules of 
procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation.
House of Representatives
House committees study, deliberate and act on all measures referred 
to them, including bills, resolutions and petitions.45 Committees also 
have oversight responsibilities to determine if laws and programmes 
are implemented in accordance with the legislature’s intent and if they 
should be continued, curtailed or eliminated.46
In the exercise of their oversight functions, committees review and study 
on a continuing basis: a) the application, administration, execution, and 
effectiveness of laws and programs; b) the organisation and operation 
of national agencies and entities responsible for the administration and 
execution of laws and programmes; and, c) conditions or circumstances 
that may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or 
additional legislation. Committees are mandated to “pursue dialogues 
and consultation with affected sectors and constituencies, conduct 
researches, and engage the services and assistance of experts and 
professionals.”47
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Committees have subpoena and contempt powers. They can access 
classified information, provided confidentiality is maintained in the name 
of state security. Generally, committee deliberations are public, except 
when, upon evaluation of the committee, state security matters are to 
be discussed; in this case, an executive session may be held. Members of 
the public and the media can observe committee proceedings, subject 
only to the limitation of space. However, only those persons officially 
invited as resource persons can speak before the committee. 
Membership in the committees is composed of the majority and the 
minority. Membership is affirmed during the plenary session, upon 
motion of the majority and minority leaders, and not subject to the 
division of the House. Committee leadership - the chair and vice chair - 
always comes from the majority party and is often the subject of intense 
lobbying to the speaker of the House. 
There are many committees that directly or indirectly oversee the police. 
The Committee on Public Order and Safety primarily exercises police 
oversight in the House of Representatives. With respect to the police, 
it has jurisdiction on all matters directly and principally relating to the 
suppression of criminality,48 civil defence, private security agencies, 
and the PNP.49 The Committee has an authorised membership of 55 
legislators. As of April 2014, it has only 49 members, of which eight per 
cent are from the minority, seven or 14 per cent are women (including 
one of the five vice chairs). The background of members – 37 per cent 
are former local chief executives (municipal/city mayors or provincial 
governors); three are retired generals of the PNP; and one is from the 
military – is interesting to note. It gives a glimpse into the capacity of 
the committee members to oversee the police. 
The committee has four permanent career staff, headed by the committee 
secretary. The staff provides legislative research and technical support 
and serves as the institutional memory. The committee itself has 
no consultants, but the committee chair is allowed to have three 
consultants. Other committee members can also hire consultants, which 
is chargeable to the budget of their respective offices. The committee 
has no specific budget. The entire legislative secretariat (of all the 
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congressional committees) has a centralised budget that committees 
may access/request to fund meetings (food), public hearings (food 
and transportation) and other operating expenses (supplies, etc.). For 
out of town hearings or ocular inspections, the Committee on Rules, 
upon recommendation of the committee chair, makes the necessary 
determination on the number of committee and secretariat members 
who can participate.
Relevant laws relating to the police were passed through the Committee 
on Public Order and Safety. In the 16th Congress (2013-2016), a total of 
74 bills, including seven joint referrals, 20 resolutions and four privilege 
speeches, are pending before the committee. A review of the pending 
bills pending reveals the dominance of PNP-related proposals on the 
amendment of its existing charter50 and increase in benefits51. Security 
related proposals52 are also abound. These proposals are reflective of 
the needs of the time, such as the call for more CCTVs in the spate 
of recent crimes against property and persons. Since the start of the 
16th Congress, the committee has conducted a total of seven meetings, 
including one public hearing, or an average of two meetings per month.
There are other House committees with jurisdiction over the 
police. The Committee on Human Rights53, which is composed of 35 
members, generally accounts the police on its adherence to human 
rights instruments. The Committee on Good Governance and Public 
Accountability54 has jurisdiction on matters pertaining to malfeasance 
(wilful and intentional action that injures a party), misfeasance (wilful 
inappropriate action or intentional incorrect action) and nonfeasance 
(failure to act where action is required) committed by officers and 
employees of the government, including the police, in office. 
The powerful Committee on Appropriations deliberates on the annual 
budget of the government, including the PNP. It has 125 members and 
jurisdictions over “all maters directly and principally relating to the 
expenditures of the national government […] and the determination 
of salaries, allowances and benefits of government personnel.”55 Under 
this committee is a sub-committee that hears and deliberates on the 
police budget and defends it in the plenary.
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Senate
In the Senate, the Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs 
is primarily responsible for police oversight. It is mandated to act on, 
among other things, all matters relating to peace and order and the 
PNP.56 It has nine members: three women (including the committee 
chair), two with a police/military background and one former local chief 
executive. The two with a police/military background are the former 
Defence Secretary of Mr. Marcos, who is also considered as one of the 
main architects of martial law, and a former military colonel and a 
graduate of the Philippine Military Academy. Both of them defected from 
Mr. Marcos during the 1986 People’s Power Revolution. The former army 
colonel is infamously remembered for his numerous failed coup d’états 
against President Corazon Aquino. The former local chief executive is 
the son of Mr. Marcos.57
Similar to the HOR, committee membership is composed of the majority 
and the minority. Committee leadership is affirmed through a motion 
by the majority and minority leaders before the plenary. The committee 
secretariat is headed by a committee secretary with five staff from the 
Committee Services of the Senate. This does not include the support 
staff from the Office of the Committee Chair. The committee, as well 
as its individual members, is entitled to consultants. Unlike the HOR, 
where the budget is centralised, the committee budget is included in 
the office budget of the committee chair. Upon inquiry, the amount of 
the budget is claimed to be confidential. In the past, however, a senator 
publicly revealed that the budget of Senate committees was P1 million 
per month. Since the start of the 16th Congress, the committee has 
conducted only three hearings, though various briefing meetings were 
held. The limited number of meetings is understandable in light of the 
pre-occupation of the Senate with the inquiry on the pork barrel scam, 
which involved some of its members. Just like its counterpart, Senate 
committees have full subpoena and contempt powers.
As of writing, there are 72 legislative measures pending before the 
committee; most are drug and PNP-related measures (i.e. reorganisation, 
modernisation, magna carta, pay, health, and insurance benefits). There 
are also legislative proposals relating to the private security industry, 
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regulation of firecrackers/fireworks, jail integration, fire arm regulations, 
fire protection and modernization, and jail management. 
Other Senate committees also have jurisdiction over police matters. 
The Committee on Finance,58 with its 17 members, is the counterpart 
of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
The Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,59 
often referred to as the Blue Ribbon Committee, is the equivalent of 
the Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability of the 
House. It deals with concerns relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and 
nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government. 
Finally, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, with its nine 
members, deals with matters relating to the administration of justice; 
the implementation of human rights provisions of the Constitution; and 
all matters pertaining to the efficiency and reforms in the prosecution 
service.60 It has a broader mandate than its counterpart in the House of 
Representatives. 
Parliament-police liaison mechanism 
Regular interaction among congress, the executive department, the 
PNP and stakeholders is necessary to effectively carry out legislation, 
congressional oversight, and needed reforms.
With respect to the police budget, liaising occurs both at the top and 
secretariat levels. The DILG leadership appears before congress during 
budget deliberations. At the same time, the committee secretariat 
coordinates directly with the PNP liaison for staff work and necessary 
information on the proposed budget. For legislative proposals, 
committees in charge request opinions and conduct dialogues/
consultations with PNP and other stakeholders. For inquiries in aid of 
legislation, the committee secretariat liaises directly with the PNP or 
concerned officials. With the frequency of interaction between congress 
and the police institutions, NAPOLCOM and the PNP designated a 
regular liaison to congress from its ranks. This ensures cooperation and 
effective coordination.
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For executive-legislative concerns, the Presidential Legislative Liaison 
Office (PLLO) under the Office of the President orchestrates the 
formulation of the executive-legislative agenda, through information 
dissemination and sustained day-to-day collaboration with congress. 
The Office of the Presidential Adviser for Political Affairs (OPA) also 
deals with the relationship among the legislators, the executive and 
the PNP.
Relationship with other overseers
Both houses of congress have varying levels of relationships with other 
police oversight bodies. Congress, in the exercise of its “power of the 
purse,” has all the opportunity to interact with not only the NAPOLCOM, 
PNP, and DILG but also other oversight bodies such as the CHR, COA, and 
the Office of the Ombudsman.
NAPOLCOM is mandated by law to submit to congress an annual 
report of its activities and accomplishments, an appraisal of the 
police organization and recommendations for remedial legislation.61 
NAPOLCOM and/or the PNP are also regularly invited to appear before 
congress on matters relating to public order and security for purposes 
of legislation or congressional inquiries. 
There is little direct interaction between congress and local 
representative assemblies on police accountability. In matters relating 
to security and peace and order, however, representatives of national 
leagues of local government units and officials are always invited 
before congress. The local chief executives chair the local peace and 
order councils in their respective jurisdictions. The councils, organised 
from the national to municipal levels, are mandated to create a venue 
for dialogues and convergence of activities to enhance peace, order and 
public safety in their respective areas of responsibility.62
The Commission on Audit is constitutionally mandated to submit 
to the president and congress an annual financial report, including 
recommendatory measures necessary to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of government spending.63 It seeks to prevent “irregular, 
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or 
uses of government funds and properties.”64 Its annual report is utilised 
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by congress during budget deliberations. When congress investigates 
financial anomalies in the police, it regularly calls on it to testify. 
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) has the power to “recommend 
to congress effective measures to promote human rights.”65 It is a regular 
fixture in congress as a resource institution for legislative proposals 
relating to human rights, and investigations of human rights violations 
committed by the police.  
The Office of the Ombudsman, is an independent constitutional body, 
which receives complaints and prosecutes graft and corruption cases 
against government officials. The Deputy Ombudsman for Military and 
Police is the unit that handles complaints against the military and police. 
Except for budget deliberations, it is seldom summoned to appear before 
congress. This is to ensure its independence in prosecuting corrupt 
officials, which may include members of congress and the police. 
Civil society organisations actively participate in the congressional 
oversight process by bringing issues to members of congress as 
complainants, providing technical support to the legislators and/or 
appearing as resource persons during committee hearings. The media, 
on the other hand, reports police anomalies and engages legislators 
on their comments, thereby making the issue a potential subject of 
congressional inquiry. 
Conclusions and recommendations
Years after the Philippines re-built democracy from the rubbles of the 
Marcos dictatorship, a new constitution was promulgated by the people 
for reforms and the democratisation of institutions. The legal mandate 
for police oversight, as well as the laws aimed at professionalising the 
police, is in place. However, challenges still abound. Corruption, abuse 
of power and unprofessionalism continue to tarnish the image of the 
PNP. Nevertheless, the situation would have been worse without the 
important reforms undertaken.
Based on the case study, the following institutional arrangements, 
procedures and practices help improve effectiveness, independence and 
transparency of police accountability to congress:
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1. The clear constitutional distinction between the military and 
police and the national scope of the police help define the nature 
of parliamentary oversight of the police. The civilianisation of the 
police under one national command contributes to clarifying its 
mandates, nature and rules of engagement. 
2. The existence of specific congressional committees that deal with 
the police improves oversight. The proportional representation of 
the majority and minorities in the committees and the participation 
of women ensure transparency and gender sensitivity in oversight 
work. 
3. The shared jurisdiction of other congressional committees 
(appropriations/finance, human rights, accountability of public 
officers, etc.) ensures that the police is held accountable and much 
needed reforms are passed.
4. The presence of qualified, permanent committee staff and 
consultants, who provide congressional committees with technical 
support, and institutional memory, and the availability of committee 
budgets contribute to the overall effectiveness of the committees. 
5. The powers of congressional committees to issue subpoenas and 
cite in contempt those who disobey their orders make oversight 
work effective.
6. Parliamentary immunity enables members of congress to speak 
freely without fear of prosecution and thresh out issues during 
deliberations and inquiries in aid of legislation.
7. The existence of a regular police liaison to congress, as well as 
cabinet-level offices (PLLO and OPA) increases cooperation and 
effective coordination among congress, the executive and the police.
8. The power to confirm appointments of key officials enables congress 
to screen only the most qualified leaders for the police institution, 
thereby ensuring professionalism in the police force.
9. The “power of the purse” enables congress to check the performance 
of the police from time to time, and redirect its plans and programs, 
under budget cuts.
10. Accountability of the police increases with the presence of other 
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oversight bodies such as the Commission on Audit, Office of the 
Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human Rights. The reports/
inputs of these institutions enhance oversight ability of congress. 
11. The existence of a comprehensive policy governing the police 
provides a road map for congressional oversight. Such a policy 
includes provisions for an independent complaint body (PLEB) and 
an internal police mechanism (Internal Affairs Office) that deal with 
police infraction and ensure professionalism of the police force. The 
disciplinary power of NAPOLCOM tempers the police from excesses 
and arrogance as “men in uniform.” 
12. The participation of local government units in the governance of the 
police has positive contributions, especially since the responsibility 
for peace and order in local communities lies with them.  
13. The presence of an open and free media that reports abuses, human 
rights violation and other unwarranted police acts helps congress 
take appropriate actions.
The constitutional provision on the nature of the police, the power 
of Congress to pass laws and oversee the police and the existence of 
other oversight bodies are oversight mechanisms in place and continue 
to contribute to reforming the police. However, there are many forces 
inside and outside the police that hinder the envisioned reforms (i.e. 
patronage politics, military culture, low pay, and a slow justice system). 
This calls for reforms in the police force in the overall context of 
security sector reform. Only an overarching security sector reform policy 
can make the reforms of the police coherent and reinforcing.
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Thailand
5
In Thailand, the Royal Thai Police (RTP) has duties and powers as 
prescribed in the Royal Thai Police Act of 2004.1 The RTP functions at the 
forefront of the criminal justice system, which provides the foundation 
for justice and protects people’s liberties under the principles of good 
governance. The 1997 Constitution stipulates numerous provisions 
and the principle of good governance relating to police conduct in the 
criminal process. Furthermore, Articles 26 to 69 of the 2007 Constitution 
(in force until May 22, 2014) set out a range of specific constitutional 
rights of the peoples.
The RTP has an internal affairs audit agency (called in Thai JA-RAY 
Police, RTP) and adopted a code of ethics and codes of police conducts 
for the purpose of controlling the behaviour of police officers. In 
accordance with the 2007 Constitution, violation of the codes is deemed 
as a violation of disciplinary measures. Particularly, the judicial police 
ethics and license system strictly controls police officers functioning 
as “judicial police” or “criminal investigators.” In case of violation, the 
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police officer’s license is suspended, and disciplinary action is ensued. 
In addition, the 2007 Constitution establishes several constitutional 
agencies to control police performance. This chapter, however, aims 
to merely examine parliamentary oversight of the police, parliament-
police liaison mechanisms, and the role of parliament within the 
broader framework of police accountability. 
Police accountability framework
This section describes police accountability as described by law in 
Thailand. The duties and powers of the RTP are prescribed in Section 
6 of the Royal Thai Police Act of 2004.2 Police officers are burdened 
with duties and powers in relation to many criminal laws,3 such as the 
Commodities Control Act,4 the Motor Vehicle Act,5 and the Probation 
Act.6 The core mission of the police is law enforcement.
Section 237 of the 1997 Constitution stipulates that an arrest shall be 
made only with an arrest warrant or a court order. Thus, the Amended 
Criminal Procedure Code of 20047 was enacted to implement the 1997 
Constitution. The most recent amendment to the Criminal Procedure 
Code of 20078 specifically stipulates the police’s duties in law 
enforcement, covering search, arrest, detention, control and temporary 
release. According to the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions, several detailed 
provisions guarantee the constitutional rights of the people and demand 
that the government amends the Criminal Procedure Code under the 
principles of due process of law and good governance. As a result, many 
provisions have been enacted to prevent abuse of the police’s stop and 
search powers. In case there is any impediment in the process of search, 
arrest, detention, control or temporary release, the Chief Justice may 
issue guidelines for the RTP.9
For the internal control of police performance, the RTP addresses the 
police disciplinary offenses in line with Article 279 of 2007 Constitution, 
which demands that all official agencies must adopt the code of 
ethics and any violation of the code is subject to disciplinary action. 
Furthermore, the law normally classifies any violation of behaviour as 
a minor disciplinary offence under Section 78 and serious disciplinary 
offences under Section 79 of the Royal Thai Police Act.  
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Before 2004, the personnel management of the RTP was administered 
by the Minister of Interior and regulated by the Police Regulation Act of 
1978. Since 2004, the RTP has had a legal mechanism as the basis for 
appointing and transferring officers, according to the Royal Thai Police 
Act. The Royal Thai Police Policy Making Board (National Police Policy 
Commission hereafter) and the Board of Police Personnel (Royal Thai 
Police Commission hereafter) govern the RTP. The Prime Minister is the 
Chairman of these two Commissions. The former decides on policies 
of the RTP and has the power to endorse appointees for the position 
of Police Commissioner General, nominated by the Prime Minister. 
The latter Commission has the power to endorse appointees from the 
ranks of Inspector up to the ranks of Inspector-General and Deputy 
Commissioner-General, endorsed by the Commissioner-General.10
For external control of police performance, the House of Representatives 
and the Senate have committees with the power to examine police 
performance. Specifically, the Committee on Police in the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Justice System and Police in 
the Senate have the mandate to consider and inquire about any matter 
relating to the police.
Moreover, the RTP has to coordinate with several other agencies related 
to the justice process, such as courts, the Office of the Attorney General 
and the Corrections Department. Some of these actors exercise power 
that controls police performance. For example, the public attorney can 
deny a case from the police when the suspect has been released on bail 
and even if the court has already issued an arrest warrant. In addition, 
the Royal Thai Police Act prescribes that the RTP has the duty to maintain 
public order, while respecting the right of assembly or demonstration. 
The right to public gatherings and demonstrations is protected under 
Article 63 of the 2007 Constitution. In the context of law enforcement, 
court decisions and independent agencies limit the power of the police 
to control demonstrations.
Functions of parliament 
The 2007 Constitution prescribes the powers and duties of the House 
of Representatives and Senate, such as legislation, the approval of 
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the annual budget, and the sanction and scrutiny of the government 
administration. Particularly, the latter power involves raising an ordinary 
or verbal interpellation, initiating a general debate for the purpose of 
passing a vote of no-confidence related to the Prime Minister or an 
individual minister, setting up a commission, and considering an annual 
appropriations bill.11 The RTP, which is an agency under the Prime 
Minister, may be required to provide information for the Prime Minister 
to answer an ordinary, verbal or urgent interpellation, consultation or 
general debate from members of parliament required to explain some 
specific information to a commission.
There are two significant committees concerning police performance. 
First, the Committee on Police in the House of Representatives reviews 
any act, and inquires about or studies any matter relating to police 
affairs, compliance with laws, and protection of domestic peace and 
order. Second, the Committee on Justice System and Police in the Senate 
considers draft bills, reviews any act, and inquires about or studies 
matters relating to the justice administration, justice system, police 
affairs, prosecutor and corrections, compliance with laws, protection of 
domestic peace and order and other relevant matters.  
Importantly, these committees play important roles under Section 5 of 
the Request Order of the Committees of the House of Representatives 
and Senate Act of 2011.12 They have the power to issue subpoenas of 
any document from a person or summon a person to give a statement 
of facts or opinions on the matter under its duties, investigation or 
study. If the summoned person is an officer, official or employee of a 
government or state agency, a state enterprise or a local administrative 
organization, the chairperson of the committee shall request the minister 
controlling or supervising that particular agency to enforce compliance 
with the summons. In case of compliance failure, the particular person 
is considered as guilty under the first paragraph of Section 13. The 
offender shall also be subject to disciplinary proceedings, in accordance 
with the second paragraph of Section 13. Thus, this Act is considered as 
a significant law supporting the operation of the committee in relation 
to fact-finding and controlling the operation of the executive.  
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However, committees only have the power to issue a report with non-
binding recommendations to the minister. They must report to the Prime 
Minister, who controls and commands the RTP and might or might not 
follow up on recommendations. For example, a committee might accept 
a complaint about illegal or unfair appointments of police personnel, 
police corruption or other administrative actions in the internal affairs 
of the police. When the parliamentary committee completes the 
investigation, the report is submitted to the minister in charge of the 
RTP or the minister concerned must answer questions in Parliament, 
which are revealed to the public. Alternatively, the committees might 
submit the report and its legally non-binding recommendations to 
the RTP. As a result, the RTP and the Prime Minister may ignore all 
suggestions.
The budget of the RTP might be considered by a special Budget 
Committee, which is appointed after the annual plan and budget 
have been considered and is accepted by the Ministry of Finance and 
approved by the Cabinet. The annual Budget Bill is submitted to both 
Houses, which each form a committee to consider the funding for all 
bureaucratic offices, including the RTP. For the RTP, the Prime Minister 
or the respective minister is responsible for defending the police budget 
if committees disagree with the Bill. However, the amount of police 
funding is not so much negotiated during this process, with discussions 
instead focused on if the budget should be decreased or increased. As 
per usual, the majority of members of Parliament will vote in favour 
of the proposed budget, In fact, the police budget will be increased 
or decreased during the deliberation process between the Ministry 
of Finance and Police Commissioners. Public resources are mostly 
limited, and the RTP never receives a sufficient budget to implement its 
mission. Exceptionally, if expenditures are altered during a committee 
consideration, they are subject to compensating changes in the funding 
of other public agencies.  
Parliament Coordination Group of the Royal Thai Police 
According to the Request Order of the Committee of the House of 
Representatives and Senate Act of 2011,13 if anyone receives the request 
of committee, the person is compelled to deliver the document or give 
86 The Role of Parliament in Police Governance: Lessons Learned from Asia and Europe
a statement of facts or opinions. In case anyone fails to comply with 
the order of the committee, the person shall be subject to a criminal 
punishment and disciplinary measure, as prescribed in Section 13 of the 
Request Order Act (2011). 
In order to handle these matters, the RTP has established the Parliament 
Coordination Group, which is a sub-division reporting to the Legal 
Affairs Division at the Office of Legal Affairs and Litigation (RTP). It 
is responsible for coordinating operations between the RTP and its 
own police branches and parliament in order to answer interpellations, 
consultations, motions and affairs of commissions concerning RTP-
matters, and coordinate information from various agencies of the RTP for 
the Prime Minister or the minister in charge to be used as information 
to answer or explain in Parliament.   
For example, in case a summoned person is an officer, official or 
employee of a government agency, a state agency, state enterprise, or 
local administrative organisation, the chairperson of the commission 
must notify the minister who controls or supervises the agency to which 
the person is attached to order that person to comply with the written 
request. If the person who receives the written request of the committee 
fails to deliver the document or appear to give a statement of facts or 
opinions, the committee shall issue an “order requiring the document 
from the person or requiring the person to appear in person and give a 
statement of facts or opinion to the committee.” In that case, this person 
shall be subject to criminal punishment and disciplinary measure, as 
prescribed in Section 13 of the Request Order Act.
For the delivery method of the summons, a written invitation and a request 
order of a committee shall be served to a person via reply-registered 
mail, a courier, facsimile, and any other method as the committee finds 
appropriate on a case-by-case basis. When the committee issues a 
written request to a police officer to deliver a document or invites a 
police officer to give a statement of facts or opinions,14 the committee 
shall submit three letters with its invitation.15 The first letter would be 
addressing the Prime Minister (as the minister who controls the RTP) 
for acknowledging and ordering the police officer, who is requested by 
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the committee, to deliver the document or give a statement of facts or 
opinions.  
The second letter would be addressing the Police Commissioner-
General for acknowledging and ordering the police officer to comply 
with the written request of the committee. This process would involve 
the Parliament Coordination Group. Once the commanding officer 
issues an order, the Parliament Coordination Group forwards the written 
order to the agency, to which the police officer is attached (such as 
the Metropolitan Police Bureau, Provincial Police Region 1-9, Central 
Investigation Bureau, etc.), to subsequently notify the police officer. 
The third letter would be directly addressing the police officer under 
the resolution for being preparation in advance of the hearing. 
The commission initiates cases involving human rights violations16 
when it deems that it is appropriate to examine any case with a human 
rights violation, has received a petition about a human rights violation17 
or has received a petition from a private organisation in the field of 
human rights.18 If the commission is of the opinion that the case falls 
within its powers and duties, it shall notify the person or agency alleged 
to be a human rights violator, or a person or agency it considers being 
involved in a human rights violation, to respond to a statements of facts 
within a specified period.19
In case the committee deems the matter is not within its powers and 
duties, it may refer the matter to a person or agency involved with the issue 
concerned.20 This person or agency shall, upon receiving the examination 
report, implement the remedial measures for solving the problem within 
the period specified and notify the results of the implementation to the 
committee.21 When this period is lapsed and the person or agency has 
not implemented the remedial measures, the committee shall report 
to the prime minister to order their implementation (except in the 
case that is not within the power of the prime minister.22 If there is no 
proceeding or order for the implementation, the committee shall report 
to the parliament and inform the public of the matter.23
Thus, the committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
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issue many letters to the Police Commissioner-General ordering police 
officers to deliver documents or give statements of facts or opinions on 
the matters under investigation within a limited period. To ensure that 
the performance of these duties is expeditious and efficient, the RTP 
has provided guidelines24 to the police for when a committee issues a 
written notification requiring any document from the police or inviting 
an individual police officer to give a statement of facts or opinions. In 
that case, the Legal Affairs Division (RTP) shall expeditiously forward 
the matter to the Commissioner-General, a commissioner in the Office 
of the Commissioner-General, or an equivalent authority.
Parliamentary committee
Thailand adopted the idea of the committee system from Western 
countries. All 17 constitutions adopted and revoked in Thailand have 
set up “committees” since the Great Revolution on the 24 June 1932. 
Thenceforth, the idea of the committee has been established from the 
Temporary Charter for the Administration of Siam Act B.E. 2475, or 1932, 
until the present. The 1932 Charter was the first time that the concept 
of the committee system from the Western countries was introduced to 
Thailand’s legislative branch. Section 26 of this Charter prescribes that: 
“The House shall be empowered to set up a subcommittee to carry out 
any act or investigate into any matter and submit an opinion thereon 
to the plenary session for further consideration. The chairperson of 
a subcommittee shall, if not appointed by the House, be elected by 
the members of such subcommittee.  A subcommittee shall have the 
power to require any person to make a personal appearance and give 
any explanation or opinion.” 
All provisions of constitutions from the past until the present have 
described the roles of the committees as performing functions of 
the National Assembly, covering all categories of affairs, as well 
as possessing operational independence and powers and duties to 
investigate or study any matter entrusted by the House.
The 2007 Constitution (Section 135) prescribes that: “The House of 
Representatives and the Senate have the power to select and appoint 
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members of each house to constitute a standing committee and have the 
power to select and appoint persons, being or not being its members, to 
constitute an ad hoc committee in order to perform any act, investigate 
into or study any matter within the powers and duties of the House and 
report its findings to the House. The resolution appointing such ad hoc 
committee must specify the activity or the matter concerned clearly and 
without repetition or duplication.”25
Therefore, the House of Representatives and the Senate have the 
powers to establish committees, which are categorised into two types. 
First, Standing Committees consist of selected members of each House. 
Article 28 of the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives of 
2008 stipulates that there are 35 Standing Committees in the House 
of Representatives. Article 77 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate 
stipulates that there are 22 committees in the Senate. Second, Ad Hoc 
Committees select persons, who are either members of each House or 
not, in order to consider carrying out any act or investigating or studying 
any matter, and report the findings to the House, whereby the scope of 
affairs or matters must be definitely specified and not redundant.26 For 
police oversight, thus, the Standing Committees of both Houses have 
been established to monitor the performing of duties of justice process 
officials and police officers. The House of Representatives appointed 
a “Committee on Police” and the Senate appointed a “Committee on 
Justice System and Police.” 
Committee mandate and power
A committee has the power to issue a subpoena or an order requiring 
a document from any person, or to summon any person to give a 
statement of facts or opinions on the act undertaken or the matter 
under its inquiry or study, based on the powers in the Constitution27 and 
Request Order of the Committee of the House of Representatives and 
Senate Act.28
As the Request Order of the Committee of the House of Representatives 
and Senate Act of 2011 has some particular provisions that restrict 
the rights and liberties of a person, the 2007 Constitution prescribes 
that such restrictions shall be imposed on a person only by virtue of 
provisions of the law.29
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In Section 5 of the Request Order of the Committee of the House of 
Representatives and Senate Act of 2011, it is stated that, “the Committee 
shall have the power to make an order requesting any person to deliver 
any document or to give a statement of facts or opinions on the matter 
under its duties, investigation or study.”   
However, the request order or subpoena shall not be made to the judge 
who will preside over the case of, and to personnel management of, each 
court, and shall not be made to the Ombudsman or to a commissioner 
in any independent organisation established by the Constitution, who 
performs the powers and duties in each independent organisation 
established by the Constitution in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitution or the Organic Act, as the case may be.
If the summoned person is a government official, officer or employee of 
any government agency, state agency enterprise, or local administration, 
the chairperson of the committee shall request the minister, who 
controls or supervises the agency to which the person is attached, to 
order that person to comply with the provisions. The only exceptions 
are matters relating to national security or gross benefit of the state.
In addition, Section 6 describes that: 
“in the performance of any duty or in the conduct of any investigation 
or study, if the Committee passes a resolution requiring any document 
from any person or summon any person to give a statement of 
facts or opinions for its consideration, the Committee shall have a 
written notification or invitation requiring that person to submit 
such document or to give such statement of facts or opinion to 
the Committee within the period as determined by the Committee. 
The written notification or invitation under the first paragraph 
shall provide sufficient cause of such requirement or invitation as 
well as the matter under question to be answered. In this case, the 
required or invited person may present related document or object 
for consideration.”30
The person, who receives the written notification or invitation shall 
submit the requested document or give the statement of facts or opinions 
to the Committee within the period determined by the Committee. As an 
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exception, if such a person receives a request for a period of less than 
three days after receiving the written notification or invitation, such 
a person may choose not to comply with it; however, the person must 
inform the Committee of such a reason within three days of receiving 
the written notification or invitation. 
Additionally, according to Article 96 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
House of Representatives, after a committee has finished consideration 
of scrutiny or study of any matter in accordance with its power and 
duties or as entrusted by the House, the committee shall report to the 
House. Moreover, while attending the meeting session of the House, 
the committee is entitled to give further explanation of such act. 
Moreover, the committee may entrust any person to give the statement 
or explanation on its behalf, upon permission from the President of 
the House. And under Article 97 of the Rules, it is prescribed that, in 
a committee’s consideration, if the committee finds an observation, 
which is suitable for being acknowledged or adopted by the Council of 
Ministers, the Court or a Constitutional Organization, the observation 
shall be recorded in the committee’s report for consideration of the 
House. And in consideration of the committee’s observation, the House 
shall pass a resolution whether to agree or disagree without any debate. 
In a case where the House agrees with the committee’s observation, the 
President of the House shall forward the report with the observation to 
the relevant Council of Ministers, Court or Constitutional Organization. 
These rules are consistent Article 91 of the Rules of Procedures of 
the Senate, which prescribed: “In the consideration of the committee, 
if the committee is of the opinion that there is an observation which 
the Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Court, the Courts of Justice, 
the Administrative Courts or constitutional organs concerned should 
be informed of or should act upon, such observation shall be recorded 
in the report of the committee for consideration of the Senate.”31 
Furthermore, the 2009 Rules of Procedures of the Senate prescribe that 
the president of the Senate, after having received the report from the 
Committee, shall place it on the agenda as an urgent matter, and the 
secretary general of the Senate shall send only the agenda and relevant 
documents without the secret report of the Committee to the Senator.
92 The Role of Parliament in Police Governance: Lessons Learned from Asia and Europe
For an example case of Parliament oversight the police performance, 
as to powers to initiate an examination into any case of a human rights 
violation are exercised32 when the Committee deems it appropriate to 
examine any case of a human rights violation or where the Commission 
has received a petition of human rights violation33 or has received a 
petition from a private organization in the field of human rights.34 If the 
Commission is of the opinion that it is a prima facie case which is under 
its powers and duties, the Commission shall notify a person or agency 
alleged to be a human rights violator or a person or agency whom the 
Commission considers to be involved in human rights violation to give 
a responded statements of facts within the period specified by the 
Commission.35
In the case the Committee deems the received matter not within its powers 
and duties, it may refer the matter to a person or agency involved with 
the matter, as it deems appropriate.36 The person or agency shall, upon 
receiving the examination report, implement the remedial measures for 
solving the problem within the period specified and shall notify the 
results of the implementation to the Committee.37 When the period is 
lapsed and if the person or agency has not implemented the remedial 
measures, the Committee shall report to the prime minister to order an 
implementation, except when it is not within the power of the prime 
minister.38 If there are no proceedings or orders for implementation, the 
Committee shall report to Parliament and disseminate the information 
to the public.39
It can be concluded that a committee’s report is likely an important 
suggestion in supporting and promoting the performance of executive 
agencies under the parliamentary system. As a report of a committee in 
the House deals with an investigation or study into a matter, of which 
the House of Representatives, Senate or National Assembly must be 
informed, the report on the committee’s consideration and observation is 
beneficial to the operation of the government’s policy implementation. 
All recommendations of the committees essentially detail the required 
measures to satisfy the need of the people and ensure that the National 
Assembly’s administration fulfils the determined missions for the Thais 
as a whole. In practice, some committees might use parliamentary 
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budgets to merely officially and unofficially travel domestically and 
abroad.  
Parliament-police liaison mechanism 
Formal mechanisms for parliament oversight police
The standing committees of both Houses have been established to 
monitor the performance of duties of justice process officials and police 
officers. The House of Representatives appointed a committee on police 
and the Senate appointed a committee on the justice system and police. 
The 2007 Constitution prescribes that the House of Representatives and 
Senate have numerous powers and duties, such as legislative power and 
the power to sanction and scrutinise the government’s administration 
of state affairs. Particularly, the power to sanction and scrutinise the 
government’s administration of state affairs is exercised by raising an 
ordinary or instant interpellation, initiating a general debate for the 
purpose of passing a vote of no-confidence in the Prime Minister or an 
individual minister, setting up a commission, and considering an annual 
appropriations bill.
Information exchange between parliament and the police
There is no law definitely prescribing how to proceed with interpellations. 
The only exception is Section 134 of the 2007 Constitution, which 
empowers the House of Representatives and Senate to stipulate their 
own rules of procedure. Whereas Chapter 8 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the House of Representatives40 and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Senate of 2008 provide guidelines related to interpellations, the 
Rules exclusively apply to procedures of the House. In addition to the 
establishment of the Parliament Coordination Group for coordinating 
between the RTP and Parliament, the RTP issued the guideline for 
answering the interpellations and consultations of the members of the 
House of Representatives and Senate.41
Relationship with other overseers 
There is no research revealing the efficiency between civilian oversight 
and the degree of police accountability. However, the RTP issued Order 
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No. 1309 (dated 25 September 1998) to set up steering and capacity-
building project management committees for ensuring the efficient 
and effective development of police officers and their performance. 
However, it failed to fulfil all its purposes, because police officers still 
consider the committee as an obstruction to their exercise of power and 
never let the committee participate in the police administration. 
In addition, several parties outside the police service have played 
an important role in examining the RTP’s performance. The 2007 
Constitution provides for the Ombudsmen to consider and inquire about 
the complaint for fact-findings in cases of failure to comply with the 
law or performance beyond legal powers and duties by a government 
official, an official or employee of a government agency, state agency 
or enterprise, or local government organisation.42 The Office of the 
Ombudsmen has issued standards for all public agencies in a code of 
ethics, which has nine core values.
For the Thai justice system, the search and arrest procedures are 
established by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code. In case of unlawful 
arrest, the Supreme Court has established a precedent that an arrest and 
inquiry are separately conducted. If the inquiry was conducted lawfully, 
the unlawful arrest shall not jeopardise the criminal proceedings.43 
Hence, the public prosecutor shall have the power to file a criminal 
case.44
Additionally, the 1997 Constitution establishes the National Human 
Rights Commission as an independent body entitled to promote and 
protect human rights in Thailand. The 2007 Constitution enhances 
its power to file a lawsuit with the administrative courts when the 
Commission agrees with the complainant that any rule, order or 
administrative act is detrimental to human rights and pertains to 
constitutionality and legality.
Moreover, the Asian Human Right Committee has urged the Thai 
government to pay attention to the recommendations from the Human 
Rights Commission of the United Nations in 2005. It also advised the 
government to sign the Convention against Torture as the foundation 
for a society premised on non-violence, and the ability to live safely, 
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free from life and bodily threatening, providing an avenue for making 
complaints dealing with police misconduct.45
Finally, the media (especially popular television programmes) has 
become active in revealing issues in a public forum. All levels of 
command pay attention to the media, and cases televised to the public 
by the media are instantly resolved by the police. The police officers 
in charge with the reported case, if unsuccessful in solving the issue, 
might be subjected to administrative sanctions, including disciplinary 
actions by their commander. 
Conclusion 
To ensure that police governance, deemed as a very important policy, is 
conducted prudently, accurately and clearly, and can be translated into 
practice, internal and external control mechanisms should scrutinise the 
RTP. Although the law prescribes procedural regulation on examining 
police performance, there are some practical drawbacks in both internal 
and external control. Thailand’s lessons learned on parliamentary 
oversight of the police can be summarised as follows:
First, consideration on some matter by a committee requires inviting a 
senior executive of a particular agency (such as the RTP Commissioner 
General) to attend a meeting in order to acknowledge opinions and 
apply them to the policy level instead of only inviting police service staff 
(who is powerless to implement policies). However, some agencies only 
arrange for an operative official to attend the sitting. This person would 
not be able to provide the committee with the required information and 
apply the findings of the consideration to practically solve an internal 
problem of the agency.
Second, some agencies receive a written invitation from a committee, but 
fail to assign any delegate to attend the sitting without an explanation 
or by claiming that the delegate is pre-occupied with another motion. 
As a result, the committee is required to re-issue the written invitation 
several times.
Third, some agencies receive a written invitation, but avoid attending 
the sitting with the committee by continuously postponing it.
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Fourth, the majority of the officials assigned to attend the sittings 
with the committee are not directly knowledgeable about the matter 
concerned and have not prepared supporting information for the 
explanations requested by the committee.
Fifth, the persons invited by the committee to attend the sittings for the 
purpose of giving statements of facts or opinions usually refrain from 
providing facts, resulting in the committee receiving incomplete facts.
Sixth, on some occasions, the persons invited by the committee to attend 
the sittings for the purpose of giving statements of facts or opinions 
are members of personnel in remote provincial agencies. It is therefore 
inconvenient for them to travel to the sittings of the committee on the 
scheduled dates and times. Thus, some agencies request to submit the 
information in written form, and the committee is unable to inquire 
about any circumstantial issue not described in the documents.
97Thailand
NOTES
1. This chapter was written in 2014, prior to 
the Thai coup d’état in May 2014.
2. Kingdom of Thailand, “Book 121, Chapter 
18 A”, Royal Thai Police Act B.E. 2547 
(Bangkok: Royal Thai Government Gazette, 
2004), p. 1.
3. Srisombat Chokprajakchat, Wiraphong 
Boonyobhas, Suree Kanjanawong, Ratchada 
Thanadirek, and Parpon Sahapattana, 
Police Reform of the Criminal Justice Process 
and Regulations (Bangkok: Faculty of 
Social Sciences and Humanities, Mahidol 
University, and Investigation and Legal 
Affairs Bureau, Royal Thai Police, 2008).
4. Kingdom of Thailand, Commodities Control 
Act (B.E.2495) (Bangkok: Kingdom of 
Thailand, 1952)
5. Kingdom of Thailand, Motor Vehicle Act 
(B.E. 2473) (Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand, 
1930).
6. Kingdom of Thailand, Crown Property Tax 
(B.E. 2479) (Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand, 
1936).
7. Kingdom of Thailand, Criminal Procedure 
Code No. 22 (Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand, 
2004).
8. Kingdom of Thailand, Criminal Procedure 
Code No. 27 (Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand, 
2007).
9. Chokprajakchat et al. , Police Reform of the 
Criminal Justice Process and Regulations. 
10. Srisombat Chokprajakchat, The Guidelines 
of the Royal Thai Police’s Human Resources 
Management (Bangkok: The Secretariat 
of the Senate, 2011), accessible at: 
http://library.senate.go.th/document/
Ext4246/4246816_0002.PDF.
11. Kingdom of Thailand, Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand (Bangkok: Kingdom of 
Thailand, 2007), B.E.2550.
12. Kingdom of Thailand, Request Order of the 
Committee of the House of Representatives 
and Senate Act (B.E.2554) (Bangkok: 
Kingdom of Thailand, 2011).
13. Kingdom of Thailand, Request Order of the 
Committee of the House of Representatives 
and Senate Act (Bangkok: Kingdom of 
Thailand, 2011).
14. There is no record that a committee has 
issued such a request order to the police.
15. Chaisan Jongmangkang, “Guidelines for 
the Police Officers to Prepare Themselves 
to Answer Interpellation, Motion or 
Consultation to the Commission”, 
Unpublished paper, 2014.
16. Kingdom of Thailand, “Section 25”, National 
Human Rights Act (B.E.2542) (Bangkok: 
Kingdom of Thailand, 1999). 
17. Ibid., “Section 23.”
18. Ibid., “Section 24.”
19. Ibid., “Section 25.”
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., “Section 29.”
22. Kingdom of Thailand, “Section 30”, National 
Human Rights Act (B.E.2542) (Bangkok: 
Kingdom of Thailand, 1999).
23. Ibid., “Section 31”.
24. These guidelines were issues in a 
memorandum of the Royal Thai Police 
dated 22 March 2014, attached to Letter 
No. 0011.17/Wor103 dated 18 September 
2012. The subject of the letter was 
“Procedures for Answering Interpellations 
and Consultations of Members of the 
House of Representatives and Members of 
the Senate”. 
25. Kingdom of Thailand, Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand, 2007.
26. Kingdom of Cambodia, Rules of Procedure 
of the House of Representatives (B.E. 2551) 
(Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand, 2008). 
27. Cf. the second paragraph in Section 135 
of the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand. 
28. Kingdom of Thailand, Request Order of the 
Committee of the House of Representatives 
and Senate Act (B.E.2554) (Bangkok: 
Kingdom of Thailand, 2011).
29. Kingdom of Thailand, “Sections 29, 31, 35, 
41 and 45”, Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand (Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand, 
2007).
30. Kingdom of Thailand, Request Order of the 
Committee of the House of Representatives 
and Senate Act (Bangkok: Kingdom of 
Thailand, 2011).
31. Kingdom of Thailand, “Article 91” Rules of 
98 The Role of Parliament in Police Governance: Lessons Learned from Asia and Europe
Procedure of the Senate (Bangkok, Kingdom 
of Thailand, 2001) 
32. Kingdom of Thailand, “Section 25”, National 
Human Rights Act (B.E.2542). (Bangkok: 
Kingdom of Thailand, 1999)
33. Ibid., “Section 23”.
34. Ibid., “Section 24”.
35. Ibid., “Section 25”.
36. Ibid., “Section 25”.
37. Ibid., “Section 29”.
38. Kingdom of Thailand, “Section 30”, National 
Human Rights Act (B.E.2542). (Bangkok: 
Kingdom of Thailand, 1999).
39. Ibid., “Section 31”.
40. Kingdom of Thailand, Rules of Procedure 
of the House of Representatives (B.E. 2551) 
(Bangkok: Kingdom of Thailand, 2008). 
41. See previous section.
42. Kingdom of Thailand, Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand, 2007.
43. Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, 
Verdict No. 2699/2516.
44. Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, 
Verdict No. 495/2500.
45. AsianHuman Rights Commission. (2005). 
Thailand: Growing repugnance of barbaric 
torture in Thailand. Retrieved 25 April, 
2014 from http://www.humanrights.asia/
news/ahrc-news/AS-71-2005/?searchterm=
Belgium
6 
In this chapter2, crucial elements of Belgium as a case study are 
described in order to better understand its parliamentary oversight of 
the police. 
The Federal Parliament of the Kingdom of Belgium is a bicameral 
system, consisting of the House of Representatives and Senate. The 
Belgian Parliament exercises democratic supervision of the Belgian 
government, which has an army and a police service at its disposal. 
In 2001, the Belgian police underwent a fundamental structural reform 
that created a genuine integrated police service on a federal (1 federal 
police) and local level (195 local police services). The three former 
police services (the municipal police, the gendarmerie and the judicial 
police assigned to the offices of the public prosecutors) gave way to 
an integrated police service. The main structural change is that the 
basis for police work is locally embedded and the power of the mayors, 
who are locally elected representatives, has been strengthened on that 
level. At the same time, the philosophy of “community policing” has 
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been introduced. It is an attempt to change the overall functioning of 
the police in relation to the public according to democratic principles, 
such as service orientation, problem-solving, partnership, accountability 
and empowerment. Previous research has shown that the articulation 
of community policing differs depending on the implicit relationship 
between the state and the citizen that goes along with these systems.3 
In some way, Belgium has tried to take the best of both worlds, as it has 
gradually integrated Anglo-Saxon elements into its French heritage.4
It is important to note that the Belgian police policy cycle is anchored in 
the law of 1998 on the Integrated Police, which is structured on federal 
and local levels. This cycle takes four years and is mainly steered by one 
national and 195 zonal security plans.5 The policy cycle is directed by 
an inter-ministerial cabinet6 and guidelines to prepare security plans.7 
Furthermore, since 2007, the federal government has been concluding 
four yearly strategic security and prevention plans with the Belgian 
municipalities, which are required to take a leading role in the process. 
The policy choices and priorities are motivated by a local security 
diagnostic tool.8 This tool aims to methodologically support cities 
and towns in offering them a picture of local crime and insecurity. 
In preparing these plans and policies, a lot of effort is focused on 
understanding what civilians expect from the government and police 
and how they feel about their security and quality of life. This is part 
of how community-oriented policing is being translated into practice.9
The Belgian police services are a key component of the government’s 
security policy, which, pursuant to the law, aims at providing a 
proper service to the population. The organisation is driven by the 
aforementioned concept of an “integrated police.” The legal basis for 
police work is defined in the law of 5 August 1992 on the General Police 
Regulations.
From an organisational point of view, the police operate on different 
levels. Their various components are based on two levels of 
responsibility and power: the federal and local levels. Whereas the 
federal police is responsible for law enforcement on the federal level, 
local law enforcement falls within the competencies of local police 
corps, which are each in charge of a district named “police zone”. Both 
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levels are autonomous without any hierarchical connections. The size 
of the Belgian police should be about 42.000 full time equivalents, but, 
in reality, it is less than 40.000 full time equivalents.
From a functional point of view, the integrated police service is 
made up of different components that complement each other. This 
complementary nature with respect for autonomy is what makes 
the Belgian police unique. The local police is in charge of all basic 
police missions, such as administrative or judicial police missions, 
guaranteeing a minimum service to the population. The federal police 
carries out missions that, on the one hand, stem from their sphere of 
activity covering the whole territory, and, on the other hand, derive from 
specializations that are to be developed within the federal police to the 
benefit of the entire Belgian police. Consequently, the federal police 
fulfils judicial and administrative missions in specialized areas or in 
areas that exceed the jurisdiction of the local police corps. To this end, 
the federal police are composed of a variety of directorates, units and 
services, which are in charge of providing a range of operational and 
other support to the local police corps. Finally, the federal police have 
the authority to represent all the Belgian police services within the 
framework of international police cooperation.
This paper starts with an executive summary of parliamentary oversight 
of the police in Belgium, followed by sections on the functions of the 
Belgian parliament, the parliamentary committee(s), the parliament-
police liaison mechanism and the relationship with other overseers. 
In the conclusion, an interpretation on using a police accountability 
framework is presented. 
Police accountability framework in Belgium
The Belgian Federal Parliament is a bicameral system, consisting of 
the House of Representatives and Senate.10 Since 2001, Belgium has 
an integrated police service structured on two levels: 195 local police 
services and 1 federal police service.11 The mayors and the public 
prosecutor are responsible for the local police, and the minister of 
interior and justice are responsible for the federal police. Each member 
of the federal parliament has the right to submit parliamentary 
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questions on the functioning of the local and federal police. To answer 
these questions, the minister of interior and/or justice is advised by a 
technical-administrative secretariat. These secretariats are composed 
of federal and local police employees, providing a liaison mechanism 
between the police and the cabinets of interior and justice. Within 
the House of Representatives, there are two committees that handle 
police matters: the Standing Committee of Home Affairs and a special 
committee especially charged with police oversight. Furthermore, the 
federal parliament is authorised to set up committees of inquiry that 
can address specific issues related to policing. 
The Standing Committee of Home Affairs is not limited to police matters, 
but deals with all matters on the subject of home affairs (e.g. also civil 
protection matters). Within this standing committee, the proceedings 
of the plenary sessions of parliament are being prepared. In practice, 
this implies that all proposals (when introduced by a member of 
parliament) and bills (when introduced by a member of government) 
are being introduced, discussed, possibly amended and eventually voted 
on by the members of this committee. The report of the discussions and 
the text adopted by the committee are then presented to the plenary. 
Like the other standing committees, the Standing Committee of Home 
Affairs has the competence to organise an overview/oversight of the 
ministers (Article 101 of the Constitution), as they are responsible for 
their respective administrations. It can do this by organising hearings 
and asking (written or oral) questions. It can invite members of the 
police to elucidate certain matters, though it does not exercise direct 
police oversight. This standing committee consists of 17 members and is 
composed on the basis of the ratio between the political parties in the 
plenary of the House of Representatives. This implies that the biggest 
political party in the plenary will have the biggest representation 
within these kinds of standing committees. Committee presidencies 
are allocated to different parties following the same principle of 
proportional representation. As a result, some standing committees 
are chaired by members of the opposition. Within the Senate, a similar 
committee with similar competences exists, consisting of 15 members.
Within the House of Representatives, there is a special committee 
charged with the oversight of the police services.12 The independent 
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oversight body, the Standing Police Monitoring Committee (Committee 
P), is accountable to this special parliamentary committee. It was created 
by the law of 18 July 1991 on monitoring police forces and intelligence 
services.13 Committee P is the principal parliamentary oversight body 
for the police. It is an independent and neutral body that assists the 
legislature in overseeing the activities of the executive. Committee P 
acts as an external body, with respect to both the executive (ministers, 
mayors, police boards, etc.) and the police (federal and local police, 
special inspection services, etc.), and is responsible for monitoring the 
overall working of the police and policing by all officials involved in 
police, inspection and monitoring activities. Therefore, Committee P will 
send its reports related to its monitoring inquiries, as well as its annual 
activity report containing its general conclusions and recommendations, 
to the members of parliament. Staff members of Committee P indicate 
that their reports, conclusions and recommendations (depending on the 
nature of the problem, its societal relevance and the media attention 
it generates) are not always receiving the necessary attention in the 
special committee.14
Furthermore, the House of Representatives and Senate are both 
authorized to set up committees of inquiry (Article 56 of the Constitution), 
which can address specific issues that can be related to policing. These 
committees inquire about issues that appear in society.15 The House of 
Representatives exercises control over the government and the policy 
followed by previous governments. Such inquiries also allow collecting 
a large amount of information, which can lead to improvements in 
existing legislation. The mandate of the inquiry committee is always 
limited in time, which is set by the plenary session on the proposal 
of the conference of presidents. The inquiry committee has the same 
powers as an investigating magistrate in an ordinary inquiry. The 
committee may thus summon witnesses and hear them under oath, 
confront witnesses, request or seize documents, order searches, and 
organise visits on location. To carry out acts of investigation, the 
committee sends a request to the first president of the Court of Appeal, 
who then designates the competent magistrates. They are placed under 
the authority of the chairman of the committee.
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In conclusion, it is fair to state that the Belgian Federal Parliament 
exercises democratic supervision over the Belgian government and 
its police. Since 1991, Committee P has been an essential part of 
that democratic supervision. Members of parliament submit many 
interpellations and questioned regarding the functioning of both the 
local and federal police. However, this does not result in profound 
debates on the functioning and organisation of the federal and local 
police.16 The National Security Plan, which must be notified under law 
to parliament, receives limited room for debate. Also, the debate on the 
budget of the federal police gets lost in the discussion of the general 
expenditure budget of the federal state. 
Furthermore, Belgium is suffering from a proliferation of its global 
mechanisms of control on the police, which hampers its efficiency and 
effectiveness.17 In a recently developed “Belgian vision on the police 
2025,” the need for greater balance between external (executive and 
legislative power and the population) and internal accountability 
(organisation-specific) mechanisms is highlighted, which can lead 
to a more transparent and democratic police service. In doing so, it 
relied on the recommendations of the Patten Commission (1999) on 
accountability, in which parliamentary oversight is only one of the 
essential mechanisms to create a democratic police service.
Functions of the Belgian parliament 
In the following sections, we focus on the legislative, oversight and 
control functions of the Belgian parliament. 
Legislative function
Between 2010 and 2014 (Belgian legislature No. 53), 75 bills were 
submitted in the federal parliament, which affect the functioning of 
the police.18 The two most important bills are related to the Act of 7 
December 1998 organising an integrated police service. The first bill 
pertains to the public nature of the crime data and the second bill 
concerns the national security plan. 
The first bill takes the text of bill No. 52 1316/001 submitted during 
the previous legislature by Mr. Vandenhove, Member of Parliament. He 
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believes that open communication to citizens about crime rates can 
contribute to increasing their feelings of security. He therefore proposes 
to require an annual report from every local police chief that describes 
the functioning of his/her police service, including evolutions in crime 
rates recorded by the police. This proposal demands national rules on 
the registration of crime and reporting of crime rates.19
The second bill is related to the national security plan. Every four years, 
the federal police formulates a Police National Safety Plan (PNSP), 
which is communicated to the House of Representatives. As members 
of parliament cannot approve or disapprove this plan or be involved in 
monitoring or evaluating this plan20; the bill suggests asking parliament 
for advice on the content of the PNSP. 
Oversight function
In 1991, as part of the Pentecost Plan,21 the government submitted a 
proposal to regulate the monitoring of police services, which became 
the law of 18 July 1991 on monitoring police and intelligence services.22 
It was this law that created Committee P. Committee P is the principal 
parliamentary oversight body for the police. The programme law 
of 27 December 2004 conferred a range of additional monitoring 
responsibilities relating to the surveillance of security services 
and officers working for state-run public transport companies on 
Committee P.
The monitoring was designed to meet three important goals relating to 
policing: respect for the constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms 
of citizens and ensuring efficient policing and coordination of police 
services. From the outset, these goals also formed the cornerstone 
of Committee P’s work. Its mission statement is paying “continuous 
attention to how the police respect fundamental rights and freedoms.”
Committee P is an independent and neutral body that assists the 
legislature in overseeing the activities of the executive. It consists 
of three components: Standing Committee P (in the strict sense of 
the word), administration, and Investigation Service. The Standing 
Committee P is composed of five members, including a president (a 
judge) and vice president. The House of Representatives appoints 
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members for a renewable term of six years. The Standing Committee 
is a collegial body: all final decisions are made by the five members 
during a plenary session of the Standing Committee. The preparation 
and implementation of these decisions take place in terms of 
dividing tasks among the five members. This Standing Committee P is 
assisted by an administration containing 35 administrative staff. The 
Investigation Service is composed of 48 members appointed by the 
Standing Committee for a renewable term of five years. Some members 
of the Investigation Service are on secondment from a federal or local 
police force. The Investigation Service conducts criminal investigations 
under the authority of the judicial authorities and monitoring studies 
at the request of the Standing Committee. A section is responsible for 
receiving, analysing and dealing with complaints and the processing of 
information from various authorities and the police in connection with 
the actions of the members of the police.
Committee P acts as an external body, with respect to both the executive 
(ministers, mayors, police boards, etc.) and the police (federal and local 
police, special inspection services, etc.), and is responsible for monitoring 
the overall work of the police and policing by all officials involved in 
police, inspection and monitoring activities. This means that Committee 
P is the only external and general monitoring body overseeing the 
work of the police and special inspection services, which is also an 
independent body. Nonetheless, Committee P is accountable to the 
special committee charged with providing parliamentary support for it. 
To this end, its tasks include sending reports on its inspection inquiries 
to the Chamber of Representatives, as well as its annual activity report 
containing general conclusions and recommendations.
Any citizen coming into contact with the police can file a complaint, 
make a declaration or provide other information to Committee P. At the 
same time, any police officer is free to file a complaint or declaration 
without the consent or approval of his or her superiors and sanctions. 
In some cases, if the complainant or the declarant expressly requests 
it, the Committee P may guarantee anonymity. The complaint handling 
procedure is detailed in writing. Committee P transfers the treatment of 
numerous complaints to the relevant departments of internal oversight, 
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which ensure a uniform and fair treatment. Committee P informs the 
judicial authorities of facts falling within its competence. In accordance 
with the law, all complaints received directly by the police authorities 
concerning police malpractice should be notified to Committee P for it 
to fulfil its supervisory function. It can be asked, through a motivated 
letter, for a second reading of a file in case of a dispute on the findings 
of an investigation. A complaint with Committee P does not suspend 
the pending administrative or judicial proceedings. Committee P cannot 
intervene on its own initiative in a pending judicial proceeding and 
has no authority to appeal against judgments of decisions and direct 
disciplinary powers in relation to police officers.23
In certain circumstances, it may therefore more appropriate to make 
a complaint or declaration to another department or institution. 
This applies in three cases. If a complaint has already been recorded 
by another organisation and the person involved wants to add new 
elements to the file, s/he should contact the institution or person s/
he initially contacted.24 Second, if it concerns a criminal offence 
(assault and battery, theft, etc.), the parties are urged to contact 
either the internal supervision of the police department of the place 
where the events occurred (or any other police force), the head of the 
department concerned with police powers or the public prosecutor of 
the prosecution. Third, if it concerns a problem of a different nature 
(functioning of the police organisation, problem related to ethics, etc.), 
the department of internal supervision of the local police involved or 
the federal police (Railway Police, FGP, contact DirCo, DirJud, etc.) or 
the head of the department concerned with police powers should be 
contacted.
Budget control function
The relevant control function of the Belgian Parliament in relation to 
oversight of the police is related to police policy and budget control. 
In relation to the police policy, only the content of the National Security 
Plan25 is reported to the Legislative House of Representatives. Members 
of parliament, however, cannot approve or disapprove this strategic 
policy plan of the police.26 It is a major shortcoming that the parliament 
cannot rely on a legislative framework to discuss the merits of the 
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National Security Plan and formulate proposals to this policy note. 
Members of parliament lack a clear picture of the security plan and 
resources necessary to meet the formulated priorities and actions.27 
Parliament cannot fully exercise its right of control over such an 
important document that sets out the priorities for the national security 
policy of the police for a period of four years. It is limited to a general 
discussion of the plan and cannot evaluate or formulate general advice. 
In relation to budget control, the government and the Minister for the 
Budget have little decision power. The budget is subject to several 
external monitoring bodies, such as the (Federal) Parliament and the 
Court of Audit. A principle of the budget is “annuality,” which means that 
the budget always covers a full calendar year. The budget is voted on at 
the beginning of the new calendar year (late December/ early January) 
in the Federal Parliament through the Finance Act.28
The budget control of the integrated police is part of the general 
budget of the federal government. Every year in October, the Belgian 
House of Representatives discusses the budget control of the federal 
government.29 A detailed clarification of the general expenditure budget 
is presented in the Federal Parliament and is publicly accessible on the 
website of the House of Representatives.30 For the integrated police, the 
commissioner-general of the Federal Police31 is in charge of drafting 
the budget and monitoring its implementation.32 This means that 
members of parliament approve the budget for the integrated police. 
They have the right to submit amendments to the Finance Act, and, 
consequently, change the provisional budget of the integrated police. 
However, the debate on the budget of the integrated police gets lost in 
the discussion of the general expenditure budget of the federal state.
Parliamentary committee/s
The Belgian Federal Parliament is a bicameral system and consists 
of a House of Representatives and a Senate. Within the House of 
Representatives, there are two committees that handle police matters: 
the Standing Committee of Home Affairs and a special committee charged 
with police oversight. Furthermore, the House of Representatives and 
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the Senate are both authorized to set up committees of enquiry33 
addressing specific issues that can be related to policing. 
Standing committee
The Standing Committee of Home Affairs has a more general approach, 
because its mandate is not limited to police matters. It deals with all 
matters on the subject of home affairs (e.g. also matters with regard to 
civil protection). Within this Standing Committee, the proceedings of the 
plenary are prepared, allowing the plenary to work more efficiently and 
effectively. In practice, this implies that all proposals (when introduced 
by a member of parliament) and bills (when introduced by a member 
of the government) are introduced, discussed, possibly amended and 
eventually voted on by the members of the Standing Committee. The 
report of the discussions and the text adopted by the committee are 
then presented to the plenary. The Standing Committee has, inter alia, 
the competence similar to other standing committees to organise an 
overview/oversight of the ministers (Article 101 of the Constitution), 
as it is responsible for their respective administrations. It can do this 
by organising hearings and ask (written or oral) questions. Members of 
the committee can invite police officials to elucidate certain matters. 
However, this Standing Committee does not exercise direct police 
oversight.
In general, the functioning of standing committees is limited to their 
legislative work by discussing, amending, voting on bills and asking 
parliamentary questions.34 After each renewal (after elections), the 
House of Representatives appoints members of the standing committees. 
A standing committee has 17 members. They are composed on the 
basis of the ratio between the political parties in the plenary of the 
House of Representatives. This implies that the biggest political party 
in the plenary will have the biggest representation within standing 
committees. Committee presidencies are allocated to different parties 
following the same principle of proportional representation. As a result, 
some standing committees are chaired by members of the opposition. 
Within the Senate, similar committees with similar competences exist. 
The standing committees of the senate each contain 15 members.
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Special committee
Aside from standing committees, there are also special committees. 
Within the House of Representatives, a special committee charged with 
the oversight of the police services exists. The independent oversight 
body, Committee P, is accountable to this special parliamentary 
committee. Therefore, Committee P will send its reports related to its 
monitoring inquiries, as well as its annual activity report containing 
its general conclusions and recommendations, to the members of 
parliament. 
Staff members of Committee P indicate that their reports, conclusions 
and recommendations are not always receiving the necessary attention 
in this special committee, which generates frustrations for staff members 
of Committee P. The degree of attention depends on the nature of the 
problem, its societal relevance and the generated media attention. 
Inquiry committees
Inquiry committees inquire about issues that appear within society.35 
The House of Representatives exercises control over the government 
and the policy followed by previous governments. Such inquiries also 
allow for collecting a large amount of information, which can lead to 
improvements in existing legislation. The House of Representatives 
and Senate have had the right to conduct inquiries since 1830. It is 
regulated by a law of 3 May 1880, (amended by the law of 30 June 1996) 
and, as far as the House of Representatives is concerned, the Standing 
Orders adopted by the Assembly on 23 October 1997.
The mandate of inquiry committee is always limited in time. The time 
limit is set by the plenary session on the proposal of the conference 
of presidents. The inquiry committee has the same powers as an 
investigating magistrate in an ordinary inquiry. The committee may thus 
summon witnesses and hear them under oath, confront one witness 
with another, request or seize documents, order searches, and organise 
visits on location. To carry out acts of investigation, the committee 
sends a request to the first president of the Court of Appeal, who then 
designates the competent magistrates. They are placed under the 
authority of the chairman of the committee.
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Parliament-police liaison mechanism
The permanent control of the police is the responsibility of the ministers 
of interior and justice for the Federal Police. The mayors and the public 
prosecutor are responsible for the local police. There is no direct formal 
mechanism between parliament and the police. However, members of 
parliament have the right to submit parliamentary questions on the 
functioning of the local and federal police to the ministers of interior 
and justice. These ministers rely on the advice rendered by members 
of staff from their cabinets, the public or the Federal Public Services 
Interior and Justices that fall under their competence. 
In addition to the cabinets and the Federal Public Services, there is a body 
that creates a direct link between the ministers of justice and interior 
(whose policies are overseen by parliament) and the integrated police. 
It is called the Technical-Administrative Secretariats (SAT), composed of 
the “SAT Home Affairs” and “SAT Justice.” These secretariats advise the 
ministers on technical, administrative and logistical matters regarding 
daily police organisation and operations. They are composed of federal 
and local police employees and responsible for the connection between 
the police and the cabinets of interior and justice. Their task is to advise 
the ministers of justice and interior on all matters falling within their 
competences regarding the police. They ensure that the files submitted 
in these areas to the ministers contain all necessary information to 
make a decision. This also includes the formulation of responses to 
parliamentary questions. 
The SAT Home Affairs consists of five officers of the Federal Police 
seconded from the directorates-general of the Federal Police and at 
least two officers seconded from the local police. The administrative 
support of the Secretariat is provided by administrative staff seconded 
from the integrated police. The SAT Home Affairs is responsible for 
the connection between the General Directorate of the Administrative 
Police, the Crisis and Coordination Centre of the Federal Government, 
the Anti-Terrorist Joint Group and the Cabinet of Ministers with regard 
to public safety and law enforcement. This Secretariat ensures a 24-hour 
permanence in relation to issues of public order and national security, 
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and any assignment of administrative police where the Minister could 
assert his or her injunction. 
The SAT Justice consists of two federal police officers, two local police 
officers and two administrative members of the integrated police. These 
members are appointed by the Minister of Justice for a renewable 
term of five years. It advises the Minister of Justice in the preparation, 
monitoring and evaluation of national security. For this purpose, SAT 
Justice receives the necessary information from the Federal Police. 
It can require information from the police and any other service or 
department under de authority of the Minister of Justice. The SAT Justice 
ensures follow-up to the decisions taken by the Minister of Justice in 
the context of his or her powers over the police and the security of the 
courts, the transfer of prisoners and security in prison. It ensures a 24-
hour permanence.
Relationship with other overseers
To describe the relationship between parliament and other independent 
oversight institutions, as well as civil society, in the area of police 
oversight, attention needs to be paid to the Federal Ombudsman, the 
Standing Police Monitoring Committee (Committee P), the General 
Inspectorate of the federal and local police, the Internal Supervision 
Services at each local police department and the Court of Audit.
At the federal level the parliament installed the office of the Federal 
Ombudsman in 199536. This is an independent and neutral institution 
that examines complaints (from citizens) about the way federal 
administrative authorities act or function. Additionally, it investigates, 
at the request of the House of Representatives, the functioning of the 
federal administrative services. It reports on a yearly basis to parliament; 
they may also issue quarterly interim reports, if they consider it useful. 
The service of the Ombudsman is restricted to complaints regarding the 
functioning of the federal administrations. Victims of police services 
are advised to redirect their complaints to Committee P, the General 
Inspectorate of the federal and local police and the Internal Supervision 
Services at each local police department. 
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As mentioned before Committee P was established in 199137 as an 
independent body that reports directly to parliament. 
After the police reform in 1998, the General Inspectorate of the Federal 
Police and the Local Police (AIG, Algemene Inspectie/Inspection Generale) 
was established by integrating the inspection of the Gendarmerie and 
the Judicial Police.38 This General Inspectorate is working independently 
of the Belgian integrated police and falls under the authority of the 
ministers of interior and justice. It acts on its own initiative based on a 
demand from one of their authoritative ministers, at the request of the 
judicial or administrative authorities, the commissioner-general or chief 
of police. In addition, any citizen may apply to the General Inspectorate 
via a complaint. The parliament did not receive any prerogative powers 
in relation to the General Inspectorate. It is important that some of the 
competences of the General Inspectorate coincide with those of other 
bodies. For example, this is the case with regard to the audit function of 
the General Inspectorate as well as Committee P. To avoid any overlaps, 
both bodies signed a protocol agreeing to mutual coordination and 
exchange of information.
At the local level, each police department created its own Internal 
Supervision Service. Within each local police zone there is an ‘Internal 
Oversight Service’ available. This service is charged with the quality 
and the management of complaints. It falls under the authority of the 
mayor and the public prosecutor, and the direct supervision of the chief 
of police. 
Finally, the Court of Audit should be mentioned, as it is a collateral body 
of parliament established by Article 180 of the Constitution. It exercises 
external review of the budgetary, accounting and financial operations of 
the Federal State, with communities, regions, public service institutions 
depending upon them, and the provinces. The Court of Audit has a 
large degree of independence and autonomy in the performance of its 
duties. Each member of parliament has the right to consult or obtain 
copies of each file that the Court has opened, the minutes of the 
general meeting and of the House of Representatives of the Court, its 
correspondence and financial and budgetary data39. The Court regularly 
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reports to parliament on the consulted records and the questions asked 
by ministers of parliament.
Even though allowing citizens to submit complaints about the police 
to Committee P, the General Inspectorate and the Internal Supervision 
Service in each local police zone, the Belgian Federal Parliament only 
has limited control over and overview of the functioning of the police.40
Conclusion
As described, the Belgian parliament exercises democratic supervision 
of the Belgian government. Many interpellations and questions are 
submitted by members of the parliament in the House of Representatives 
and Senate regarding the functioning of both the local and federal police. 
However, this does not result in profound debates on the functioning 
and organisation of the federal and local police.41 The National Security 
Plan, which must be notified under the law to parliament, receives 
limited room for debate in parliament. Furthermore the debate on the 
budget of the Federal Police gets lost in the discussion of the general 
expenditure budget of the federal state. 
It is clear that Belgium suffers from a proliferation of mechanisms for 
police oversight.42 This was also a point of attention in the development 
of a new Belgian Police Vision 2025, which has been presented on the 
1 June 2014.43 The vision includes the advice, described below, to move 
towards a better balance between five forms of accountability inspired 
by the work of the Patten Commission.44
First, the accountability of elected representatives of the community 
must be either locally or federally monitored, as contained in the Law 
on the Integrated Police. This concerns both the management of the 
local police by the mayor or the police college and the management of 
the federal police by the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice. 
An optimization of the control, the functional link between the local 
and the federal component benefit which immediately symbolizes the 
uniqueness of the Belgian integrated police, now and in the future. 
Second, the police organisation is accountable for the way public funds 
are spent. An annual budget control of the integrated police is part 
115Belgium
of the overall resource budget of the federal government. The budget 
is subject to public debate in the Belgian House of Representatives. 
A second control power is vested in the Court of Audit to oversee 
the proper use of public funds. The Court carried out an audit of the 
coherence and monitoring of federal standards regarding the minimum 
basic police functioning and the minimum capacity of the police (2004), 
the National Security Plan (2005), the impact of police reform on social 
security (2007) and on the financing and evaluation of the action plans 
of the traffic police (2007). A well-functioning financial watchdog is 
necessary, especially in times of economic crisis.
Third, the community should be informed about what the police 
are doing and how police policy is established. This transparency is 
essential to give rise to the choice made for a community-oriented 
police organisation. The media and civil society have a significant role 
to play in this regard. 
Fourth, the police is permanently accountable for the way its statutory 
powers are enforced. Committee P, the magistracy and the Privacy 
Commission are critical watchdogs and have to collaborate in an 
efficient manner. More attention should be paid to accountability 
regarding the partners of police and citizens as the ultimate touchstone 
of a democratic police.
Fifth, it is crucial that individual police officers can be held accountable 
for their actions in society. This form of accountability goes beyond the 
traditional form of internal control, which focuses on compliance with 
internal rules and procedures, status and discipline. There is a need for 
greater internal accountability in the spirit of community policing but 
also in relation to policy processes. It should be considered, to that end, 
if the required and crucial networks are established sufficiently. In this 
way, the functioning of the police is being evaluated in interaction with 
the wider society and other security actors.
This advice implies a balance between the internal (organisation-specific) 
and external (executive and legislative power, and the population) 
accountability mechanisms that can lead to a more transparent police 
service. It is an advice to look at parliamentary oversight as just one 
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of the important accountability mechanisms to move towards a more 
democratic concept of policing. 
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Germany
7
In the framework of the comparative study that focuses on the role 
of parliament within the context of wider police accountability, this 
chapter analyses the case of Germany.2 The central research questions 
underlying this paper directly derive from this research framework: 
What are the characteristics of police accountability in Germany in 
comparison to other democratic countries? And what is the specific 
role of parliaments for police accountability in the centralised and 
decentralised polities of the German Federation? For policing and 
police oversight, the federal structure of the country is a predominant 
pattern, as policing is among the most prominent responsibilities of the 
16 German States (Länder). Therefore the German police system can be 
characterised as semi-(de-)centralised.3 Each State has its own police 
agency or agencies. Police officers are employed and paid by the States. 
The Federal State (Bund) has its own police forces. They include (1) the 
Federal Police (Bundespolizei) for the protection of the external borders, 
the railway system and the airports and (2) the Federal Criminal Police 
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Office (Bundeskriminalamt), mainly for the federal coordination of 
criminal investigation. Both are under the supervision of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior (Bundesinnenministerium). Secret services are 
separated from the police in the German system. The Federal Customs 
Administrations (Bundeszollverwaltung), under the supervision of the 
Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesfinanzministerium), also have a 
number of security-related tasks.
Table 1: Police agencies in the German federal system4
Police Agency Functions Number of Police Officers 
and Police Employees5
Bundespolizei (Federal 
Police)
Border, airport and railway 
police; formed units
38.000
Bundeskriminalamt (Federal 
Criminal Police Office)
Coordination of criminal 
investigation; international 
cooperation; prevention 
of dangers in cases of 
international terrorism; 
5.000
Zoll (Federal Customs 
Administrations)
Tasks related to customs; 
criminal investigation in 
specific cases (illegal drugs; 
protected species; illegal 
labour et al.)
(34.000)6
Polizei Baden-Württemberg 
(Police Baden-Württemberg)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
30.000
Bayerische Staatliche Polizei 
(Police Bavaria)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
29.800
Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin 
(Police Chief Berlin) 
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
22.000
Polizei Brandenburg (Police 
Brandenburg)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
8.000
Polizei Bremen (Police 
Bremen)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
2.500
Polizei Hamburg (Police 
Hamburg) 
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
9.800
Hessische Polizei (Police 
Hesse)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
18.000
Polizei Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
6.000
Polizei Niedersachsen (Lower 
Saxony)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
24.000
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and Police Employees5
Polizei Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Police North Rhine-
Westphalia)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
50.000
Polizei Rheinland-Pfalz 
(Police Rhineland-Palatinate)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
7.200
Polizei im Saarland (Police 
Saarland)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
3.000
Polizei Sachsen (Police 
Saxony)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
13.000
Polizei Sachsen-Anhalt 
(Police Saxony-Anhalt)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
8.000
Polizei Schleswig-Holstein 
(Police Schleswig-Holstein)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
6.500
Thüringer Polizei (Police 
Thuringia)
Prevention of dangers and 
criminal investigation
7.000
Total number of Police Officers and Employees (without 
customs)
287.800
Citizens, civil liberties advocacy groups, political decision-makers, 
police agencies, police unions and individual police officers have 
numerous different expectations about what should be the outcome 
of police oversight. Victims of police misconduct may expect sanctions 
for the police officers behaving badly or simply feel the need that a 
complaint should be taken seriously. Non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) defending civil liberties often focus on the correct investigation 
into cases of police misconduct. Some NGOs also lobby for drawing 
policy consequences from typical complaints in order to improve police 
work in the sense of enhancing respect, especially with regard to human 
rights. Police agencies oriented towards a good relationship with the 
public may also be interested in drawing consequences from misconduct. 
Some police officers and their unions may rather be interested in 
preventing the sanctioning of police officers.7 Members of Parliament 
and governmental representatives may sustain these expectations, 
which only partly overlap. Independent police oversight by parliaments, 
courts and civilian oversight bodies is therefore highly contested in 
Germany, as in other countries. Thus, police oversight institutions have 
been frequently reshaped and are a matter of trial and error.8
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Most police agencies have internal affairs units investigating cases of 
police misconduct that come to the attention of an agency either by 
its own observations or outside complaints. However, in practice, such 
internal affairs units mostly show a number of shortcomings.9 Police 
officers investigating cases of misconduct from their own colleagues 
may succumb to internal pressure. Police leaders might hesitate 
to communicate openly in the public about cases of misconduct, 
potentially affecting the agency’s public reputation. Human rights 
groups have consequently criticised that internal investigations tend 
to be incomplete, slow and not sufficiently neutral.10 When police 
officers are concerned by a complaint from outside of the police, police 
agencies sometimes tend to open criminal investigations against the 
complainant as a defence mechanism,11 especially in cases where an 
encounter between police officers and the complainant verbally or 
physically escalated. In such a case, complainants have even more 
reasons to doubt the neutrality of internal investigations.
The paper analyses the specific role that the German parliaments 
play in this multi-actor system of police accountability from a trans-
disciplinary legal, political and administrative science perspective.
Police accountability framework
Police accountability in Germany is closely linked to central 
characteristics of the country’s political system. Germany, as it exists 
since 1949 (Federal Republic of Germany) and 1990 (reunification 
with the Democratic Republic of Germany), has a federal structure, 
relatively strong parliaments and a specific rule of law tradition. Public 
administrations, including the police, mostly have internal units dealing 
with cases of police corruption or misconduct.12
By contrast, Germany has a weak tradition of independent oversight 
institutions for public administrations as they are established in many 
other countries with ombudspersons or oversight commissions involving 
citizens.13 In recent years three states have established independent 
ombudspersons with specific police oversight authority: Rhineland-
Palatinate (2014), Schleswig-Holstein (2016) and Baden-Württemberg 
125Germany
(2016). In the past decades, independent data protection commissioners 
have been established in Germany. They also cover data collection and 
processing by police agencies.
NGOs that exert police control functions are independent from the 
police. They play an important role for independent reporting on 
cases of police misconduct.14 Numerous German lawyers are engaged 
in civil liberty NGOs or networks (e.g. Republikanscher Anwältinnen- 
und Anwaltsverien; Strafverteidigervereinigungen; and Vereinigung 
Demokratischer JuristInnen).15 They often support the non-state 
police oversight. Additionally, networks have been established to aid 
people in trouble with the police, mostly in connection with political 
demonstrations.16 These NGOs do not have any formal authority 
to investigate cases of police misconduct. However, they can collect 
information (e.g. from victims or witnesses) and publish it. This puts the 
police agencies under pressure to prevent problems in the future and to 
change behaviour, especially if cases find an echo in the media. Other 
NGOs focus their activities on specific issues, such as police racism.17
According to the specific German rule of law tradition, as established 
in the 19th century, any state activity that restricts the citizen’s 
fundamental rights is only allowed if parliament has given the 
administration, such as the police, a specific legal base for this 
restriction. This constitutional requirement has characterised German 
police law since the late 19th century.18 In the 20th century, this 
tradition was further strengthened in two respects: The West German 
Constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) drafted under Western 
allied forces’ supervision after World War II and in force since 1949, 
specifically underlines the legal value of the individuals’ fundamental 
rights, more than any previous German constitution. Based on these two 
influences, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
then further strengthened the legal value attributed to fundamental 
rights. The numerous cases that individuals bring before the Court 
open path-dependencies19 in the sense that the Court establishes new 
doctrines, often extending the legal value of fundamental rights that 
become the starting point for further development in administrative 
practice, case law before lower courts and its own future case-law. 
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The strong position of fundamental rights became possible because of 
the individuals’ right to bring cases directly before the Constitutional 
Court if legal remedies before the general courts are unsuccessful or a 
new legal provision directly endangers fundamental rights. Similarly to 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), individual access to the 
German Federal Constitutional Court enables the Court to react to new 
developments that may endanger fundamental rights.
This has been particularly relevant for policing. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has further developed and often strengthened 
the fundamental rights relevant for policing, especially the right to life 
and physical integrity and the freedom of the person (both Article 2(2) 
of the Grundgesetz), the freedom of expression and of the press (Article 
5(1)), the freedom of assembly (Article 8), the freedom of correspondence 
and telecommunication (Article 10) and the inviolability of the home 
(Article 13).
Due to the specific German rule of law requirements and the 
Constitutional Courts’ fundamental rights case law, the laws governing 
police activity in the country tend to be detailed. Police tactics that 
restrict fundamental rights require an explicit legal base. In the early 
1990s, this legal requirement was adopted and underlined by the 
ECHR in French cases concerning telephone tapping.20 It is, therefore, 
now a European standard, but German laws in this field still tend to 
be more concrete and explicit than those of other European countries. 
This means that parliaments have to revise the laws relevant for 
policing on a regular basis, taking into account new developments 
of threats and dangers, police tactics and technology in the use for 
policing. For the Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) and the 16 State Parliaments (named Landtag or 
– in the three City States – Bürgerschaft (Bremen and Hamburg) or 
Abgeordnetenhaus (Berlin)), police oversight is primarily exerted by the 
legislative function.
Police accountability also includes internal control mechanisms with 
hierarchical supervision and disciplinary procedures for cases of police 
misconduct. These procedures may lead to sanctions up to dismissals. 
Most German police agencies have procedures for the handling of 
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citizens’ complaints. However, these internal mechanisms have often 
been criticised as insufficient and not impartial.21
Cases of contested police tactics can be brought before administrative 
courts if a citizen feels that his or her fundamental rights have been 
inadequately restricted. Cases of police misconduct that infringe on 
criminal laws lead to criminal investigations against the police officers 
involved and proceedings before criminal courts. However, as the police, 
public prosecutors and criminal courts have to cooperate closely in 
criminal investigations, cases against police officers are often conceived 
as insufficiently neutral. The number of police officers convicted in 
criminal proceedings is low in relation to the cases of alleged police 
misconduct.22
Audit institutions at the Federal and State levels also play a role in police 
oversight, but they usually restrict their audits to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of policing.
In Germany, there is no specific legislation on the implementation of 
anti-corruption laws in the police. Police officers are under the same 
legal regime as officers in other public administrations. Criminal 
investigation into cases of police corruption is mostly the task of 
specific police units that are usually strictly separated from the units 
with the officers suspected of corruption.
The functions of independent “watch-dogs” for the police are mostly 
exerted by NGOs. Compared to other citizens, these NGOs do not have 
any specific rights in relation to the police according to German law so 
far.
Police oversight functions of the German 
parliaments
The following section explores the core functions that the Bundestag, 
Bundesrat and the 16 State Parliaments apply to police oversight.
Legislative functions
The distribution of tasks between the Federal and State Parliaments is 
closely linked to the constitutional distribution of legislative powers. 
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Due to the specific German rule of law tradition and the Constitutional 
Court’s case law, the legal framework for policing is dense and, compared 
to other countries, detailed.23
The German legal system strictly distinguishes between criminal 
procedure, which is only applicable when a criminal offense occurs, 
and the prevention of dangers (Gefahrenabwehr). Criminal law 
(materielles Strafrecht) and criminal procedure (Strafprozessordnung) 
are under federal legislation, as well as the law regulating the Federal 
Criminal Police Agency (Bundeskriminalamt) and the Federal Police 
(Bundespolizeigesetz). By contrast, the prevention of dangers is under 
State legislation. Each of the 16 German States therefore has its own 
police law regulating the organisation of the police and the prevention 
of dangers by the State police agency (Landespolizei). Federal legislation 
regulates the prevention of dangers by the Federal Police with limited 
authority, only including railway stations, railway lines and airports. The 
Federal Police also exerts auxiliary functions for State police agencies 
with its formed units (“anti-riot units”). 
The German style of federalism is usually labelled “cooperative” in 
comparison to states such as Belgium where federalism is the result 
of major conflicts among regions and citizens.24 In practice, this means 
that the German federal government and the State governments have 
established permanent working structures that assure coordination 
and a minimum of uniformity, even in cases where the regulation of 
policing is under state legislation. The 17 ministries and police agencies 
coordinate their activities very closely in the administrative structures 
established by the conference of the federal and state ministers of 
the interior (Innenministerkonferenz). Cooperative federalism assures 
mutual assistance: For example, if a State police lacks enough officers 
for policing a major event (e.g. a political demonstration with many 
participants or a major sports event), other State police forces and the 
federal police will send officers in order to ensure adequate policing. 
Legislation restricting fundamental rights can normally not be 
delegated to the government. Therefore, amendments to State police 
laws and federal laws that authorise and regulate the use of special 
powers (e.g. criminal procedure) have to be approved by the parliaments. 
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Parliament or the government can initiate the law-making process at 
the federal level the Federal Parliament, the Federal Council or the 
Federal Government (Bundesregierung).25
In recent years, law-making in the field of policing has been particularly 
relevant for the legal framing of technologies, such as the collection 
and use of personal data and their retention in databases, information-
sharing or the collection and use of DNA data for policing. In 1983, 
the Constitutional Court proclaimed the right to informational self-
determination as a fundamental right derived from human dignity (Article 
1(1) Grundgesetz) and the right to free development of the personality 
(Article 2(1)). This is a specific variation of data protection or privacy 
underlining that individuals have the right to decide themselves what 
public administrations should know about them. Therefore, any kind of 
data collection or data processing by the police requires a legal base in 
a parliamentary law.26
In view of the shared competence and relevance of decentralised State 
authority for policing, these requirements lead to a quasi-permanent 
need to adapt the relevant laws. Political pressure to increase police 
authority tends to occur after major incidents, such as the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.27 Since the late 1960s, the Constitution also 
gives emergency competences to the federal government,28 but these 
powers have not yet become practically relevant.
The freedom of assembly (mainly relevant for political demonstrations; 
Versammlungsfreiheit, Article 8 Grundgesetz) has a high value according 
to the Constitutional Court’s case law. The German political system 
is mainly based on representation by parliaments. This limits citizen 
participation to elections every four or five years. Referenda only play a 
minor role. In this perspective, the freedom of assembly is a compensation 
that ensures a pathway for citizens’ political protest and participation 
in between elections. This has become particularly important since the 
1970s, when NGOs organised protests against the use of nuclear power. 
At that time, some State governments massively restricted the citizens’ 
right to political protest through police measures. In 1985, the Federal 
Constitutional Court declared such restrictions as unconstitutional.29 
Today, restrictions to the freedom of assembly have to be strictly 
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limited and necessary for the protection of other citizens’ freedoms. 
Assemblies are therefore regulated under specific laws. The right to 
legislate was transferred from the federal state to the individual States 
in the 2006 constitutional reform of German federalism. Nevertheless, 
police conduct in connection with assemblies tends to be contested 
and is therefore regularly on the agenda of the relevant parliamentary 
committees. 
For other forms of crowd management, such as in connection with 
football matches or concerts, not covered by the freedom of assembly, 
policing is currently less legally restricted. This will probably continue 
to be a field of parliamentary debate and possibly of more detailed 
legislation (e.g. on the organisation of the cooperation between the 
police and private security companies and the question of who has to 
pay for policing in connection with such kinds of events).30
Internationalisation and Europeanization
International and European police cooperation has so far been less of a 
focus in German parliaments, compared to issues related to national or 
regional policing. As transnational policing was predominantly informal 
and therefore not subject to federal or State legislation until the 1980s, 
parliaments could only exert their legislative functions in connection 
with the ratification of “classical” international law instruments on 
issues such as mutual legal aid or extradition. This has partly changed 
with the trend towards extended and more official cooperation among 
police agencies in the European Union (EU).31 Trans-border information 
sharing and cooperation have increasingly become issues for German 
parliaments, even at the State level.32 However, these issues are still 
much less relevant and not everyday business, compared to the core 
questions of everyday policing.
Police oversight functions
Parliamentary police oversight is, in the German case, concentrated 
on policy-making, legislation, and general oversight of the Federal 
and State government ministries of the interior. As policing is one 
of the core issues in their responsibilities, policing plays a central 
role in parliamentary oversight of these ministries. However, in the 
German political system, the extent and the impact of parliamentary 
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oversight are limited by the fact that federal and State governments 
are elected by the majority of the members of parliament. Therefore, 
critical oversight is mostly limited to opposition party groups, while 
party groups represented in the government mostly tend not to criticise 
“their” government in the public.
In German law, there is no legal obligation to produce programmatic 
documents for policing and security issues, in contrast to the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Article 68 TFEU). Periodically, such kinds of documents have 
been produced by governments with the conference of federal and 
State ministers of interior.33 Parliaments are not directly involved in the 
preparation of these documents.
The organisation of the police, top appointments, as well as setting 
and implementing policing priorities, are among the governments’ 
responsibilities in the German political and administrative system. 
Parliaments have the right to be informed about governmental 
decisions and administrative practice and to discuss them, which 
usually takes place in the standing parliamentary committees for the 
interior. Parliaments can also conduct special inquiries if they believe 
that police practice goes wrong. Parliament has direct oversight only 
of the government and governmental decisions. According to Article 
43 of the Grundgesetz, the federal parliament has the right to summon 
members of the federal government. As this constitutional right 
requires a majority vote in parliament, it is not very relevant in practice. 
Only parliamentary inquiry committees have the right to summon other 
government representatives as witnesses.34 The hearing of government 
representatives under oath by the standing parliamentary committees 
is not foreseen by German law. In practice, parliamentary committees 
regularly ask the government to send top officials from the police to 
respond to Members of Parliaments’ questions, such as after a major 
political demonstration or if something has gone wrong in policing. 
Governments mostly give a positive response in such cases, but the 
Members of Parliaments’ right to force police officers to respond to 
their questions is limited to parliamentary inquiries.
In most cases, Members of Parliament have not been directly involved 
in police reform projects. Usually, governmental coalitions decide how 
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and by whom reform projects will be prepared, such as by a group of 
experts.35
Budget control functions
Budget control functions are among the core functions of parliaments 
in the German political system. The annual budget has to be approved 
by parliaments. Amendments of the budget in the course of the 
parliamentary discussion are frequent. However, in practice, parliaments’ 
influence is limited by the fact that governments are elected by the 
majority of Members of Parliament in the German democracy, making 
it not probable that parliaments use their budgetary power to force 
governments to change policies. 
The general police budget has been rarely contested in German federal 
and State parliaments. The parliaments’ budgetary decisions are rather 
relevant for major investments (e.g. for extending or reducing the 
number of police officers or for innovations in police technology). Both 
issues are often relevant after major incidents such as terrorist attacks 
or natural disasters. Electoral campaigns sometimes include promises 
to increase the number of police officers. The budget then has to be 
approved by the government’s majority after the elections in order to 
transform such promises into reality.
German parliaments do not have the explicit task to scrutinise the 
effectiveness and efficiency of policing. However, if they wish, they 
can do so. This would be typically carried out in the framework of the 
parliamentary committee that covers policing and other policies under 
the authority of the ministry of the interior. Parliamentary committees 
also have a budget that enables them to hire external expertise (e.g. 
studies by university researchers).
As most other political systems, Germany has audit institutions that 
carry out audits not only on the legal conformity of the expenditure 
with the relevant legal rules, but also on the effectiveness of 
public administrations. The audit institutions are constitutionally 
independent.36 Reports published by the audit institutions are primarily 
addressed to the audited administration. In major cases, or if a dissent 
remains, the Courts of Auditors will report to the parliaments’ budgetary 
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control committees, which then decide on involving the committee for 
the specific policy in the further discussion.
Parliamentary committees with police oversight 
functions
Parliamentary committees are the core actors for the German 
parliaments’ oversight role of public administrations. Members of 
Parliament specialised in a policy, often with a relevant professional 
background, meet in specialised parliamentary committees, overlapping 
the logics of party politics with specific policy-related expertise. German 
parliaments generally attempt to keep parliamentary committees free 
of party politics and “window dressing”. This is the main reason for why 
committee meetings are generally not public – with possible exceptions, 
especially for hearings with invited external experts.37
The Federal and State constitutions do not define the composition and 
the role of parliamentary committees in detail. The Federal Constitution 
only includes the obligation to establish a committee on the European 
Union (Article 45 Grundgesetz), a Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence (Article 45a), a Petitions Committee (Article 45c) and a 
Parliamentary Control Panel for the federal secret services (Article 
45d). For the other policies, parliaments mostly establish committees 
corresponding to the portfolio of each government department. 
Generally, a minister and his or her administrative staff have to respond 
to one committee. In the 16 states, parliamentary committees are also 
mostly organised according to this principle. After a reorganisation of the 
government departments, parliaments will mostly adapt the structure 
of their committees to the new structure of governmental portfolios, 
which often happens after general elections. The number of seats that 
the party groups (Fraktionen) have in the committees is proportional 
to the composition of the plenary. The members of the committees are 
selected by the party groups. The party groups will have a number of 
committee chairs corresponding to their size in the plenary (cf. Table 2).
Policing is a core task of the committees specialised in interior 
policy and is sometimes combined with other responsibilities of the 
relevant government department (e.g. sports or immigration). German 
134 The Role of Parliament in Police Governance: Lessons Learned from Asia and Europe
parliamentary committees frequently organise public hearings, 
especially when new pieces of legislation are under discussion. As 
normally the party groups select the experts to be heard, the input 
depends on the kind of invited experts. Hearings may therefore be 
dominated by lobbyists, but are often used to integrating external 
experts, such as university professors, into the law-making process.
Table 2: Standing parliamentary committees for police oversight 
(2014) 
Police Agency Standing Parliamentary 
Committee exerting the 
oversight function
MPs as Members of the 
Committee
Bundespolizei (Federal 
Police)
Innenausschuss des 
Deutschen Bundestages 
37
Bundeskriminalamt (Federal 
Criminal Police Office)
Innenausschuss des 
Deutschen Bundestages
37
Zoll (Federal Customs 
Administrations)
Finanzausschuss des 
Deutschen Bundestages
37
Polizei Baden-Württemberg 
(Police Baden-Württemberg)
Innenausschuss des Landtags 19
Bayerische Staatliche Polizei 
(Police Bavaria)
Ausschuss für kommunale 
Fragen, innere Sicherheit 
und Sport des Bayerischen 
Landtags
18
Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin 
(Police Chief Berlin)
Ausschuss für Inneres, 
Sicherheit und Ordnung des 
Berliner Abgeordnetenhauses
19
Polizei Brandenburg (Police 
Brandenburg)
Ausschuss für Inneres des 
Landtags Bandenburg
10
Polizei Bremen (Police 
Bremen)
Staatliche Deputation für 
Inneres und Sport
13
Polizei Hamburg (Police 
Hamburd)
Innenausschuss der 
Hamburgischen Bürgerschaft 
13
Hessische Polizei (Police 
Hesse)
Innenausschuss des 
Hessischen Landtags
19
Polizei Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (Police 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern)
Innenausschuss des Landtags 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
11
Polizei Niedersachsen (Police 
Lower Saxony)
Ausschuss für Inneres und 
Sport des Niedersächsischen 
Landtags
15
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Police 
North Rhine-Westphalia)
Innenausschuss des Landtags 
Nordrhein-Westfalen
27
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Police Agency Standing Parliamentary 
Committee exerting the 
oversight function
MPs as Members of the 
Committee
Polizei Rheinland-Pfalz 
(Police Rhineland-Palatinate)
Ausschuss für Inneres, 
Sport und Infrastruktur des 
Landtags Rheinland-Pfalz
16
Polizei im Saarland (Police 
Saarland)
Ausschuss für Inneres und 
Sport des Landtags des 
Saarlands
12
Polizei Sachsen (Police 
Saxony)
Innenausschuss des 
Sächsischen Landtags
19
Polizei Sachsen-Anhalt 
(Police Saxony-Anhalt)
Ausschuss für Inneres und 
Sport des Landtags Sachsen-
Anhalt
13
Polizei Schleswig-Holstein 
(Police Schleswig-Holstein)
Innen- und Rechtsausschuss 
des Landtags Schleswig-
Holstein
11
Thüringer Polizei (Police 
Thuringia)
Innenausschuss des 
Thüringer Landtags
13
The extent to which government departments have to answer to 
Members of Parliaments’ questions has often been contested. This is 
particularly relevant for security-related issues, such as the work of 
police agencies or secret services that is usually characterised by a 
high degree of secrecy. Cases in Federal or State Constitutional Courts 
have mostly strengthened the parliamentarians’ right to be informed.38 
However, for policing and security issues, conflicts remain concerning 
the extent of executive autonomy in relation to parliamentary control. 
Members of Parliament also have access to police premises in their 
respective jurisdiction. However, in practice, on-the-spot visits for 
oversight purposes are rare and very much depend on the individual 
Member of Parliament’s engagement in this field.
Parliamentary committees of inquiry, foreseen for the Federal State 
in Article 44 of the Constitution, are important instruments for in-
depth investigations into security-related issues by Members of 
Parliament. The establishment of a committee of inquiry is the right 
of the parliamentary opposition, requiring the support of a quarter 
of Members of Parliaments. In 2001, procedural issues of inquiry 
committees at the federal level were regulated by federal law.39 The 
committees have the power to summon witnesses and have access to 
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all administrative documents. For secret documents, access is mostly 
restricted to Members of Parliament personally. They do not have the 
right to take away copies in this case. 
The inquiry committees can also hear experts. Typically, inquiry 
committees are established after major scandals that have been 
broadly discussed in the public, but where the attribution of political 
and administrative responsibility remains at least partly unclear or 
contested. Inquiry committees have to publish a report on the results of 
their work. Dissenting votes are permitted and frequently used. These 
reports are usually interesting material for further policy-making and 
for scholarly research. Federal or State parliamentary committees of 
inquiry have regularly covered issues related to policing. In recent 
years, the Federal Parliament and several State Parliaments established 
inquiries into a major scandal caused by a series of murders and bank 
robberies committed by a group of far right terrorists. The police and 
secret services were unable to detect and stop these terrorists who lived 
in an East German city. Nine of the ten victims killed by the group were 
immigrants. Even if it was soon clear that it was a series of murders, 
police and secret services ignored the extremist background and even 
suspected the victims to have been involved in organised crime. The 
Federal Parliament and State parliaments published major reports on 
the case, requiring reforms in the police and secret services.40 In the 
1990s, a parliamentary inquiry committee of the State parliament in 
the city-state of Hamburg investigated cases in which the Hamburg 
State Police had mistreated immigrants and political protesters. The 
recommendations issued by the State Parliament in 1996, including 
improved police accountability mechanisms, have still not been fully 
implemented today.41
The budget committees (Haushaltsausschuss) and the budgetary control 
committees (Rechnungsprüfungsaussschuss) may also play a role in the 
parliamentary oversight of police agencies. In practice, this is mainly 
relevant for major investments for policing, such as new computer 
systems.
The standing parliamentary committees, the inquiry committees and 
the single Members of Parliaments have staff in order to prepare their 
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tasks. However, it has always been contested if the number of staff is 
sufficient in order ensure an effective parliamentary control.
Citizens may send a complaint related to policing to the Petitions 
Committees that exist in the Federal and in all State parliaments. If 
citizens convince the members of the Petitions Committee that their 
request is justified, this kind of parliamentary intervention can be a 
relevant case by case contribution to police oversight.
In view of the size of the police and the numerous other tasks that 
Members of Parliaments have, police oversight by parliamentary 
committees is necessarily selective and punctual. Opposition party 
Members of Parliament tend to select issues interesting for the media 
that they can use to demonstrate shortcomings of governmental politics. 
Government party Members of Parliament tend to use more informal 
ways of influence if they wish to be informed about issues related to 
policing or criticize governmental activities in this field.
Parliament-police liaison mechanisms
German parliaments do not have institutionalised liaison mechanisms 
for the police. Information exchange is mainly organised via the 
ministries of the interior. This does not exclude informal contacts (e.g. 
between Members of Parliaments and police officers or police union 
representatives).
Typical forms of parliament-police interactions are therefore: 
• senior police officers accompanying politicians appearing before 
parliamentary committees for police-related issues;
• police officers preparing answers for police-related issues that the 
interior ministry gives to Members of Parliament;
• representatives from the ministry of the interior presenting answers 
to questions raised by members of parliament at parliamentary 
committee meetings;
• in certain cases, information on statistics on policing is given to 
parliament on a regular basis, e.g. on police surveillance in private 
homes (Article 13 (6) Grundgesetz);
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• police officers, mostly police leaders or representatives of police 
unions, invited as experts to hearings before parliamentary 
committees;
• police officers summoned to witness before parliamentary committees 
of inquiry; and
• informal contacts between Members of Parliament and police officers.
Relationship with other overseers
As there is only a weak tradition of independent civilian police 
oversight in Germany so far, there is no formalised relationship 
between independent civilian police oversight and parliaments. In the 
past, only NGOs completely independent from the police and public 
administrations were engaged in external police oversight. NGO 
representatives (e.g. from Amnesty International) communicate with 
Members of Parliament on a regular basis. 
Independent civilian police oversight may be strengthened in the 
future if several States governed by coalitions in which the Green 
Party participates implement their plans to establish independent 
police complaint mechanisms. In 2014, the additional function 
of a commissioner for the State Police was attributed to the 
Bürgerbeauftragter (Ombudsman) of Rhineland-Palatinate (Rheinland-
Pfalz). The Ombudsman is elected by and reports to the State Parliament 
(Landtag).42 Similar institutions have recently been established in 
Schleswig-Holstein and Baden-Württemberg.
The Federal and State Data Protection Commissioners exert oversight 
functions for police data processing.43 In this function, they are 
independent. Data protection is closely linked to parliaments in Germany, 
as the commissioners are elected by the federal or state parliament. 
They also regularly report to the parliamentarians. In 2015, the Federal 
Data Protection Commissioner’s office was detached from the federal 
ministry of interior and became independent, reporting directly to the 
Federal Parliament.
In the German rule of law system, courts are important overseers of 
police activities. They have judicial independence (Article 97(1) of the 
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Grundgesetz) also in relation to parliament. Certain police measures 
and investigation tactics, such as telephone tapping, other forms of 
surveillance, arrests and police custody, require an authorisation by a 
court. Citizens may also bring cases before administrative or criminal 
courts in order to have them determine the legality of police measures 
in view of police law, respectively criminal procedure. There is no direct 
link between courts dealing with individual cases and parliaments. 
Parliamentary committees of inquiry may use court cases for their 
purposes. Judges may also be heard as experts in parliamentary 
hearings. Some laws allowing specific police measures (e.g. acoustical 
surveillance in private homes) require a statistical reporting to 
parliament on a regular basis.
Audit institutions are independent, but reporting to parliaments. 
German Federal and State parliaments regularly use reports by the 
external audit institutions. Committees may also hear representatives 
from the audit institutions as experts.
In conclusion, German parliaments are key players, bundling and 
evaluating the different elements of police oversight.
Conclusions and recommendations
In a comparative perspective, German parliaments have the power to 
make a strong contribution to the oversight of the police and other public 
administrations. Over time, Federal and State Constitutional Courts 
strengthened the right of parliaments to be informed by governments 
and have access to information. In this respect, the German legal and 
institutional framework may serve as an example for other countries. 
However, German parliaments do not have the capacity to exert 
oversight of the everyday work of police agencies. This would require 
important administrative capacities specifically devoted to this issue, 
which German parliaments do not have in view of the broad range 
of their other tasks. Police oversight by courts and data protection 
commissioners is mostly limited to single cases brought to the attention 
of these institutions.
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Even in countries, such as Germany, with a long tradition of a democratic 
polity, policing often leads to conflicts between police agencies or 
police officers, on the one hand, and individuals or groups of citizens, 
on the other. Policing political protests and socially disadvantaged 
urban areas are classic situations that have repeatedly escalated in the 
past. Therefore, police organisations in democratic countries are under 
pressure to solve problems in a more decent and de-escalating way 
and prevent conflicts. Most German police agencies have developed 
the ambition to become a “normal” modern, service-oriented public 
administration and to get away from the old image of maintaining 
public order with the help of (sometimes disproportionate) violence. 
Accountability of policing, including lawful police behaviour and high 
professional standards, has become an important issue over the past 
decades.44
Oversight by the ministries of the interior and internal police 
hierarchies is not always impartial in cases of wrongdoing.45 Therefore 
the establishment of independent civilian police oversight bodies, as 
they exist in many other countries, would clearly contribute to improved 
police oversight. The political and scholarly debate on the establishment 
of such institutions has already been led for several decades.46 An 
independent complaint and oversight institution, as it was recently 
established in the states of Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Baden-Württemberg, may also strengthen parliaments, as reports 
and policy recommendations published by independent oversight 
institutions can be the base for parliamentary initiatives directed 
towards higher standards of professionalism and protection of human 
rights in policing.47 Effective oversight institutions will be independent 
from the police agency for monitoring, but have the authority to request 
the information needed for an investigation. Effectiveness also requires 
intensive communication with police agencies. Independent police 
oversight will be effective only if oversight institutions are able to 
convince police officers, police leaders political decision-makers that it 
is necessary to learn from cases that went wrong. The trend that many 
police agencies wish to become a “normal” public administration may 
also lead to a convergence of external and internal accountability.48
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Oversight institutions that are designed by and reporting to parliaments 
seem to be best placed to be independent and have sufficient influence 
upon administrative practice and political decision-making. Their 
attachment to parliaments also ensures democratic legitimacy.
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The Netherlands
8
The police service has far reaching powers. In a democratic system 
under the rule of law, the state has the monopoly to use violence, which 
is exercised by the military and the police services under full political 
responsibility. A system of checks and balances has to be created to 
control the use of coercion and violence. The people’s representatives 
exercise the tasks of controlling government policy and criticizing 
government legislation proposals. Parliament plays an important role 
in the system, because trust in the state, its institutions and its actions 
is at stake.
The Dutch police is in a phase of transitioning from 25 regional police 
services to one National Police Service. Therefore, a lot of rules and 
procedures have been scrutinized in the last few years in a legislative 
process. Some procedures are still being developed.
In this case study, the Dutch parliamentary system is explained on the 
basis of policy issues related to security and justice, with a focus on 
policing. It contains a description of formal procedures and formal and 
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informal ways in which Parliament as a whole, as well as individual 
Members of Parliament, are being informed about police matters. It 
deals with questions about parliamentary practices and procedures: 
What is important? What is advisable? What and what not works?
Police accountability framework
The Dutch police is organised as a National Police Service, consisting 
of ten regional units. There are a number of national units, such as 
a national criminal investigation unit, and the Police Service Centre 
(Politiedienstencentrum).  The Police Service Centre is responsible for 
national operational management: human resources management, 
facility management, finance, information management, information and 
communication technology (ICT) and communication. The head of the 
National Police Service is the national police commissioner (Korpschef), 
who is responsible for all ten regional police units. Each regional unit 
is headed by its own chief.
Police Act 2012
The legal framework for the National Police Service is enshrined in 
the Police Act of 2012.2 The Minister of Security and Justice has full 
ministerial responsibility for the National Police Service. The Minister 
determines the budget and sets the framework within which the 
National Police Service has to work. The Minister determines national 
priorities for the police, in agreement with the National Police Service 
and the Public Prosecution Service.
Before 2013, the Dutch police was organised in 25 regional police 
services and the Dutch Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke 
Politiediensten), each with their own police commissioner. It is one of 
the purposes of the National Police Service for regional units to work 
together more promptly and effectively, subordinated to a single national 
police commissioner. Furthermore, ICT, accommodation, purchasing and 
human resources management are centralised. As a result, operational 
management overhead will be smaller.
The reorganisation has no effect on the duties and powers of the police. 
Authority over the police is still with the mayor (who is responsible 
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for maintaining public order) and the chief public prosecutor (who is 
responsible for criminal investigation). They make local agreements 
about police deployment. Each municipality is responsible for a 
public safety and security plan, which serves as a basis for the mayor’s 
management of the police.
Judiciary
Police work as a part of criminal investigation is always subjected to 
the verdict of the judge. Judges are independent: they are appointed 
for life and cannot be dismissed by the Minister of Security and Justice. 
The judiciary, which consists of judges and public prosecutors, is not 
a department of the Ministry of Security and Justice. However its 
organisations are directly linked to the Ministry.
Internal investigations
Every case of the use of firearms by police officers, causing serious 
injury or death, is to be investigated by the National Police Internal 
Investigations Department (Rijksrecherche).  Impartial investigation 
is not only important to the victims and their relatives, but also to 
the police officers involved. Therefore, the National Police Internal 
Investigations Department is the only division of the Dutch police that 
is governed by the exclusive responsibility and authority of the Board 
of Procurators General (College van procureurs-generaal) of the Public 
Prosecutions Department (Openbaar Ministerie).3 No other European 
country has a similar independent investigations organisation.
Inspectorate of Security and Justice
On behalf of the Ministry of Security and Justice, the Inspectorate 
of Security and Justice (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie) monitors 
organisations, inter alia the National Police Service. Monitoring means 
collecting information about the quality of organisations with an 
executive task, analysing this information and formulating a judgement 
based on this analysis. The Inspectorate does not have the authority to 
intervene in organisations. However, it can make recommendations or 
give advice about adjustment of policy or rules to the Minister, or make 
practice-oriented recommendations to the executive organisations. 
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The Inspectorate does not evaluate laws or government policy. However, 
research of the Inspectorate can be used for policy evaluation. The 
Inspectorate of Security and Justice works on the basis of core values: 
transparency, independence, professionalism, efficiency, selection and 
cooperation. Its reports are publicly accessible.4 As a rule, the Minister 
of Security and Justice presents Inspectorate reports to Parliament. 
Parliament discusses Inspectorate reports with the Minister, in 
conjunction with the government position paper.
Supervisory Committee
Recently, the Cabinet established the Supervisory Committee on 
National Police Service Management (Commissie van toezicht beheer 
nationale politie).5 The committee members are independent experts. 
The committee will periodically report to the Minister of Security and 
Justice, providing solicited and unsolicited advice.
The committee assesses the implementation of the management 
of the National Police Service. The supervision of the committee is 
complementary to the supervision of the Inspectorate of Security and 
Justice. Management includes, for example, the organisation structure, 
working procedures, the care of the staff, police resources and financial 
management. The committee assesses if objectives are implemented 
within the agreed framework and if they are implemented effectively 
and efficiently.
Court of Audit6
The Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) audits if central government 
revenue and expenditure are received and spent correctly and if central 
government policy is implemented as intended. As a High Council of 
State,7 the Court of Audit is a central government body created to ensure 
that the democratic system functions properly.
The Court of Audit expresses an opinion on government policy that 
has already been adopted; it does not express political opinions. It 
can come to the conclusion that a law is not working as intended. The 
government and/or the House of Representatives decide on giving a 
political opinion.
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It is important that the Court of Audit provides Parliament with useful 
and relevant information for deciding if the government’s policies 
are effective. For example, in 2012, the Court of Audit concluded in 
its report Performance of the Criminal Justice System8 that an unknown 
and undesirable number of cases were leaving the criminal justice 
system9. In a comment on the 2014 budget, the Court of Audit notes 
that the Minister has taken many measures for improvement and has 
set ambitions and goals. The National Police Service is playing an 
important part in improving the performance of the criminal justice 
system, but the Ministry’s budget does not disclose the resources it is 
using to do so.10
Police complaint bodies
Every citizen is entitled to file an official complaint about the actual 
behaviour of a police officer that s/he is dissatisfied about. The police 
is obliged to properly handle complaints. This is an internal complaints 
procedure. 
A police complaints officer is assigned to the complainant as an 
independent contact within the police organization. This person cannot 
be the officer in question or his or her superior. The first step is always 
for the complaints officer or someone else to try to mediate between 
the complainant and the officer in question and/or his or her superior. 
If the complainant is satisfied with the outcome of the mediation or 
the consultations, the complaints procedure is concluded. Otherwise, a 
formal complaint procedure is instated.
There is a police complaints committee for the national unit and for 
every regional unit of the National Police Service.11 The members of the 
committee are appointed by the national police commissioner after an 
open application process, on the basis of legal expertise, skills in the 
field of dispute resolution or mediation and knowledge of police work. 
The complaints committee looks into the complaint and advises the 
competent authority (i.e. a police chief, the Police Commissioner, the 
Board of Procurators General or the Minister of Security and Justice) on 
how to deal with a complaint.
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The competent authority is obliged to supply the committee with all 
the information that the committee deems as necessary. The national 
police commissioner is responsible for an annual publication of the 
registered complaints and decisions, indicating the extent to which 
certain symptoms point to structural weaknesses in the functioning 
of the police service. If appropriate, attention is paid to the means to 
eliminate these shortcomings.
In addition to the committee, the mayor and/or the chief public 
prosecutor may advise on how to proceed. The competent authority 
will base its decision on these recommendations. The decision will 
also state whether or not, and if so why, the decision differs from the 
recommendations.
Sometimes a complaint may lead to a criminal investigation or an 
internal investigation within the police organization.
If the complainant disagrees with the decision of the complaints 
committee, s/he may address his or her complaint to the National 
Ombudsman, who is also competent for the National Police Service. The 
National Ombudsman provides an external complaints procedure.
The issue of the independence of police complaint committees is still 
being discussed. At request of the House of Representatives, the Minister 
of Security and Justice will appoint the chair.12 The ten regional mayors 
(Regioburgemeesters)13 argued that police complaint committees should 
be more independent.14 In the past the regional mayor had an official 
role in the process of handling complaints as the force manager of the 
regional police service. Following the argument of the regional mayors, 
the Minister decided to appoint the chair as well as the members of the 
Police Complaints Committees, on the basis of a joint recommendation 
by the regional mayor and the chief public prosecutor.15
National Ombudsman 
The National Ombudsman was instituted in 1982 as a High Council 
of State.16 The National Ombudsman is appointed by the House of 
Representatives. The National Ombudsman is an independent, impartial 
intermediary between the citizen and the public administration and has 
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to defend the citizen’s interests and keep a critical eye on government 
operations.
In 2013, the National Ombudsman received 2792 complaints about the 
behaviour of police officers. The National Ombudsman not only deals 
with individual complaints. His or her annual report is accompanied 
by a series of advisory letters to government agencies. For example, 
in the annual report of 201317, the National Ombudsman expresses his 
concern about the tendency of the government to push the limits of its 
powers. For example, he notes that there was improper use of stop and 
search powers in large-scale police checks. According to the National 
Ombudsman, a government that pushes the limits of the law should not 
be surprised that people do the same.
The National Ombudsman can conduct investigations on the basis 
of a complaint or on his or her own initiative. In 2014, the National 
Ombudsman published a report on the actions of police officers in a 
multicultural quarter of The Hague.18 The report focuses on different 
topics, namely treatment of citizens, ID-checks, use of force, ethnic 
discrimination, and recording of complaints filed against police officers. 
The National Ombudsman found no evidence of structural defects in the 
actions of the police officers. However, he concluded that both police 
and citizens should make efforts to prevent escalation.
Functions of Parliament
Legislative function
The creation of a legal framework for the reorganisation of the Dutch 
police into a National Police Service was a major legislative project. 
The proposal of a National Police Service was sent to the House of 
Representatives in July 2011, after a long period of public debate about 
the organisational structure of the police service. The lack of adequate 
cooperation between the 25 regional police services, especially in the 
field of ICT, was predominant in the appreciation of the organisation of 
the police service.
The local anchoring of the police service was an important issue in the 
parliamentary debate about the National Police Service. The government 
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expects scale benefits from centralisation. However, it is clear that 
centralisation carries the risk that the central level where decisions are 
made is too removed from local security issues. Some political groups 
were afraid that centralisation of the police service would inevitably 
lead to an undesirable distance between the police service and the 
public. Therefore, the House has adopted an amendment stating that 
there shall be at least one police officer (Wijkagent) per 5.000 citizens.19
Statistics
Every year since 2008, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) carries out 
a survey of the population on the subjects of safety, quality of life and 
victimization. This survey, the Security Monitor (Veiligheidsmonitor), is 
commissioned by the Ministry of Security and Justice and presented 
to parliament. The CBS publishes statistics about developments in 
criminality and in criminal investigation. These statistics are important 
for parliamentary debates on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
police service as a part of the system of criminal justice with the 
Minister and the Secretary of State of Security and Justice.20
Legislation Office
The House of Representatives has an internal parliamentary Legislation 
Office (Bureau Wetgeving), which has an important role in the preparation 
of amendments. It translates political intentions into adequate legal 
texts. Of course, the Member of Parliament is responsible for the 
formulation of his or her motivation for any amendments. It is possible 
and common practice that the Legislation Office consults with lawyers 
in government ministries. However, it is important that Parliament 
has its own legislative support, which can have a critical judgment on 
government proposals.
Parliamentary initiative
The Government introduces most bills in Parliament. The House of 
Representatives can adopt, reject or amend a bill. A Member of Parliament 
can also put forward a proposal for a new law, a so-called “initiative 
bill.” In the field of security and justice, there are a few examples of 
legislation initiated by Members of Parliament. 
In 1999, Wim van de Camp, Member of Parliament, proposed legislation 
155The Netherlands
to enable the police to carry out preventive searches for weapons. In 
this proposal, the mayor is entitled to assign the status of a “safety 
risk area,” which includes the possibility of preventive searches. The 
proposal was adopted by the House in 2001 and the Senate in 2002.21
Another initiative bill is the proposal to sharpen the “measures to 
combat football hooliganism and serious nuisance.”22
Oversight function
As a rule, Parliament can discuss all aspects of police work with the 
Minister of Security and Justice in the annual debate on the budget. 
In a separate committee meeting on the budget bill, the Standing 
Committee on Security and Justice discusses the budget of the National 
Police Service. For Parliament, it is important to use the right to amend 
the budget to set policing priorities. However, it is an unwritten rule 
that there should be financial coverage for every amendment of the 
budget.
When Parliament approved of the reorganisation of the police into a 
National Police Service, the Minister promised to inform Parliament on 
a regular basis about the progress of the reorganisation. On 11 June 
2014, Parliament received the sixth biannual progress report.23 The 
headline of the press release was: “National Police on track.”24 However, 
headlines in the newspapers said: “Reporting to the police is still a 
drama;”25 and “Internet declarations are lost, it takes forever to make a 
declaration in a different place and some police officers lie about the 
handling of declarations of burglary.”
It is important for a Member of Parliament to be adequately informed. 
Therefore, s/he should read external comments before any letter or 
press statement from the Minister. Whereas the Minister might focus 
on positive developments, external comments may point out setbacks 
or weaknesses. 
Parliament itself has neither the manpower nor the resources to 
scrutinise all government information. The right of the Parliament, in 
fact of any Member of Parliament, to be informed by the government 
is not only important for Parliament itself but even more for society 
as a whole. Citizens and institutions, all with their own interests and 
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expertise, can take note of the government’s information and comment 
on the government’s allegations and policy. Therefore, Parliament’s 
power to make government information publicly available is a very 
important democratic tool of oversight.
Judicial
For the use of special powers (such as a house search, interception of 
telephone lines or arrest), magistrate has to authorise the police to 
use these powers, usually at the request of the public prosecutor. In 
any judicial investigation, the magistrate is a judge appointed by the 
President of the Court to decide on matters that the prosecutor has no 
jurisdiction over. In case of a house search, the magistrate has to be 
present. S/he leads the investigations and decides on what should be 
seized.
Court of Audit
In 2011, the Court of Audit published a report on “ICT in the Police 
Service 2010”. The audit was carried out at the request of the Minister of 
Security and Justice. However, the request was made at the insistence of 
the House of Representatives in mid-November 2010. The report includes 
a reconstruction of developments in ICT in the police service and an 
analysis of the problems and risks in the steering and management of 
ICT. One of the main developments in recent years was the establishment 
of the Dutch Police Cooperation Facility (Voorziening tot samenwerking 
Politie Nederland) in July 2006. The audit paid special attention to the 
information systems in place for police officers and detectives, such 
as the standard facilities for enforcement (Basisvoorziening Handhaving, 
BVH), investigation (Basisvoorziening Opsporing, BVO) and capacity 
management (Basisvoorziening Capaciteitsmanagement).
The audit found that the police service had made little progress in 
finding permanent solutions to ICT problems in the past ten years. 
Information systems such as the BVH and BVO provide inadequate 
support for police work. The BVH and BVO are not future evidence, 
have poor user interfaces and were not introduced uniformly. Regional 
police service managers lack understanding of ICT. The heads of the 
police services upheld their own regional procedures, and the minister’s 
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supervision was inadequate. The distance between ICT decision-makers 
and the shop floor was too great. In consequence, police officers were 
overlooked and lost confidence in ICT.
The case of the National Police Service was very much supported by the 
conclusions of the Court of Audit in this report.
Temporary committee on ICT
In 2009, the House of Representatives decided to formulate its own 
future and investigation agenda. Every year, the House decides on 
investigations to be carried out, either into the implementation of policy 
or future developments and with a maximum of three investigations per 
year. These investigations provide Members of Parliament with a more 
thorough understanding and knowledge of the subject in question, 
which makes it easier for them to form opinions and proper decisions. 
Special temporary committees, often supported by external experts, 
carry out investigations. These temporary committees do not have 
special rights compared with the standing committees. They can 
organise public hearings and round table conferences, but they do 
not have the authority to question people under oath. People are not 
obliged to participate in their investigations or to accept an invitation 
for a hearing.
In 2012, the Temporary Committee on ICT Projects was commissioned 
to carry out a parliamentary investigation into government ICT projects. 
The government often fails fix its ICT projects. The committee’s aim 
was to identify what went wrong and well, and why. The committee was 
expected to present its final report to the House in autumn 2014. One 
of the seven case studies the temporary committee was supposed to 
conduct is the C200026 digital communications system for emergency 
services of the police, fire department, and ambulance services.
Budget control function
The budget of the National Police Service27 is part of the budget of the 
Ministry of Security and Justice28. The draft budget is presented to the 
House of Representatives on the third Tuesday in September.
Prince’s Day
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The third Tuesday in September is “Prince’s Day.” In a joint meeting of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, the King delivers the so-
called “King’s Speech,” explicating the government’s policy for the next 
year. Subsequently, the Minister of Finance presents his or her famous 
“Third-Tuesday-in-September”-briefcase to the speaker of the House 
of Representatives. This briefcase contains the Budget Memorandum 
and the National Budget. The National Budget consists of a number of 
proposals of law (bills), one for each ministry, with regard to national 
expenditure, obligations and national revenue for the coming year. 
Prince’s Day marks the start of the parliamentary debate on the policy 
intentions of the Cabinet.
The Budget Memorandum is a policy document in which the government 
looks ten years back and four years ahead. It is the financial translation 
of the King’s Speech. It describes the current economic and financial 
situation of the Netherlands and the prospective developments in the 
Netherlands, in Europe and abroad. It also describes the State’s financial 
situation, the “public treasury.” 
Council of State
Every bill presented by the government to the House of Representatives 
is accompanied by an advice of the Council of State (Raad van State). As 
a High Council of State, it is an independent advisor of the government 
on legislation and administration and the highest administrative court 
in the Netherlands. The advice of the Council of State on the Budget 
Memorandum contains important information for the parliamentary 
debate. The government is not obliged to observe the recommendations 
of the Council of State, but has to answer critical remarks.
Budget bills
The budgets of the respective government departments are presented 
in the form of budget bills. In autumn, both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate discuss the budget bills, which require Parliament’s 
approval. The House of Representatives only has the right of amendment 
to budget bills. The Senate can only adopt of reject the budget.
Parliament authorizes the Cabinet to spend money, assume obligations 
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and raise revenues. The National Budget, as well as specific budgets 
for each field of policy (such as security and justice), are laid down by 
Act of Parliament. A minister may spend less than the budget, but is not 
allowed to exceed the budget. If necessary, an additional bill has to be 
passed by Parliament to increase the budget.
Bureau for Research and Public Expenditure
Before the parliamentary debate, Members of Parliament can ask 
factual questions about the budget bills in a written procedure. In this 
process, the parliamentary Bureau for Research and Public Expenditure 
(Bureau Onderzoek en Rijksuitgaven) plays an important role. It produces 
an internal memorandum on each of the budget bills for the use of 
Members of Parliament. The Bureau makes connections between serial 
budget bills and proposes questions for explication and clarification. 
The Bureau, however limited in staff, is qualified and its contributions 
are appreciated by Members of Parliament.
Spring and Fall Memorandums
The Minister of Finance reports the progress in government expenditure 
and revenue in the so-called Spring Memorandum (June) and Fall 
Memorandum (December). Windfalls, shortfalls and changes in policy 
over the running year can lead to adjustments in the estimates of 
the current budget. These are incorporated in the Spring and Fall 
Memorandums and the accompanying supplementary budget bills.
Supplementary budget bills are updated estimates, and need to be 
considered and adopted by both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate. However, major changes in policy are seldom suggested. The 
House and Senate process supplementary budget bills the same as any 
other bill. Only the House has the right to propose amendments.
Accountability Day
Prince’s Day marks the start of the parliamentary debate on the 
budget, Accountability Day (Verantwoordingsdag), the third Wednesday 
in May, marks the end of de budget cycle. On Accountability Day, the 
government presents its annual report to the House of Representatives. 
At the same time, the President of the Court of Audit presents a report 
to the House of Representatives, scrutinising the government’s policy 
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over the past year: Did the government achieve its desired policy goals? 
Did the Cabinet observe the law? The Court of Audit also comments on 
the annual reports of each ministry. 
The reports of the Court of Audit are important, because they contain 
recommendations for the government, which are points of attention for 
Parliament. Usually, Parliament is more occupied with policy intentions 
than it is interested in policy achievements. Prince’s Day is more of a 
highlight in the parliamentary year than Accountability Day, even though 
the Minister of Finance carries an equally stylish “Third-Wednesday-in-
May”-briefcase. Nevertheless, the Court of Audit is an important advisor 
for both the government and Parliament.
Draft Budget for the National Police
The draft budget of the National Police Service is presented to the 
House of Representatives as an appendix to the Budget Bill of the 
Ministry of Security and Justice. The Minister of Security and Justice 
has agreed not to determine the budget of the National Police Service 
before the plenary debate in the House about the budget of the Ministry 
of Security and Justice.
The House has a right of amendment on the total amount of money 
to be spent on the National Police Service, because this is part of the 
budget of the Ministry of Security and Justice. However, the House lacks 
the right of amendment on the distribution of resources within the 
budget of the National Police Service. 
Therefore, the Court of Audit sent the House of Representatives a critical 
letter on the 2014 budget of the National Police Service.29 In the letter, 
the Court of Audit comments on the following aspects of the budget:
• The budget does not clarify what ambitions the Minister of Security 
and Justice have for the formation of the National Police Service. The 
minister only mentions three conditions for the budget: budgetary 
framework, operational strength and agreed performances.
• The minister states in the budget what the National Police Service 
is expected to do, but does not state how much money is needed. 
No connection can be made between policy goals, performance and 
resources.
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• The Minister of Security and Justice does not explain his or her 
responsibilities and powers regarding the management of the 
National Police Service.
The Minister of Security and Justice replied that it is impossible to 
make a connection between the budget for national policy priorities 
and police performance because of the way the police was financed 
until the Police Act of 2012. The Minister sees a “growing path” to make 
that connection in the future.
Parliamentary committee
Policing is mandated to the Standing Committee on Security and Justice. 
The members are appointed after general elections. It has each 26 
regular and alternate members. Half of the members belong to coalition 
parties and the other half to opposition parties. A member of one of the 
government parties occupies the committee chair.30
The committee discusses the policy areas for which they are responsible 
with the Minister and the State Secretary of Security and Justice. The 
topics range from law enforcement to justice, corporate law to copyright 
and youth protection to prisons. The committee meets regularly with 
the Minister and the State Secretary of Security and Justice to discuss 
European policy in preparation for the Council of Ministers of Justice 
and Home Affairs of the European Union (the JHA Council).
Most committee meetings (Algemeen overleg) are held to discuss 
general policy issues with the Minister or State Secretary. Members 
of Parliament ask questions, and the member of the Cabinet replies. 
Committee meetings about policing matters involve many different 
subjects that are discussed with the Minister of Security and Justice. 
For example, the agenda for the committee meeting on 30 January 
2014 numbered 21 government papers on different subjects.31 However, 
there is no focus in a four hour meeting with 21 different subjects to 
discuss. Thus, a lot of issues do not receive the appropriate attention of 
members of parliament.
Committee meetings on policy documents (Notaoverleg) and on bills 
(Wetgevingsoverleg) “unburden” the plenary meetings. In a committee 
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meeting, different specialist and technical aspects can be dealt with in 
detail, so that only the headlines have to be discussed in the plenary 
meeting.
Working visits
Standing committees frequently conduct working visits to gain 
information on a certain situation or learn how specific problems are 
dealt with abroad. In recent times, the Standing Committee on Security 
and Justice has conducted working visits to the police service, as well 
as to the Police Academy. It is important that Members of Parliament 
not only discuss policy with police authorities. They should also be 
informed by police officers at the shop floor level.
MP-civil servants contacts
It is government policy that civil servants are not allowed to contact 
Members of Parliament.32 Every contact between a civil servant and a 
Member of Parliament is to be reported to the Minister for approval. 
Even when invited for a parliamentary committee hearing, a civil servant 
has to ask permission from the minister.
The reason for this policy is the ministerial responsibility for the civil 
service. The minister is accountable for the behaviour of civil servants. 
Civil servants should not express themselves about policy issues. 
Moreover, civil servants should not be seen as influencing Members of 
Parliament to disapprove of government policy. 
However, a distinction is made between policy and technical information. 
In most cases, ministerial permission is given to civil servants to inform 
Members of Parliament, especially in private technical briefings. Recently, 
the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations refused permission 
to the head of the General Intelligence and Security Service to be heard 
by the standing committee, similar to the Minister of Defence denying 
permission to the head of the Military Intelligence Service.
Formal contacts between Members of Parliament and civil servants 
are strictly regulated. However, in an open information society, formal 
contacts are not as important as they used to be.
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Petitions
The House of Representatives has a Standing Committee on Petitions 
and Citizens’ Initiatives. It is charged with reporting on all petitions 
and citizens’ initiatives passed to it by the House or a committee 
of the House. It is also tasked with matters relating to the National 
Ombudsman, if necessary.
To be admissible, a petition must be about an issue which (a) concerns 
an individual or a small group of people, (b) concerns a responsibility of 
the government, and (c) cannot be submitted to court.33
If the committee decides to take a petition into consideration, it submits 
the petition to the responsible minister or the Secretary of State, asking 
for a response. Subsequently the petitioner is asked to comment on the 
minister’s response. The adversarial principle is applied in a written 
procedure. On the basis of the file, the committee will draft a report.
Each report on a petition, which is anonymised before publication, 
contains a clear conclusion or proposal to deal with the petition. The 
plenary meeting of the House forms a conclusion on every petition, 
usually in accordance with the proposal of the committee.
The Senate has a Standing Committee on Petitions as well. The citizen 
can choose to submit a petition to the House of Representatives, Senate 
or to National Ombudsman. Once one of these three actors has formed a 
conclusion on the petition, it will not be admissible again.
Until 2012, the Joint Committees on Petitions published an annual 
report.34 However, the number of petitions submitted to Parliament 
is relatively limited. For example, in 2006-2007, 367 petitions were 
submitted to both Committees and in 2010-2011 216 petitions were 
submitted. Most petitions concern tax matters.
In their last annual report, the Joint Committees on Petitions cast some 
doubt on the competency of the committees to take petitions on police 
matters into consideration. The committees state that they lack this 
competency, while petitioners believe they are competent or do not 
accept it. However limited the facilities of the Standing Committees on 
Petitions may be in practice, in principle the right to petition has to be 
understood as an external complaints procedure, also on police matters.
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Transparency of parliamentary proceedings
The standing committee deals with legislative proposals in the field 
of security and justice. In procedure meetings the committee decides 
on the proceeding of a bill. The procedure meetings are public. As a 
rule, parliamentary documents are available online. The agenda of the 
procedure meetings is now being published. All public plenary and 
committee meetings of the House are being recorded and are now 
available online.
Preparatory examination
The Standing Committee first examines every bill and the accompanying 
advice from the Council of State. All political groups can make remarks, 
pose questions to the government, and propose changes to the bill. 
The Standing Committee may ask experts and stakeholders from society 
to comment on controversial plans in a public or private hearing or 
a round table debate. Of course, experts and stakeholders can always 
notify the Committee of their opinions, regardless whether or not they 
were asked.
The House of Representative draws up a report on the examination of 
the bill by the Standing Committee. The minister replies to this report 
by means of a memorandum of reply. Both documents are public. The 
Standing Committee can decide that a further report is necessary if 
questions are not adequately answered or more information is needed. 
Finally, it decides when a bill is ready to be discussed in a plenary 
debate. 
These decisions may seem routine, but there is often a political aspect 
to the procedures. If necessary, the Standing Committee makes decisions 
by majority vote of the members present. However, the House can always 
overrule a procedural decision in a plenary meeting.
Parliament-police liaison mechanism
Parliament is informed about police priorities and performances on 
a regular basis in the budget of the National Police Service and the 
Explanatory Memorandum. The Minister of Security and Justice presents 
the annual report of the National Police Service to parliament. The Court 
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of Audit comments on the annual report of the Ministry of Security and 
Justice.
In the Netherlands, there are four national police unions.35 These unions 
negotiate with the Minister about working conditions and other aspects 
of police work. They also turn to Parliament or individual Members of 
Parliament to express their views on policy matters.
Police officers may be active members of political parties. Therefore, 
political parties or groups in Parliament are able to establish their own 
police network groups, sounding boards or advisory groups. For Members 
of Parliament, it is important to be informed by police officers from the 
board to shop floor level. Policy decisions can affect the executive level, 
which is not where these decisions are made. Members of Parliament 
might defend certain group interests, but, more importantly, they 
balance interests. Therefore, they have to be informed as broadly as 
possible.
Relationship with other overseers
Independent oversight institutions such as the Court of Audit and the 
National Ombudsman are advisory institutions to both government 
and parliament. They inform parliament about their recommendations 
and explain their findings. Moreover, these institutions are prepared to 
conduct investigations upon request. Parliament can ask them to take 
on certain subjects.
Independent police complaint bodies publish an annual report on their 
activities. While Parliament can take note of the annual reports, they are 
not officially presented to parliament. 
There are no official relations between parliament and local councils. 
Of course, Members of Parliament have contact with local councillors 
via political party channels. However, municipalities usually negotiate 
with Cabinet Ministers via the Association of Dutch Municipalities 
(Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten).
Most police work is carried out on the local level, under the authority 
of the mayor and in agreement with the police commissioner and the 
public prosecutor. The local council is responsible for a public safety 
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and security plan, which serves as a basis for the mayor’s management 
of the police. Questions of distribution of police capacity within a 
regional unit cannot be dealt with by parliament. Parliament can only 
discuss the framework with the responsible minister.
Parliament is usually informed about the views of police authorities 
or board members on policy matters via the Minister of Security and 
Justice, accompanying the cabinet view. The minister channels these 
letters with advice, opinions and recommendations to parliament. 
There is no direct relation between parliament and police authorities. 
However, on an individual basis, Members of Parliament are welcome to 
pay working visits to police meetings.
Conclusions
Ministerial responsibility is a pivotal concept in Dutch constitutional 
law. The minister is responsible for any act of the civil servants of his or 
her department. The Minister of Security and Justice is responsible for 
the National Police Service. Parliament can address the Minister on all 
matters of policing and a majority of Parliament can force him or her to 
change policy. This starting point of police accountability to Parliament 
is essential.
When it comes to police accountability to Parliament in practice, its 
effectiveness could be improved by enabling Parliament to cope with 
large amounts of information. Information overload is a serious problem 
for a Member of Parliament with relatively limited staff. The amount of 
information available causes an urgent need for information analysis 
tools. The Government is obligated to inform parliament; however, 
Parliament itself is not able to process all government information. 
Therefore, third parties should be involved to adapt information for the 
political process of decision-making.
To improve independence in the area of accountability of the police 
to Parliament, it is important that there are a number of independent 
institutions focused on different aspects of policing. For example, the 
Court of Audit is concerned with the legality, effectiveness and efficiency 
of policy. The National Ombudsman, on the other hand, deals with 
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standards for proper behaviour of officials. Parliament has to create a 
network of independent institutions to control government policy. 
Transparency in accountability of the policy should not be mistaken for 
measurability. Performance agreements can be useful to measure the 
effectiveness of police work. However, performance agreements focus 
on figures and might result in wrong incentives.
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The United Kingdom
9
This study1 examines the arrangements for holding the police 
accountable to parliament in the United Kingdom (UK). It describes the 
structure of the police service, relevant governance and accountability 
frameworks, roles and responsibilities of the UK Parliament, and the 
parts played by various independent oversight agencies and those 
bodies to whom certain policing responsibilities have been devolved 
(e.g. the Scottish Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly, the Mayor of 
London, Court of Common Council (City of London Police), and police 
and crime commissioners across England and Wales). It also examines 
the formal and informal relationships and mechanisms existing within 
and between the various organisations that together constitute the 
police governance frameworks, and recent reforms aimed at improving 
police performance and accountability.
Whilst the systems that operate in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland are broadly similar in nature, there are also some fundamental 
differences. For the sake of simplicity, this study therefore focuses on 
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the arrangements that operate in England and Wales, particularly as 
that is where the highest proportion of police officers is deployed 
(around 84 per cent) and the UK Parliament has direct responsibility. 
The differences existing in both Scotland and Northern Ireland in terms 
of structures, governance, accountability and funding are, however, 
referenced in each of the relevant sections of this study.
Police accountability framework
The role of the UK Parliament
The UK Parliament has an overall responsibility to debate and pass 
law (legislation), examine and challenge the work of the Government 
(scrutiny) and enable the Government to raise taxes (budgeting). There 
are numerous mechanisms and conventions in place to enable it to 
perform these important functions, many of which have been established 
over many centuries.
Parliament is the ultimate authority for policing in the UK, but has 
devolved responsibility for policing in Scotland and Northern Ireland to 
the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly respectively. It 
has a more direct role with regard to policing in England and Wales. Here, 
the UK Parliament holds the UK Government accountable, principally, 
through the Home Secretary as the senior minister responsible for the 
work of the Home Office, whose remit includes policing across England 
and Wales.
The structure of policing
Although the main aims of the police are relatively clear and 
straightforward (i.e. to prevent and detect crime, maintain peace, and 
protect the public), its governance and accountability arrangements 
are complex. There are 43 police services in England and Wales 
(compared to one each in Scotland and Northern Ireland) based either 
on metropolitan areas (e.g. the Metropolitan Police Service in London), 
individual counties (e.g. Hampshire) or a combination of smaller 
counties (e.g. West Mercia, covering Herefordshire, Worcestershire and 
Shropshire). A chief constable (or commissioner in both the Metropolitan 
Police Service and the City of London Policy) heads each service. To 
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further complicate the picture, there are a number of other police 
services operating in the UK that have specialist functions and their 
own governance and accountability arrangements. The most significant 
amongst these are the British Transport Police (responsible for railway 
policing across England, Wales and Scotland and accountable to 
Parliament through the Department of Transport); Ministry of Defence 
Police (providing policing on the Defence Estate and accountable to 
Parliament through the Ministry of Defence); and the Civil Nuclear 
Constabulary (safeguarding nuclear establishments and materials and 
accountable to Parliament through the Department for Energy and 
Climate Change). 
Governance and accountability
Until recently, governance of the police service was organised through 
a rather loosely constructed tripartite arrangement between the Home 
Office (providing central direction), Police Authorities (established in 
1996 to hold local police services accountable) and the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)2. However, this arrangement changed 
in 2012 as part of a programme of significant policing reforms 
introduced by the Coalition Government since taking office in May 
2010. These reforms included the provisions of the Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act 2011 that replaced Police Authorities with 
democratically elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and gave 
them greater devolved powers to hold local police services and their 
chief constables accountable. Furthermore, the responsibilities of ACPO 
in police governance terms has been under review as a consequence 
of recent reforms, including the establishment of a policing college in 
December 2012 to take over the role of setting professional policing 
standards and producing appropriate guidance. A report by General 
Sir Nick Parker in November 20133, commissioned for presentation to 
the PCCs, recommended a number of changes to the ACPO role and 
constitution to reflect the wider policing reforms. The recommendations 
are principally focused on the ACPO conducting operational and 
managerial coordination between chief constables, providing a forum 
for command and leadership of the police service, informing policy and 
practice, speaking as an independent voice on operational policing, 
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and clarifying its governance and a number of its practices. A board, 
consisting of members selected from the police governance community 
(e.g. PCCs, chief constables, the Home Office) was established to oversee 
the implementation of the recommendations. 
The provisions of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011 
mean that chief constables in 41 of the 43 police services in England 
and Wales (i.e. all services outside of London) are now held accountable 
by PCCs elected for each police service area. The first PCC elections 
took place in November 2012, alongside three UK parliamentary by-
elections and two mayoral-related elections.4 The role of the PCCs is 
to produce annual police and crime plans setting out the objectives for 
their service, allocate the funds needed to achieve them and hold the 
chief constable accountable for their delivery. Police and crime panels 
(PCPs) provide oversight and scrutiny of PCC performance at a local 
level. These panels comprise between 12 and 20 members (depending 
on the size of the police service area), who are drawn from councillors 
in each constituent local authority, and augmented by two co-opted 
independent members appointed for their relevant expertise. Directly 
elected mayors and council leaders are able to hold PCCs accountable for 
policing performance in their constituencies through representation on 
PCPs. In reality, however, the powers of these oversight panels are fairly 
limited. Similar local governance and accountability arrangements exist 
in the other two (London-based) police services. For the Metropolitan 
Police Service, the PCC equivalent role is performed by the Mayor’s 
Office for Policing and Crime and overseen by the London Assembly, 
whilst the Common Council of the City of London performs equivalent 
governance and accountability roles for the City of London police.
Although the Government has effectively devolved responsibility 
for local policing matters to the PCCs and their equivalents within 
London, it remains ultimately accountable to Parliament for policing 
matters across England and Wales. For this reason, reserved powers 
and legislative tools were retained to enable the Home Secretary to 
intervene at a local level and give directions where there is a perceived 
risk to public or national security. The Home Secretary also continues 
to issue an annual “Strategic Policing Requirement”5 setting out his or 
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her view of the national threats and the policing capabilities needed to 
counter them. He or she also remains directly responsible for policing 
and security matters deemed to be best dealt with at a national level, 
such as serious and organised crime (the remit of the National Crime 
Agency sponsored by the Home Office).
The role of independent oversight and similar bodies
There is a multitude of legislation, regulation and guidance governing 
how the police should operate and conduct itself, on which the 
UK Parliament is able to draw in holding the police accountable, 
including the professional standards set by the College of Policing. 
The UK Parliament is also assisted in its oversight role by a number 
of independent bodies, including the National Audit Office (NAO) that 
scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament and provides support 
in holding the Government accountable. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) assesses police services and policing across all 
activities, including financial, and reports to Parliament on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the police. The Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) oversees the police complaints system. Similar to 
the NAO and HMIC, the IPCC presents an annual report and statement 
of accounts to Parliament for consideration. 
The IPCC was established by the Police Reform Act of 2002 and became 
operational in 2004. It conducts independent investigations into the 
most serious cases of police misconduct, deaths, serious injuries and 
other human rights breaches. It also acts as an appeal body for some 
categories of complaint handled locally by individual police services and 
issues statutory guidance on handling complaints to all police services. 
It is led by a chair, deputy chair and ten commissioners and employs 
around 560 staff6, including a chief executive and small administrative 
team. The IPCC has generally discharged its responsibilities objectively 
and competently in a high profile and challenging environment. It has 
brought genuine independence to the oversight of police complaints, 
whilst a strong focus on critical issues, such as deaths following 
police contact, has contributed to notable improvements in such 
areas.7 However, the IPCC has been the subject of significant criticisms, 
including inadequate funding by successive governments (leading to 
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on-going backlogs and delays); failure to independently investigate 
a higher proportion of the more serious complaints and incidents8; 
oversight of a too complex and bureaucratic complaints system; and 
failure to achieve the core objective of securing and maintaining public 
confidence in the police complaints system.9 In response to these 
growing criticisms, the Home Secretary launched a review of the police 
complaints system in July 2014, which was due to report in the autumn 
of 2014. 
In addition to the independent oversight bodies mentioned, the Home 
Secretary also seeks advice on policing matters relating to recruitment, 
diversity, collaboration and more general issues from a statutory body 
established under the Police Act of 1996, known as the Police Advisory 
Board for England and Wales. This Board meets about four times each 
year to consider such matters, including draft regulations proposed 
by the Home Secretary to affect change in such areas, and provide 
appropriate advice. It does not, however, cover police pay and conditions 
of service (such as hours of duty, leave and allowances), which fall within 
the remit of another statutory body established under the Police Act of 
1996, known as the Police Negotiating Board (PNB). The PNB negotiates 
between police employers and staff representatives across the UK on 
such matters and makes recommendations to Scottish and Northern 
Irish ministers, as well as the Home Secretary. In the event of a failure 
to agree on a recommendation made by the PNB, the matter may be 
referred to a police arbitration panel. The PNB was due to be replaced in 
the autumn of 2014 by the Police Remuneration Review Body in England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland (for officers at the chief superintendent 
level and below) and the Police Negotiating Board for Scotland, 
following changes introduced by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act of 2014 and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill (introduced in 
June 2013) respectively. When the changes are implemented, officers 
above the rank of chief superintendent will be covered by the Senior 
Salaries Review Board, which provides independent advice on the pay 
of senior public officials such as senior civil servants, the judiciary and 
senior officers in the armed forces.
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The part played by other policing-focused professional bodies 
Although not part of the formal governance and accountability 
arrangements, a number of professional bodies contribute to influencing, 
or attempting to influence, the daily role of the police and periodic 
proposals for policy and operational change. These actors include 
academic researchers and think tanks (e.g. the Police Foundation), 
employer representative bodies (e.g. Association of Police and Crime 
Commissioners), and staff representative organisations (e.g. the Chief 
Police Officers’ Staff Association, Police Superintendents Association, 
the Police Federation, and Unison).
The role of the judiciary        
The judiciary has no formal role in the governance and accountability 
of the police to Parliament in the UK. Yet, it is not unusual for the 
Government to appoint senior members of the judiciary to lead 
high profile inquiries into alleged or suspected instances of police 
maladministration. Furthermore, the police, like other members of the 
public, are subject to all aspects of the rule of law. Consequently, a 
police officer arrested and prosecuted for a criminal offence would 
be subject to exactly the same judicial procedures as any other UK 
citizen. If convicted, though, any evidence that the offence committed 
was associated with an abuse of public office could be treated as an 
aggravating factor and lead to a comparatively tougher sentence.
As explained, oversight of the police complaints system is the 
responsibility of the IPCC rather than the judiciary. If, however, the 
investigation of a complaint against a police officer by the IPCC, or an 
individual police service, uncovered evidence of a criminal offence, or 
the common law offence of misconduct in public office, the matter would 
normally be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service for consideration 
of judicial proceedings.
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Functions of parliament 
The legislative function
The legislative process: Primary legislation
Similar to other established democracies across the globe, the UK’s 
legislative framework is set within or alongside a range of international 
laws and commitments in various treaties and conventions (e.g. the 
UNHCR Refugee Convention 1951). 
Against this international background, and taking full account of 
the inherent commitments, the legislative process in the UK usually 
commences with a political party developing a set of policy proposals, 
which it then embodies in a pre-election manifesto. It is also common 
practice for political parties to develop additional legislative proposals 
once in government. Regardless, the next stage normally involves the 
publication of a Green Paper that sets out the Government’s policy 
proposals in broad terms for public consultation, followed by a White 
Paper that transforms the post-consultation proposals into concrete 
legislative plans. If approved by the Government’s top ministerial 
team (i.e. the Cabinet), departmental lawyers and the Parliamentary 
Counsel translate the legislative proposals into a draft Bill, which is 
introduced in Parliament (usually the House of Commons) for debate 
and scrutiny. The main focus of such scrutiny takes place within a 
dedicated General Committee (Public Bill Committee) in the House of 
Commons and the Grand Committee in the main chamber of the House 
of Lords. Even though a mechanism for the Government to submit a 
draft Bill to the appropriate Select Committee for prior scrutiny (e.g. the 
Home Affairs Committee for a policing-related Bill) exists, this facility is 
used only occasionally. In any event, Select Committees tend to subject 
legislative proposals to their own scrutiny either before or in parallel 
to the formal scrutiny taking place elsewhere in Parliament and feed 
their observations into that dedicated process. Once the draft Bill has 
received a majority in favour in both Houses, it receives formal Royal 
Assent and becomes an Act of Parliament.
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The legislative process: Secondary legislation
It is usual for Acts of Parliament (primary legislation) to confer the power 
to make secondary or delegated legislation on the executive to cover 
matters of detail, such as the timing of implementation and technical 
design. Statutory instruments form the majority of secondary legislation 
in the UK. Such legislation is subject to the full rigour of parliamentary 
scrutiny through the Commons Select Committee on Statutory 
Instruments, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments10 and the 
Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.11 Secondary legislation may 
also be challenged in the courts by any organisation or member of the 
public through a process known as judicial review. Judicial reviews 
are used, quite extensively, to test whether a government minister has 
properly used the powers conferred by the relevant Act of Parliament in 
authorising the introduction of secondary legislation.
The legislative framework governing policing
Policing in the UK has traditionally attracted a strong political and media 
focus. The legal framework governing police activity and accountability 
is extensive and subject to regular public and parliamentary scrutiny, 
not least in the wake of high profile incidents and real or perceived 
failings. The statutory basis for police operation covers ranges from 
governance12 to states of emergency13, public order14, cross border 
domestic and international assistance15, and police pay and conditions 
of service16. 
In each case, the underpinning statutory base usually contains elements 
of international, primary and secondary legislation. For example, the 
use of firearms and less lethal weapons by the police is governed by 
a legal framework that includes the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Human Rights Act 1998, Section 3(1) of the Criminal Law 
Act 1967, Section 117 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, health and 
safety legislation, common law (e.g. self-defence and use of reasonable 
service), Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 and statutory guidance17. 
The development and operational use of new weapons is also governed 
by statute18, which requires prior authorisation by the Home Secretary 
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following a period of technical and medical evaluation by subject 
experts.19
In addition to legislative proposals generated and presented by the 
Government, the catalyst for policing reform or change can arise from 
a variety of sources, including public petitions, lobby groups, media 
pressure, individual Members of Parliament, and the recommendations 
of Parliamentary Committees. The chances of success depend, however, 
on proactive government support and sponsorship for the proposals in 
question and, of course, the parliamentary approval in processing the 
necessary legislation.
The oversight function
The UK Parliament is able to perform its police oversight function in a 
number of ways. These are all based on long-established parliamentary 
mechanisms and conventions that exist for holding public bodies 
accountable.
Written and oral parliamentary questions
Individual Members of Parliament, for example, can ask Home Office 
ministers written questions on policing and other matters falling within 
their areas of responsibility. These require written answers within 
fairly tight deadlines. On a set date and time every month, Members of 
Parliament are also able to orally question the Home Secretary in the 
main chamber of the House of Commons on the full range of his or her 
responsibilities, including policing. A similar process takes place in the 
House of Lords for thirty minutes at the beginning of every day (except 
for Friday), but it is aimed at government representatives as a whole 
and not individual government departments.
Early day motions
Members of Parliament can also draw attention to a particular issue 
or concern by joining to sign an Early Day Motion (EDM). Whilst not 
normally debated, EDMs with a significant number of signatures can 
often force the Government into making a response.
181The United Kingdom
Select committees
Arguably the most effective form of parliamentary oversight takes place 
through the current House of Commons Select Committee system, which 
was established in 1979. In essence, there are two Select Committees, 
which together play an important role in holding the police to account. 
First, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is responsible for checking 
that government expenditure is in strict accordance with the plans 
approved by Parliament and represents optimum value for money. In this 
role, it is able to examine and challenge all aspects of police financial 
management and control. It normally focuses related hearings on 
specific areas of police spending and performance based on dedicated 
reviews and reports from the NAO. 
The other important Select Committee is the Home Affairs Select 
Committee (HAC). It covers all areas of the Home Office remit, but 
immigration and policing tend to dominate the Committee’s programme, 
given the priority and profile they have within the department’s overall 
set of responsibilities. Similar to the PAC and other Select Committees, 
the HAC operates throughout the life of a Parliament and sets its own 
agenda. It has the prerogative to select any aspect of policing for 
scrutiny, including structure, size and organisation; practices; vision 
and doctrine; powers; finance;20 and operational tactics, including 
the policing of large-scale and violent protests, and the use of lethal 
weapons. In the latter regard, the HAC conducted an inquiry into the city 
centre riots that occurred across England in August 2011 following the 
fatal shooting of Mark Duggan by the police in Tottenham, London. The 
HAC published its inquiry report21 with recommendations in December 
2011, and the Government responded in February 201222. It is also 
customary for ministers to provide prompt statements to Parliament, 
and for the issues to be scrutinised in debate in the event of such 
critical incidents.
The HAC can, and does, adjust its programme to reflect fast-moving 
contemporaneous events, such as the public/media criticism of the 
policing of the G20 demonstrations in 2009 and the dismissal of a 
chief constable by a police and crime commissioner in 2013. The HAC 
also plays a role in scrutinising proposed new legislation affecting the 
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police, either in advance of the introduction of the relevant draft Bill to 
Parliament or alongside the work of the General Committee established 
specifically to oversee the passage of the legislation through the House.
In all of these areas, the principal role of the HAC, and that of the PAC, is to 
subject the government’s policies and their operational implementation 
to continuous scrutiny, expose any failings or weaknesses and make 
recommendations for improvement. The Government and others 
involved in policing governance and accountability (e.g. PCCs) are not 
obliged to accept their observations and recommendations. However, 
their reports attract significant publicity and place considerable pressure 
on the executive to manage the cases with the utmost efficiency and 
effectiveness and explain the reasons coherently and persuasively in 
instances when it has decided against accepting the recommendations. 
The budget control function
The budgetary process
The UK Parliament plays a critical role in enabling the Government to 
raise taxes and meet the costs of public spending. In March or April of 
each year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer gives a budget speech in the 
House of Commons on the state of the national finances and proposals 
for changes in taxation and spending. Following the parliamentary 
debate, the measures proposed and approved are embodied in an annual 
finance Bill, which is subject to the same parliamentary procedures as 
any other Bill.23
As part of the budget setting and approval process, the Government 
allocates a “departmental expenditure limit” (DEL) for each department 
based on a detailed Treasury-led analysis of respective requirements 
assessed against government priorities and overall affordability. This 
analytical process is known as a “spending review” and usually looks 
several years ahead.24 In the Spending Review of 2010, the centrally-
funded police budget was cut by 20 per cent in real terms between 
2011/12 and 2014/15 as part of the Coalition Government’s austerity 
programme aimed at reducing the nation’s budget deficit. 
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The sources and allocation of police funding
Police services in England and Wales receive their funding from three 
main sources. These sources are centrally in the Home Office and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (or the Welsh 
Assembly in the case of the four police services in Wales), and locally 
in a proportion of the Council Tax known as the “police precept.” It has 
been estimated that forecast increases in the local (“police precept”) 
element of police budgets during the period of 2011/12 to 2014/15 
would have the effect of reducing the overall cut in central funding 
from 20 to 14 per cent in real terms. In addition, PCCs can generate 
income from charging for policing commercial events (e.g. sporting 
fixtures and entertainment events) and investments. The ratio of central 
to local funding is roughly 75 to 25 per cent respectively (i.e. £9billion 
to £3billion in 2013/14).
The central funding provided to police services is allocated annually 
by the Home Office on the basis of a long-established and rather 
complex formula that uses various data sources, including population 
density, in each service area. Home Office ministers present details 
of the proposed allocations to Parliament by means of a police grant 
report25 each autumn. The proposals are subject to parliamentary 
debate and vote before being published early in the following year. 
This process provides Parliament with the opportunity to compare and 
contrast the proposed allocations and debate their relative fairness and 
potential implications. Almost inevitably, these debates tend to reflect 
the determination of individual constituent Members of Parliament to 
promote and protect the interests of their local service. However, the 
ability of Parliament to alter the allocations proposed by Home Office 
ministers is limited, because the vote following the debate most likely 
favours the Government and, therefore, the proposed allocations, when 
it has a working majority. Beyond these processes, Parliament has the 
ability to commission and review reports on aspects of police budgeting 
and financial management through the Select Committee mechanisms.
Financial accountability mechanisms
The significant reforms recently made to the police governance and 
accountability arrangements in England and Wales necessitated 
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the introduction of new or additional mechanisms to ensure robust 
financial management and the delivery of value for money within the 
transformed landscape. These have included the issuing of a policing 
protocol26 by the Home Secretary, describing how the functions of police 
and crime commissioners, chief constables and police and crime panels 
will be exercised in relation to each other. This was followed in 2012 
(and revised in October 2013) by the Financial Management Code of 
Practice,27 which provides clarity on the new financial governance 
arrangements and high-level guidance to help ensure effective and 
constructive relationships in all financial matters. They came into effect 
in 2012 and flow from statutory powers conferred by the Police Reform 
and Social Responsibility Act of 2011.
As the most senior civil servant in the department, the Home Office 
Permanent Secretary is accountable to Parliament for the proper 
stewardship of the resources allocated to the Home Office, including 
those partly funding policing in England and Wales. By way of an 
assurance, s/he is required to publish an annual statement28 describing 
the accountability system that ensures the functioning of appropriate 
controls and delivery of value for money. This assurance covers the 
arrangements generally in place at a local service level, notwithstanding 
the extent of the recent devolution of responsibility to locally elected 
PCCs and the degree of autonomy they now have. Parliament holds the 
Permanent Secretary accountable to the robustness and effectiveness 
of the systems in place. Indeed, the NAO recently conducted a review 
of the new accountability landscape following the introduction of PCCs 
and identified a number of potential risks. Their related report, “Police 
accountability: Landscape review”29, was published and presented 
to Parliament on 22 January 2014 and provided the Public Accounts 
Committee and Home Affairs Committee with a firm foundation for 
holding the Permanent Secretary to account on such matters.
Scotland and Northern Ireland: The “Barnett Formula”
The budgets of Scotland and Northern Ireland are normally considered 
and determined within the parliamentary budget-setting arrangements 
described previously. A long established formula (the “Barnett Formula”) 
is applied to provide each jurisdiction with a population-based share 
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of changes in comparable spending across government departments 
as a whole. The funding provided, however, takes the form of a block 
grant, which means that the governing bodies in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland are able to spend money on their devolved responsibilities, 
including policing, according to their own determined priorities and 
subject to the approval of the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland 
Assembly respectively.   
Parliamentary committees
Background
As briefly described previously, the committee system plays a significant 
role in the parliamentary accountability arrangements for public bodies. 
Much of Parliament’s activities take place within committees, which 
typically comprise ten to 50 Members of Parliament or Members of 
the Lords. They examine issues in detail across the full spectrum of 
government policy and action, including proposed new legislation and 
wide ranging subjects such as the economy. The number of committees 
varies over time, depending on the nature and range of business in 
each Parliamentary session. A snapshot in June 2014 revealed that there 
were just over 100 committees in existence at that time, of which 39 
were House of Commons Select Committees, 35 were House of Lords 
Select Committees, and ten were Joint Committees.
Types of committees
There are essentially four types of committees in the UK Parliamentary 
system. First, the House of Commons Select Committees, such as the 
HAC and PAC previously referred to, each focus on the work (i.e. policies, 
administration and spending) of an individual government department 
or on cross-cutting issues such as public administration or the economy. 
There are also Select Committees operating in the House of Lords, but 
these do not shadow individual departments. Instead, they concentrate 
on four key cross-cutting topics: Europe, science, economics and the 
UK Constitution. Second, Joint Committees comprise both Members of 
Parliament and Members of the Lords and operate similar to Select 
Committees, but focus on a limited number of significant topics (e.g. 
Human Rights or Statutory Instruments30). Third, General Committees 
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are established principally to scrutinise and debate individual draft 
Bills.31 General Committees (also known as Public Bill Committees 
when established for this dedicated purpose) play a significant role 
in challenging and influencing the content of draft Bills during their 
passage through the parliamentary process. Fourth, there are three 
Grand Committees examining issues relating to Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales respectively, and one based in the House of Lords, 
which debates draft Bills outside of the main Lords Chamber.
From a policing perspective, the most important committees are those 
House of Commons Select Committees that oversee the police and its 
governing bodies on a regular basis (i.e. the HAC and PAC) and General 
Committees established to scrutinise new policing related legislation 
as it is introduced to Parliament.
Select committees
House of Commons Select Committees are normally established at 
the beginning of each Parliament. A minimum number of 11 Members 
of Parliament are appointed to each Select Committee, drawn from a 
cross-section of all parliamentary parties represented in the House. 
Following a report by the Reform of the House of Commons Committee 
(the “Wright Committee”) in November 200932, the Chair of each Select 
Committee is now appointed as a result of a secret ballot amongst 
all Members of Parliament using an alternative voting system. Other 
members are selected following a secret ballot within individual 
party groups.33 The Chair and other members of each Committee are 
appointed for the entire five-year term of a Parliament, though changes 
in membership can occur (e.g. as the result of a member being promoted 
to a ministerial position). By convention, the Chair of the PAC is always a 
member of the opposition party.
Having chosen a subject to examine, a Select Committee will establish 
a programme of evidence gathering and analysis, leading to the 
publication of a report with recommendations.34 The process normally 
starts with a formal announcement by the Committee of the subject or 
issue to be examined and an invitation to relevant organisations and 
individuals to submit evidence and comments in writing. The Committee 
then tests and supplements these written contributions by taking oral 
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evidence at a series of formal hearings from invited politicians, civil 
servants, professional bodies (e.g. those representing the police) and 
independent experts. The majority of these hearings are televised, and 
the questioning tends to be both direct and robust. 
Select Committees have the power to order the attendance of 
witnesses at their hearings and to request written information or data 
from government departments, the bodies or agencies performing 
a governance role (such as the police), or other relevant sources. 
Committee members can also conduct field visits35 to help inform 
their inquiries. There are some rather ancient rules and conventions, 
through which Select Committees can, with Parliamentary authority, 
apply sanctions for refusal to provide information or attend hearings 
or giving false testimony, but these are rarely used in practice. 
Committees prefer to rely on the adverse media and public criticism, on 
inferences that usually flow from an individual’s failure of compliance, 
and on the ability to reflect their own conclusions in their eventual 
report and recommendations. The associated reputational damage, 
or its threat, generally has the effect of persuading the reluctant or 
hesitant witness to comply with Committee requests. The powers and 
procedures described are covered by Parliamentary Privilege, which 
enables freedom of speech and protects Parliament’s internal affairs 
from interference by the courts.
Select Committees are supported by a small team of administrators, and 
they have the power to appoint specialist advisors on either a general 
basis or to assist with particular inquiries. The HAC, for example, employs 
four administrators and three specialist advisors. The latter tend to be 
academic researchers paid on a small daily rate. Whilst it is possible for 
a Committee to appoint policy or operational experts in such roles (e.g. 
police officers in the case of the HAC), the tendency is to rather rely on 
the questioning of subject experts at Committee hearings or informal 
discussions to obtain such expertise.
In terms of process, the Select Committee’s reports and recommendations 
are published on the UK Parliament’s website. Regardless of the Select 
Committees’ conclusions, their comments cannot be questioned in 
a court of law. Moreover, there is no right of reply, or redress, in the 
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event of reputational damage caused as a result of a Select Committee’s 
findings.36
Once a report is published, the Government normally has 60 days to 
respond to the Committee’s comments and recommendations. The 
reports may give rise to their own dedicated parliamentary debates 
depending on the nature and profile of the issues covered and the 
will of the House. The Government is not bound to accept the Select 
Committee’s conclusions and recommendations, but its response is 
expected to clearly explain what it is both accepting and rejecting and 
why. These responses are also published on the UK Parliament’s website. 
Select Committees play an important role in monitoring government 
responses to ensure that the recommendations that have been accepted 
are implemented in an appropriate and timely manner. They are also 
free to re-visit rejected recommendations on future occasions, if they 
feel particularly strongly about the issues and reasons for rejection.
General committees
General committees, which are mainly established to scrutinise 
newly proposed legislation, are normally appointed as each draft 
Bill is published. They are unique to the House of Commons, as the 
entire House of Lords (and its single Grand Committee)37 debates new 
legislation introduced to the House. General Committees comprise 
between a minimum of 16 and maximum of about 50 members 
drawn from a mix of political parties in the proportion that they are 
represented in the House of Commons. Thus, there is always a majority 
of members representing the political party in Government on General 
Committees. Each Committee is assigned a Chairman, and they debate 
draft Bills in the way that they would debate issues in the Commons 
chamber and with broadly the same rules of engagement. Similar to 
Select Committees, General Committees can request oral and written 
evidence in relation to the subject under scrutiny.
General Committees responsible for scrutinising draft legislation go 
through each Bill line by line before reporting its conclusions and any 
proposed amendments to the Commons as a whole, where the Bill is 
further debated. The Bill is then published again, incorporating any 
agreed amendments, before progressing through the remaining stages 
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in Parliament (including the House of Lords) en route to Royal Ascent 
and passing into law.
The handling of complaints against the police
None of the existing Parliamentary Committees have a direct role in 
receiving and investigating complaints relating to the police. This is a 
function residing with the Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC) in England and Wales (and the Police Inspections and Review 
Commissioner in Scotland and the Police Ombudsman for Northern 
Ireland). However, the UK Parliament has the ability to hold the IPCC to 
account (principally through the PAC and HAC) in the same way that it 
does other publicly funded bodies. It is not unusual, for example, for the 
HAC to conduct hearings on the basis of incidents or complaints that 
have been the subject of an IPCC investigation.
Parliament-police liaison mechanisms 
Formal mechanisms
Beyond the previously described arrangements, there are few formal 
mechanisms for interaction between the UK Parliament and the police. 
Yet, given the extent to which the UK Parliament is able to hold the 
police to account in England and Wales, either directly or through their 
governing and oversight bodies (e.g. Home Secretary, Home Office, 
PCCs, HMIC, and IPCC), it is doubtful if the room or need exists for any 
additional accountability or liaison mechanisms.
Informal mechanisms
The picture concerning the informal liaison between the UK Parliament 
and the police is, however, somewhat different. There is no restriction 
on the ability of, for example, the Chair and Members of Committees 
dealing with policing issues, or individual constituency Members of 
Parliament, to liaise informally with Home Office ministers, PCCs, Chief 
Constables, leaders of independent oversight agencies and professional 
representative bodies to seek information, obtain clarity, improve 
knowledge and understanding, and undertake field visits, provided 
that normal courtesies of engagement38 are observed. There is also a 
considerable amount of informal liaison that takes place behind the 
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scenes, such as ad hoc telephone conversations, and discussions in the 
margins of formal business meetings and conferences. 
There are general codes of conduct and propriety in place to guide 
public officials, including Members of Parliament and the police, on the 
standards expected of them in the execution of their duties and the 
consequences of non-compliance.39 There are no additional or specific 
codes dedicated to liaison between Parliamentary representatives 
and the police, the informal nature of which is generally regarded as 
conducive to the efficacy of the more formal accountability arrangements. 
There are inevitably some risks inherent in placing a degree of reliance 
on the existence and appropriate function of informal liaison networks. 
These include the adverse impact on transparency and accountability, if 
the informal contact is not properly recorded or reported, the potential 
for conflicts of interest, and the possibility of abuse to go undetected. 
However, overall experience suggests that the benefits of allowing a 
proportionate element of informality within liaison arrangements 
outweighs the risks, particularly in ensuring that the bureaucracy 
normally associated with formal processes does not result in progress 
being reduced to an unacceptably slow rate.
Relationship with other overseers 
The relationship between the UK Parliament and other oversight 
institutions operating within the policing landscape is little different 
from that existing between the police and its governing bodies, 
particularly concerning the Select Committee system. The HAC can, 
for example, call witnesses and obtain evidence from members of the 
HMIC, IPCC, PCCs and others on the same basis as from ministers, civil 
servants, other professional experts and members of the wider policing 
community. It can, and does, conduct dedicated inquiries focused on the 
work and performance of each of the oversight bodies.
At a working level, some early tensions have been observed with regard 
to the embryonic relationship between the UK Parliament and some 
of the pioneering PCCs, due, in no small part, to the high degree of 
autonomy the latter feel has been invested in them as democratically 
elected overseers of police services at a local level. However, the 
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legitimacy of the UK Parliament to hold all elements of the police 
governance structure accountable, including PCCs, is difficult to deny 
given its ultimate responsibility for policing legislation, funding and 
oversight.
In performing its latter role, the UK Parliament also involves and 
challenges non-governmental organisations, think tanks, interested 
lobbying groups and wider members of civil society, particularly when 
conducting inquiries through the Select Committee mechanism. Although 
these organisations and individuals are obviously not accountable 
to Parliament in the same way as the police and its governance and 
other oversight bodies, the same rules and conventions apply to the 
provision of written and oral evidence. Consequently, an appearance 
before a Select Committee can be just as daunting and lead to similar 
reputational damage in the event of a failure to comply or presentation 
of inaccurate or misleading information.
Conclusions and recommendations
Conclusions
The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that, whilst the 
funding and structure of policing across the UK is extremely complex, 
the ability of the UK Parliament to hold the police and its various 
oversight bodies to account is both strong and effective. This ability is 
based on many years of evolving powers, custom and practice that are 
now well established, described in clearly articulated and accessible 
parliamentary guidance, and thoroughly transparent (e.g. through the 
public transmission of Select Committee hearings).
The complicated policing structures, governance arrangements and 
funding mechanisms, however, bring forth the obvious question as to 
whether or not a simpler and clearer policing landscape would make 
the UK Parliament’s role a good deal easier and more straightforward. 
Successive studies have suggested or hinted that sustaining as many as 
43 police services in an area as relatively small as England and Wales 
is not really tenable in terms of either efficiency or effectiveness and 
a move to a regional, or even national, structure would lead to greater 
economies of scale, and consistency of practice and procedure across 
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the two countries. Whilst the introduction of democratically elected 
PCCs in November 2012 has resulted in greater local awareness of 
policing issues in most areas, and more of a direct community input 
to the determination of priorities based on local need, these benefits 
are offset by the increased risk of a widening divergence of policy and 
practice between local services, led by individual PCCs.
These are early days, of course, and the increased risk of divergence 
is mitigated to some extent by the work of independent policing 
bodies (e.g. HMIC, IPCC and the College of Policing) that are focused 
on informing and guiding the delivery of excellence and consistently 
high standards within and across individual police services. However, 
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a single police service 
serving England and Wales, or eight or nine regional services, would 
be an easier structure to administer and oversee than the current 43. It 
is worth noting, in this respect, that Scotland recently moved from an 
eight service structure to a single service in the interests of improved 
efficiency and effectiveness.
On the basis of this case study, therefore, it is considered that the current 
structure, governance and funding of policing across England and Wales 
would require some significant rationalisation, along the lines briefly 
described, before they could be recommended as a composite model 
for other jurisdictions. Such rationalisation could be achieved without 
losing the focus on local democratic accountability and the principle of 
ensuring that communities have a substantial input in determining the 
policing needs and priorities in their particular areas (e.g. by embodying 
arrangements for local democratic accountability within larger and 
fewer police services).
On the other hand, the role that the UK Parliament performs in holding 
the police and its various governance and oversight bodies to account, 
and the formal and informal procedures it follows in doing so, are clear, 
transparent, robust and highly effective. This is despite the complexities 
inherent in the policing landscape described above. Therefore, the UK 
Parliament provides a model of democratic accountability that could be 
presented to other jurisdictions as a possible framework for adoption 
or adaption. 
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Recommendations
On the basis of this study, and drawing on the conclusions described 
above, the following recommendations have been formulated for 
general consideration:
a. In any democratic society, it is important that the nationally elected 
parliament holds the police service fully accountable in the same 
way as any other public sector body.
b. The rules and procedures governing the accountability arrangements 
should be comprehensive, unequivocal and transparent.
c. The accountability arrangements should include the ability of 
parliament to inquire about any policing-related matter of its 
choosing; request any relevant evidence or other written information 
from whatever source; summon witnesses to open hearings; and 
impose sanctions in the event of non-compliance or false testimony.
d. The national parliament should be supported in its role by a number 
of independent oversight bodies charged with setting policing 
standards; checking police performance; ensuring financial best 
practice and value for money; and overseeing the police complaints 
system.
e. The police service and oversight body structures and relationships 
should be rational, uncomplicated and clear. Their respective roles 
and responsibilities should be articulated in a way that avoids any 
potential for doubt or confusion.
f. The liaison arrangements between parliament, the police service 
and other oversight bodies should be clearly defined and governed 
by protocols covering both formal and any informal modes of 
engagement.
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NOTES
1. The study was drafted in Summer 2014.  
2. ACPO is a separate legal entity comprising 
the most senior police officers that 
provided professional expertise, a national 
voice, the setting of standards and central 
co-ordination. 
3. General Sir Nick Parker KCB, CBE, 
“Independent Review of ACPO” (London: 
ACPO, 2013). 
4. Elections take place every four years.
5. Home Office, “The Strategic Policing 
Requirement, 2013” (London: Home Office, 
2012).
6. It employs 560 staff as of 31 March 2014.
7. For example, the number of deaths in, or 
following, police custody has reduced from 
36 in 2004/5 to 11 in 2013/14.
8. The majority is investigated by police 
services under IPCC management or 
supervision. 
9. That is based, in part, on regular public 
surveys showing low satisfaction and 
confidence levels, particularly amongst 
black and minority ethnic communities and 
young people.
10. The Commons Select Committee on 
Statutory Instruments and the Joint 
Committee on Statutory Instruments focus 
on potential legal and drafting defects. 
11. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny 
Committee refers to the House for 
consideration any secondary legislation 
which it believes to be of special interest 
and importance and therefore worthy of 
critical attention
12. An example is the Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act of 2011. 
13. An example is the Civil Contingencies Act 
of 2004. 
14. Examples are the Public Order Act of 1986 
and Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
of 1994. 
15. An example is the Police of 1996.
16. These regulations are made by the Home 
Secretary under Section 50 of the Police 
Act of 1996 and Section 1 of the Police 
Pension Act of 1976 and are subject to a 
statutory negotiating framework. 
17. An example is the Code of Practice on 
Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal 
Weapons made in December 2003 under 
the Police Acts of 1996 and 1997.
18. Police Acts of 1996 and 1997, as amended 
by the Police Reform Act of 2002. 
19. College of Policing, Legal Framework 
[Internet], http://www.app.college.police.
otg.uk/app-content/armed-policing/legal-
framework/ [accessed 26 April 2014].
20. It is able to cross PAC boundaries. 
21. House of Commons, Home Affairs 
Committee, “Policing Large Scale Disorder: 
Lessons from the disturbances of August 
2011” (London: The Stationery Office, 
December 2011). 
22. The Government Response to the Sixteenth 
Report of the Home Affairs Committee 
Session 2010-12 HC 1456, “Large Scale 
Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances 
of August 2011” (London: The Stationery 
Office, February 2012).
23. However, as a Money Bill, the House 
of Lords cannot reject the contents of 
the draft legislation and can only delay 
progress for up to one month
24. The 2010 Spending Review determined 
expenditure limits for each department 
in each of the years 2011/12 through to 
2014/15
25. Home Office, “Police Grant (England and 
Wales), The Police Grant Report (England 
and Wales) 2012/2013” (London: The 
Stationery Office, 2012).
26. Home Office, “Statutory Instruments, Police, 
England and Wales, The Policing Protocol 
Order 2011” (London: The Stationery Office, 
2011).
27. Home Office, “Financial Management 
Code of Practice For The Police Service 
of England and Wales” (London: The 
Stationery Office, 2012).
28. Home Office, “Home Office Accounting 
Officer: Accountability System Statement 
for Policing and Crime Reduction (2013)” 
(London: Home Office, 2013).
29. National Audit Office, “Police accountability: 
Landscape review” (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2014).
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30. Statutory Instruments Select Committee 
is dedicated to the scrutiny of secondary 
legislation. 
31. A dedicated General Committee is 
established to scrutinise every draft Bill 
introduced into Parliament
32. House of Commons, “House of Commons 
Reform Committee, Rebuilding the House, 
First Report of Session 2008-09” (London: 
The Stationery Office, 2009).
33. Under the previous arrangements the 
appointment of the Select Committee 
members was heavily influenced by the 
recommendations of Party Whips.
34. For instance, the HAC has recently 
identified and investigated topics such as 
“E-Crime” and “Leadership and Standards in 
the Police”.
35. For example, they can take field visits 
to police services, individual police 
establishments and, occasionally, fact 
finding visits overseas
36. Robert Rogers, “Liaison Committee – Select 
Committee effectiveness, resources and 
powers, Written Evidence submitted by the 
Clerk of the House” (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2012). 
37. The Grand Committee discusses draft 
legislation outside of the main chamber of 
the House of Lords. 
38. For example, by making their objectives 
clear and ensuring to book appointments 
beforehand.
39. Examples include a code of conduct for 
Members of Parliament, and a code of 
ethics produced by the College of Policing 
in July 2014 for members of the policing 
profession.
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In this edited volume, the role of parliament in police governance 
in eight country case studies in Asia and Europe was researched. In 
Asia, the four country case studies are India, Indonesia, Thailand and 
the Philippines and in Europe the case studies concern Belgium, 
Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This concluding 
chapter integrates and provides an analysis of the various case 
studies and relevant findings. Analysed below are matters relating to 
police governance, and the role of parliament in police governance 
in relation to its legislative, oversight and budget functions. The role 
of parliamentary committees, independent oversight bodies and the 
police-parliament liaison mechanism across the different case studies 
are likewise discussed below. Best practices are also highlighted in 
each of the succeeding discussions.1
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Police Governance
While the objectives of the police are clear and straightforward (i.e. 
to prevent and detect crime, maintain order, and protect the public), 
the case studies demonstrate that the governance and structure of the 
police is a complex matter, with a great variety of governance models 
between states, due to contextual matters, such as legal framework, 
political system and other factors discussed in the introduction.
In each country case study, a variety of state institutions are involved 
in the oversight of the police, including various executive bodies, the 
legislature, the judiciary and independent oversight bodies, as well as 
local government. Tables 1 and 2 in this chapter give an overview of 
the institutions involved in the governance of the police in the eight 
case studies. While each country is unique and no single model for 
the governance of the police exists, various commonalities across the 
countries can be distinguished. First, in all countries, parliament has 
the overall responsibility for passing laws, scrutinising the activities of 
the police, and allowing government to use public funds for the police. 
While parliament is the ultimate authority, in many states some of its 
responsibilities are devolved to regional and local governments. 
Furthermore, all case study countries illustrate that the police is 
accountable to the law rather than to the government of the day. This is 
achieved in all case study countries by setting up a system of checks and 
balances that limits and details the executive’s tasking and reporting 
of the police. In all countries, this system of checks and balances 
consists of a combination of internal, executive, parliamentary, judicial 
and specialized oversight institutions whose mandates and powers are 
based on publicly available law. For example, in the Netherlands, all 
directives of the minister of home affairs to the police are in writing, 
and parliament is duly informed. Most countries have a system of 
police accountability that includes at least one civilian body that is 
independent of both the police and executive. The combined remit 
of oversight institutions covers all aspects of police work, including 
their compliance with the law, the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
activities, their finances, and their administrative practices.
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In various countries, efforts are made to bring the police closer to the 
public by decentralising the decision-making power over the police to 
local bodies. For example, in the United Kingdom, in 2011, a system 
of democratically-elected local police and crime commissioners was 
set up to devolve greater responsibility for community-based policing 
to the local level. In the Philippines, local People’s Law Enforcement 
Boards (PLEBs), which are local independent representative bodies 
with the power to resolve people’s complaints against the police, were 
set up. In the Netherlands, while the minister determines the national 
priorities and budget of the police, authority over the police rests with 
the mayor of each municipality (for maintaining order) and the local 
prosecutor (for criminal investigation) at the local level. In India and 
Germany, provincial or State Assemblies have extensive powers to 
examine any police matter and make the police answerable to local 
elected representatives. With the exception of Thailand and Indonesia, 
the case studies illustrate that the decentralisation of decision-making 
power to local police units reinforces the implementation of community 
based policing, as it enables local police chiefs to directly respond to 
the needs of the local constituency. 
In most countries, structures are in place to insulate, but not to isolate, 
the police from politics and avoid that political authorities exercise 
direct control over police operations. The case studies show that 
there are three ways to limit political control over the police. First, in 
countries such as the Netherlands and India political control is limited 
by creating civilian capacity in the ministry of home affairs to draft 
ministerial guidelines for the police and monitor the activities of the 
police. In a second group of countries (e.g. the Philippines and Indonesia), 
a national police commission is mandated to provide administrative 
control and operational supervision over the police. National police 
commissions are independent executive agencies that provide guidance 
and operational control over the police. In doing so, they act as a buffer 
between political authorities and the police and limit political control 
over the police. In a third group of countries (e.g. the United Kingdom), 
the scope for political control over the police is limited because the 
minister of home affairs shares the responsibility of police governance 
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with other institutions, including the Association of Chief Police Officers 
and the locally elected police and crime commissioners. 
Furthermore, most countries have avoided that the police is policing 
itself. To this end, independent police complaints bodies are set up 
that are empowered to receive and investigate complaints about police 
misconduct. In some countries, specific independent police complaints 
bodies are set up, such as in Belgium, the Philippines and the United 
Kingdom. In other countries, generic independent complaints bodies 
are mandated to receive and investigate complaints, such as in the 
Netherlands (National Ombudsman) or in Indonesia (National Human 
Rights Commission and the Corruption Eradication Commission). 
Lastly, in all countries, civil society organisations play a major role in the 
governance of the police. In some cases, on the initiative and pressure 
of citizen movements, parliament has enacted an independent oversight 
body (e.g. an ombuds institution in India in 2014). In other cases, such 
as in Indonesia, civil society organisations have contributed to the 
exposure of corruption within the police. The enactment of Freedom 
of Information (FoI) laws (e.g. in India) were of great importance for 
citizens to have access to information about the functioning of the 
police.
Good practices
1. While no single model for police governance exists, the governance 
of the police is a combination of internal, executive, parliamentary, 
judicial and specialised oversight institutions whose mandates and 
powers are based on publicly available law. An effective system 
of police accountability includes at least one civilian body that is 
independent of both the police and the executive.
2. Parliament possesses ultimate responsibility for law-making, 
scrutiny and allowing the use of public funds for the police, while 
respecting the decision-making powers of the police at the local 
level. 
3. To devolve greater responsibility for community-based policing to 
the local level, local government and police boards have decision-
making power over the police budget and policing priorities. 
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4. In order to avoid the politicisation of the police, political 
authorities, including members of parliament and the cabinet, have 
no operational control over the police. To this effect, independent 
executive agencies are mandated to provide administrative control 
and supervision over the police.
5.  A common feature of police governance is that the police is not 
policing itself. Citizens can submit complaints about police 
misconduct to independent oversight bodies, which are mandated 
to receive and investigate complaints related to the police.
6.  The role of civil society organisations in public transparency of the 
police is enhanced by the enactment of FoI laws.  
Table 1. Police governance in selected countries in Asia and Europe 
(2014)2
Police framework Branch of Government
Federal or 
centralised
Ministry Parliament Local government
Belgium • Federal Police
• Ministry of 
Interior
• Ministry of 
Justice
• House of 
Representatives 
• Standing 
Committee of 
Home Affairs 
• Special 
Committee for 
Police Oversight
• Mayors
• Public 
prosecutors
Germany • Federal Police
• Ministry of 
Interior
• Bundestag 
Committee for 
Interior 
• Bundestag 
Committee for 
Budgets
• State 
Assemblies, and 
executives
Indonesia
• Indonesian 
National Police
• House of 
Representatives 
(DPR)
• DPR 
Commission III
India
• Indian Police 
Service
• Union Ministry 
of Home Affairs
• Parliament of 
India
• Standing 
Committee for 
Home Affairs
• State 
Assemblies
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Police framework Branch of Government
Federal or 
centralised
Ministry Parliament Local government
Netherlands
• National Police 
Service
• Ministry of 
Security and 
Justice
• Public 
Prosecution 
Service
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Police governance and the role of parliament
In the following section, the three generic functions of parliament are 
applied to police governance. They concern the legislative, oversight 
and budget control functions. 
Police governance and the legislative function of 
parliament
As demonstrated by the country case studies, it is common practice for 
parliament to legislate an up-to-date legal framework for the police that 
enumerates not only the mandate, powers, organisation and functions 
of the police, but also provides for oversight on and accountability of 
the police.
The case studies show that the legal framework of police services 
covers the constitution, as well as a wide range of laws pertinent to 
police governance, including police act, penal code, code of criminal 
procedure, acts related to peacefully assembly, laws governing oversight 
institutions (including parliament and ombuds institutions), and laws 
related to dealing with specific issues such as public order and state 
of emergency. Furthermore, the legal framework includes regulations 
(sometimes referred to as secondary legislation) issued by the executive 
dealing with specific police matters, e.g. internal control procedures 
and codes of ethics. Last but not least, in federal countries, e.g. Germany 
and India, local assemblies can adopt laws that pertain to the police 
within their jurisdiction. 
All the case studies demonstrate that parliament exercises wide latitude 
of legislative powers. With specific reference to the police, parliament 
provides for an updated legal framework that addresses contemporary 
governance issues. Such updating aims to address issues relating to 
decentralisation and deconcentration (as in the cases of Belgium and 
the United Kingdom), or demilitarisation/democratisation as in the case 
of the Philippines, Indonesia, or nationalization of the police as is the 
case in the Netherlands. India has still has laws in place that originate 
directly from colonial times, e.g. the Police Act V (1861) or the Indian 
Penal Code (1860).  Current legislations governing the police go beyond 
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the structure, qualification and promotions, ranks, retirement, etc. of 
the police. New legislations include accountability mechanisms such 
as complaint bodies, internal affairs units, and roles of local elective 
officials in the governance of the police.
Various case study authors have cited the growing interest on 
demilitarisation/democratisation, creation of a national police, 
community policing and decentralisation as reasons for the updating 
of legal frameworks governing the police. This is in response to the 
growing public clamour to make the police service increasingly 
accountable to the public, especially to the locally elected authorities, 
while simultaneously addressing the need for efficient and effective 
policing. 
In the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia, with the fall of the 
dictatorship, demilitarising the police and organizing a national police 
service under civilian authorities became an urgent task. Aguja cited the 
passage of the new police law in the Philippines in 1990 as paving the 
way for the creation of one national police, civilian in character, under 
the supervision of a national police commission. The Philippine law 
also gives power to local chief executives to appoint the chief of police, 
discipline the police, inspect the police service, and oversee the police, 
including developing local police plans. The law likewise provides for 
the establishment of an internal affairs office within the police service, 
and a citizen’s complaints body. 
In the Netherlands, the study describes the creation of a national police 
service through the Police Act of 2012. The 25 regional police services 
and the Dutch Police Services Agencies, each with their own police 
commissioner, were all placed under one single police commissioner 
to ensure coordination of the various (local) police services. The author, 
however, noted that the reorganisation did not diminish the authority 
of local chief executives (e.g. mayors) and the chief prosecutors 
(responsible for criminal investigations) over the police.  
On the other hand, Easton and Dormel noted that the recent Police 
Reform Law of 1998 in Belgium was guided by the principles of 
deconcentration and decentralisation. This will strengthen the powers 
205Role of Parliament in Police Governance in Asia and Europe: Insights from Comparative Analysis
of locally elected representatives over the police. The authors further 
noted that the Belgian integrated police is structured on two levels 
(one federal police service and 195 local police services), where “both 
levels are autonomous without any hierarchical link binding them.” 
A similar trend of local accountability is occurring in the United Kingdom 
through the passage of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
of 2011. According to Vic Hogg, all chief constables in 41 of the 43 
police services in England and Wales are now accountable to elected 
Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). The PCCs are in turn under the 
oversight of Police and Crime Panels (PCP), where its most of its members 
are drawn from councillors in each constituent local authority, and two 
more members are appointed for their expertise. Similar accountability 
mechanisms are in place in two (London-based) areas. 
The different studies show that, aside from addressing police 
organisations, parliaments are equally preoccupied with passing legal 
measures that strengthen police accountability through the creation of 
oversight bodies, protection of the rights of the public and the police, 
and maintenance of public order and security.
Legislation of independent oversight bodies and complaints bodies
To increase police accountability to the public, parliament passes 
laws creating oversight bodies and providing for public accountability 
measures. In the case of the Philippines, Congress passed laws governing 
the Ombudsman, and the code of conduct and ethical standards for 
public officials and employees, including the police. The parliaments of 
Thailand and Indonesia also passed measures institutionalising their 
respective human rights commissions and independent anti-corruption 
bodies. Furthermore, parliament legislated independent complaint and 
police oversight bodies in the United Kingdom and Belgium. 
Participation of the public in law-making process (open hearings 
and public consultation)
Except for Germany, where parliamentary committee procedures are in 
camera, the case studies show a transparent, inclusive and democratic 
process of legislation. Stakeholders, the general public and the media 
have access to parliamentary documents and debates, and actively 
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participate in the legislative process through the sending of position 
papers and personal appearances as resource persons during committee 
hearings. For example, while in Germany committee proceedings are in 
camera, Germany parliamentary committees frequently organise public 
hearings, especially when new pieces of legislation are under discussion. 
As normally the party groups select the experts to be heard, the input 
depends on the kind of experts that are invited. Hearings may therefore 
be dominated by lobbyists, but they are often used to integrate external 
experts, such as university professors, into the law-making process.
The media plays an active role in shaping public opinions on pending 
legislation. The media is given access to parliamentary documents and 
is often in attendance during committee hearings and parliamentary 
debates. Political parties and members of parliament make their 
positions known to the public through the media and conduct public 
consultation on their own initiative.
Good practices
1. Parliaments actively exercise their legislative power. Current 
updating of legal frameworks governing the police is undertaken 
to improve governance and make the police more democratic by 
ensuring their accountability to locally elected officials. 
2. The democratisation of the legislative process is currently a norm 
among the parliaments studied. Parliamentary materials are highly 
accessible to the public, and there is now greater openness of 
legislative proceedings through on-time media coverage, as well as 
greater public participation in committee hearings. The crafting of 
public policies is no longer an exclusive domain of legislators and 
their political parties, with the participation of stakeholders and 
the media, thereby democratising the entire legislation process.
Police governance and the oversight function of 
parliament
Inquiries: Mandate, powers and organisation
All case studies show that oversight functions or the power of inquiries 
are inherently exercised by the parliaments, albeit with variations 
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of the mechanisms and intensities and thus with differing levels of 
effectiveness. Inquiries are exercised either in the plenary or via the 
committees. Members of parliament could raise matters of public 
concern during parliamentary question hours, either in writing or orally 
(as in the case of the United Kingdom), when a concerned minister 
may respond to queries. However, the most dominant expression of 
the power of inquiry/oversight is exercised by the committee system 
through a select/standing committee or commission that existed in all 
case studies.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, parliamentary inquiries are 
open to the public. In fact, the case study authors of Netherlands, the 
Philippines and the United Kingdom mentioned that the inquiries are 
broadcast live on television unless the committee members agree to 
make it closed or limited to the public due to justified reasons. In the 
case of the Philippines, congressional proceedings including inquiries, 
as a general rule, are open to the public except when the President 
requests that it be held in an executive session or when the committee 
determines that national security necessitates that it be held in camera.
Field-visits: organisation  
The case studies of Belgium, Indonesia, Philippines and the United 
Kingdom explicitly highlight the power of concerned parliamentary 
committees to make field visits, fact-finding missions or field 
investigations.
Hearings: power to call-up police officers and executives
The majority of the case studies affirm the power of inquiring/
investigating parliamentary committees to compel or summon 
individuals to appear before or to submit documents to the committee 
under pain of penalty. This system is institutionalized in Belgium, 
Germany, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. The 
exercise of power of subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum is 
considered necessary for the effective conduct of inquiry. In the case of 
Indonesia, the author highlighted that one of the source of weakness of 
parliamentary oversight is the lack of the inherent power of parliament 
to compel witnesses, especially top-ranking government executives, 
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to attend or submit documents to inquiring committees. In the United 
Kingdom case study, the author observed that parliament rarely uses its 
contempt powers against those who fail to personally appear or turn 
over documents. Accordingly, with its transparent process, parliament 
relies more on adverse media, public criticism and influence against 
those who fail to heed the parliamentary order. Failure or refusal to 
attend or submit documents to the inquiring parliamentary committee is 
believed to bring severe reputational damage to the concerned parties. 
In Germany, only parliamentary inquiry committees have the right to 
summon other government representatives as witnesses. The hearing of 
government representatives under oath by the standing parliamentary 
committees, however, is not foreseen by German law. Nevertheless, 
government and police officials mostly give a positive response in such 
cases, but the members of parliaments’ right to force police officers 
to respond to their questions is limited to parliamentary inquiries. In 
Thailand, Srisombat noted that, while subpoena and contempt powers 
exist, there is no record that such powers have been used. On the other 
hand, the Congress of the Philippines, in its history of congressional 
inquiries in aid of legislation, has fully utilised both its subpoena and 
contempt powers. In fact, the contempt power has been directed against 
those who failed to heed Congress’ power of subpoena, who failed to 
cooperate at all during the inquiry, and who failed to observe proper 
decorum or lied to the committee during inquiries. 
Good practices
1. There is a growing consciousness in public accountability, with a 
number of parliaments conducting inquiries open to the public, as 
these inquiries are imbued with public interest. 
2. For the parliament to be successful in its inquiry, it must be clothed 
with subpoena and contempt powers to compel witnesses to 
appear or submit documents needed to shed light onto the subject 
of inquiry. Without such powers, parliamentary committees will be 
rendered inutile in their exercise of their power of oversight of 
the executive branch or the public in general. The exercise of such 
power must be used with utmost professionalism with the aim of 
uncovering the truth, rather than as a tool for political persecution.
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Police governance and the budget control function 
of parliament
Access to budgetary information
All case studies highlight the important role played by parliament in 
passing the national budget, including that of the police. It plays the 
role of scrutinising the proposed budget and eventually passing it. It 
is apparent in all case studies that members of parliament have full 
access to budgetary information, including analysis of the proposed 
budget as prepared by their respective in-house think-tank (i.e. Bureau 
of Research of the Parliament of the Netherlands or the Congressional 
Policy and Research Department for the Philippines).
Extra-treasury budgets/revenues of the police
Two case studies mention the existence of extra-treasury budgets of 
the police. In the United Kingdom case study, Hogg noted the different 
sources of funding for the police. One source is from the Home Office 
and the Department for Communities and local Government (or Welsh 
Assembly in the case of the four police services in Wales). There are 
also locally sourced funds from a proportion of Council Tax known 
as the “police precept,” which is estimated to represent 14 to 20 per 
cent of the central funding. In addition to the sources of income of the 
police, the author details further sources from the PCCs from charges 
for the policing of commercial events (e.g. sporting and entertainment 
events) and from investments. In 2013/14, Hogg reported that the ratio 
of central to local funding is roughly 75 to 25 per cent respectively. The 
author raised no issues related to off treasury budget of the police. 
In the Indonesian case study, Aditya argued that, despite the 
parliamentary power over the budget of the ministries, parliament 
remains weak in terms of controlling the non-tax revenue usage of the 
police. Government Decree No. 31/2004 authorized the police to use 
up to 90 per cent of certain non-tax revenues, such as driving license 
and car license registrations, driving courses, criminal record letters and 
arms ownership licenses to support its operation. The non-tax revenues 
of the Indonesian police are not without its share of controversies, as 
the case study revealed. In 2011, the Indonesian media reported that 
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the police received USD 71.9 million from PT Freeport Indonesia for 
its services in providing security for the port. In 2012, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission arrested a top ranking police chief of traffic 
for corruption. It was discovered that the money was sourced from the 
revenues of the driving simulator. The Indonesian Parliament, through 
Commission III, investigated these controversies. However the author 
concluded that “in the context of non-state budget funds accountability, 
the commission appears to be powerless.” As the power of the purse is 
one of parliament’s most important powers, extra treasury or non-tax 
revenues are undermining parliaments power to oversee police affairs. 
Budget processing
Different parliaments adopt varying procedures for processing their 
respective national budgets. Nevertheless, the process could be briefly 
summarised: the presentation of the proposed budget, parliamentary 
hearing/deliberation on the budget, and voting for approval of the 
budget bill. Presentation usually entails either a ceremonial turn-over 
of the budget documents to the parliament or a speech by the head 
of finance of government to members of parliament during a plenary 
session to signal the start of the budget process in the parliament.  
The ceremonial turn-over of budget documents to parliament is 
exemplified in the Philippines and the Netherlands. In the case 
of the Philippines, the secretary of the Department of Budget and 
Management presents the leaders of Congress a copy of the budget, and 
other relevant documents (i.e. the President’s Budget Message, Budget 
Expenditures and Sources of Financing, National Expenditures Program, 
Details of Selected Programmes and Projects, and Staffing Summary), 
within thirty (30) days after the State of the Nations Address (SONA) of 
the President. The SONA is delivered by the President every 4th Monday 
of July before the joint session of Congress. In the Netherlands, the case 
study showed that during the “Prince’s Day” (3rd Tuesday of September) 
where the King as head of state, delivers the so-called “King’s speech” 
(Troonrede), the Minister of Finance presents the “Third-Tuesday-in-
September” briefcase to the speaker of the House of Representatives. It 
contains the budget memorandum, and the proposed national budget. 
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The Budget memorandum includes policy documents about the state’s 
financial situation ten years back and four years ahead. The submission 
also includes the advice of the independent Council of State on the 
budget memo. 
In the United Kingdom, the author cited that during the month of April 
or May, the Chancellor of the Exchequer delivers a speech in the House 
of Commons on the state of the country’s finance, including proposals 
for taxation and spending. In Indonesia, the case study showed that 
the government submits the budget proposal to the plenary session 
towards the end of May. During the plenary presentation, party caucuses 
will make a response, followed by a subsequent government response.
After the budget has been formally presented to the parliament, there 
are different processes involved in parliaments for its scrutiny, until the 
eventual passage of the budget bill. In the Netherlands, even prior the 
start of the parliamentary debate on the budget, members of parliament 
can already ask factual questions in writing about the budget bill to 
their Parliamentary Bureau for Research and Public Expenditure. The 
bureau in turn prepares an internal memorandum for the use by the 
members of parliament, which includes proposed questions and 
clarifications that could be raised during the budget deliberation. In 
the Dutch system, while the budget is deliberated in both chambers, 
only the House of Representatives has the right to amend the budget. 
The Senate does not exercise such right to amend. It can only adopt or 
reject the proposed budget. 
In the case of the Philippines, as soon the budget is presented, the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and its 
sub-committees start the budget hearing. It is an annual event where 
executives are called by Congress to present their plans, defend their 
budget, and appraise Congress of their performance. After the committee 
hearings of all agencies are done, the budget bill is presented to the 
plenary and once again debated per agency. The heads of the executive 
agencies are expected to be present when Congress deliberates their 
budgets in the Plenary. A similar exercise is done in the Senate. After 
both chambers have completed their deliberations and passed it 
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during a third reading, a bicameral conference (or bicam), composed 
of representatives from both chambers, is called to reconcile the 
disagreeing provisions. Once a consensus is reached, the bicam transmits 
the finalised version of the bill for ratification to both chambers. After 
both chambers have ratified the bicam report, it will be delivered to the 
President for his signature or veto of certain line items. Just like any 
other law, the President has 30 days to act on the proposed bill, or it 
will lapse into law.  The Constitution provides that the budget bill must 
emanate from the House of Representatives. While both chambers have 
the power to amend the budget submitted by the executive, it can only 
lower it. Increasing the budget as proposed by the chief executive is 
prohibited by the constitution. 
In Indonesia, the budget process is equally rigorous.  Once the 
presentation of the budget in the plenary is completed, the budget 
proposal is distributed to the different parliamentary commissions, 
who in turn deliberate the proposal with the concerned ministers. It is 
during the commissions’ budget hearing where government agencies 
present their utilisation of the current budget, and their proposed 
budget. After all the commissions’ hearings, a budget proposal will 
be submitted to the budget committee (composed of representatives 
of various commissions) where it will be discussed with government 
representatives (e.g. Ministry of Finance). It is only after the budget 
committee and the government representatives agree on the budget 
bill that it will be submitted to the plenary for approval.
In Germany, while the formal powers of the Bundestag to control the 
government’s budget are formidable, Aden mentioned that, in practice, 
the parliament’s influence is limited by the fact that governments are 
elected by the majority of the members of parliament in the German 
democracy, making it not probable that parliaments use their budgetary 
power to force governments to change policies.
Audit of past expenditures: Role/use of supreme audit institutions
Audit institutions do play an important role in the effective performance 
of the parliamentary budget control function. More often than not, budget 
institutions are required to submit to parliament a comprehensive 
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report on how the government spent the money and whether it was in 
accord with the policies set by parliament. 
In the case of the Netherlands, the author noted the role played by 
the Court of Audit as “advisor for both government and parliament.” 
While the “Prince’s Day” signals the beginning of the budget process, 
the Accountability Day (Verantwoordingsdag), on the 3rd Wednesday of 
May, marks the end of the budget cycle. It is during this day that the 
government presents its annual report to the House of Representatives, 
at the same time that the President of the Court of Audit presents 
its findings and recommendations, including annual reports of the 
different ministries. It points out matters that require attention from 
the parliament. 
In the case of United Kingdom, aside from the National Audit Office3 
(NAO) that “scrutinizes public spending” on behalf of the Parliament, the 
PAC of the parliament is tasked to check the government expenditures 
in reference to the plans approved by parliament. The PAC also oversees 
the NAO. It is a unique parliamentary feature, as the parliament oversees 
government expenditures, in cooperation with the NAO, on a regular 
basis, unlike many parliaments that scrutinise only during the budget 
process. 
In the case of Belgium, the Court of Audit, a collateral body of parliament, 
provides an external review of the budgetary, accounting, and financial 
operations of government. It is regularly consulted by parliament on 
records of performance of government agencies. 
In India, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), who audits the 
different levels of government, submits its report to the President/or 
Governor who in turn submits the report to the federal/state parliaments. 
The author noted that the CAG “provided some checks against blatant 
political shenanigans.” 
In the case of the Philippines, the Commission on Audit (COA) is mandated 
to submit to the President and to Congress its annual audited report of 
all government agencies. The COA report is also publicly accessible on 
its website. Individual members of Congress, more often than not, use 
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the COA audit reports during budget deliberation of concerned agencies. 
The congressional planning office in its briefing paper/annual analysis 
of the proposed national budget for legislators included relevant audit 
observations of COA.
Good practices
1. It is common practice for parliaments to provide members of 
parliament access to relevant information about the proposed 
budget (including economic assumptions, government strategic 
plans, and analysis of differences between planned and real police 
expenditures). It allows members of parliament to freely question 
concerned agencies, not only on their proposed budget, but also 
on their overall performance. As access to information increases, 
members of parliament become more effective in their mandate to 
pass the national budget. 
2. To effectively scrutinise the budget, members of parliament are 
assisted by either an internal or external think-tank in the timely 
analysis of the budget. 
3. It is equally necessary that committee hearings on the police budget 
be undertaken to not only fully scrutinise the police budget but 
also to increase the transparency of the budget process. This also 
creates an opportunity for the legislative and executive branches of 
government to annually discuss matters of public concern. 
4. The report of the audit body, when made available in time for the 
budget process, enhances the quality of the dialogue between the 
elected officials and appointed civil servants. 
5. Parliament engages with the public and the budget process by 
organising public debates in the committee and the plenary, and 
public hearings, as well as putting all non-classified government 
documents in the public domain. In doing so, the budget process 
creates windows for greater public involvement and enhances 
public involvement in state affairs. 
6. As a common practice, off-budget revenues are disbursed in 
accordance with guidelines and are accounted to the treasury. If not, 
there is a need to subject it to stringent accountability measures to 
ensure the integrity of the fund.
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Role of parliamentary committees
Parliamentary committees are the core actors for parliaments’ oversight 
role of public administrations. Members of parliament specialised 
in a policy, often with a relevant professional background, meet in 
specialised parliamentary committees. As shown in the case studies, 
parliamentary committees vary in types (standing committees, special 
committees, ad hoc commissions, and commissions of inquiry), size of 
membership, and rules on membership and leadership (majority and 
minority representation).
All case studies show the existence of different types of parliamentary 
committees with varying mandates. The United Kingdom has four 
types of committees (i.e. select committees, joint committees, general 
committees, and grand committees); the Philippines has three (standing 
committees, special committees, and joint congressional committees); 
Belgium has three (standing committees, special committees, and inquiry 
committees); and, Indonesia has commissions and special committees. 
Committee procedures (transparency, open/closed meetings)
The case studies show different levels of transparency in the procedures 
of parliamentary committees. In the case of the Philippines, Indonesia, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, parliamentary proceedings 
are public and open to the media. In India, committee proceedings are 
in-camera, or not open to the public, in “consideration of the subjects 
discussed” and to ensure that “members perform their duties in non-
partisan ways.” In Germany, it is attempted to keep parliamentary 
committees free of party politics and “window dressing”. This is the 
main reason for why committee meetings are generally not public – 
with possible exceptions, especially for hearings with invited external 
experts.
Committee staff/expertise
In terms of staff support, availability of experts and resources for the 
disposal of the committee, the case studies revealed that there is a 
great variation between continent and countries. Some authors, in fact, 
highlighted the need for additional resources. In Indonesia, for example, 
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the author notes that “support of parliamentary staff is still far from 
ideal requirements.”
Committee mandate
The case studies show different levels of focus in terms of police matters. 
Some countries have committees that are primarily and directly, but 
not necessarily exclusively, responsible for police matters. Most are not 
directly responsible for police matters, but have them as one of their 
mandates (i.e. in the Philippines, these are the human rights committees, 
Blue Ribbon committee, public finance and budget). For those with a bi-
cameral legislature, both chambers have counterpart committees.
Among the countries studied, Thailand and Belgium have committees 
exclusively focusing on the police. The House of Representatives 
of Thailand has a committee on police; its Senate counterpart, the 
Committee on Justice System and Police, however, does not focus 
exclusively on police matters. The Belgium Parliament has a special 
committee dealing with the police. The Committee P (see the section on 
independent police oversight bodies) reports to the special committee in 
parliament. In Germany, on the Federal level, two Bundestag committees 
deal with police affairs, including the Home Affairs Committee and the 
Budget Committee, with further parliamentary committees dealing with 
police affairs within each of the parliaments of the states (“Länder”).  
The rest of the case studies subsumed police matters under general 
social concerns committees such as: the Home Affairs Committee 
(HAC) and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House of Commons 
of the United Kingdom; the Standing Committee-Ministry of Home 
Affairs of India; the Standing Committee on Security and Justice for the 
Netherlands; the Committee on Public Order and Safety for the House 
of Representatives; and Committee on Public Order and Dangerous 
Drugs for the Senate in the Philippines.
To enable committees to effectively exercise their oversight role, they 
are provided with different levels of power. In the Philippines, Aguja 
described that the Philippine Congress is clothed with the power to 
subpoena persons to appear before the committees and/or to subpoena 
documents (subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum). It also has contempt 
powers against those who disobey the orders of Congress and/or its 
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congressional committees. It can detain those who violate its orders or 
rules. 
Such subpoena and contempt powers are also available in inquiry 
committees of Belgium, or to the select committees of the United 
Kingdom, Thailand and Indonesia have the power to invite but have 
no power of contempt or have never used said power, as the police 
in these countries are directly under the head of state, the President/
Prime Minister. Such organisational set-up, and the absence of contempt 
power limit the oversight power of parliament. 
Committee membership
The size of the committee varies, as the case studies revealed. It is 
often dependent on the size of the parliament or of a specific chamber. 
The existence of a system of proportional representation of majority 
and minority parties/coalitions is notable, however, in most of the case 
studies. In fact, in some parliaments, the committee is headed by a 
member of parliament from the opposition, as in the cases of the United 
Kingdom, India, and the Netherlands. As a matter of convention, the 
chair of the Public Accountability Committee (PAC) in the UK Parliament 
is from the opposition party.
Good practices 
1. While having one exclusive committee that focuses on the police 
is ideal (regardless of the type of police service), the existence of 
multiple committees that handle police affairs is common practice. 
2. The mandates of these committees are clear and describe its 
objectives, powers and methods. 
3. It is common practice that committee meetings, hearings, documents, 
and reports are publicly accessible, both in theory and practice.
4. In terms of membership, it is common practice that the proportional 
representation of minority and majority parties is observed to 
ensure transparency and accountability.  
5.  As members of parliaments have different backgrounds and 
expertise, the availability of qualified staff and consultants, and 
committee resources ensures that the committee will be able to 
perform its mandates effectively. 
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Independent oversight bodies
In all states, a variety of external oversight bodies exist with jurisdiction 
over the police (see Table 2). The following types of oversight bodies 
can be distinguished across the country case studies: 
• Independent police complaints and oversight bodies, 
• National ombuds institutions and human rights institutions, and
• Anti-corruption bodies and audit institutions.
Independent police complaints bodies
Independent police complaints bodies can be found at the heart 
of various police reform programmes. The objectives of setting up 
independent complaints mechanisms are to: 
• Improve external civilian oversight of the police, 
• Strengthen credibility of police complaints mechanisms in the eyes 
of the public, and
• Monitor the compliance of the law and respect for human rights by 
the police.
In the recent past, independent police complaints bodies became a 
common feature of the police governance in many states, including 
Cyprus, France, Hungary, Ireland and Portugal, and they are in the 
process of being set up in other status, such as Austria, Denmark, Norway 
Sweden and Turkey.4 Independent external police complaints bodies 
can be found in Belgium, the Philippines and the United Kingdom.
In Belgium, the parliament has established by law the Standing Police 
Monitoring Committee - also known as Committee P - which is an external, 
independent and neutral body that assists parliament in overseeing 
the activities of both the police and the executive agencies including 
the minister of home affairs, mayors and police boards. Committee P 
has jurisdiction over all police services and police inspectorates, both 
at the federal and national level. The members of the committee are 
appointed by parliament, and it reports to parliament on its monitoring 
activities of the police. Committee P issues public reports and issues 
recommendations to parliament about making the police in Belgium 
more professional and accountable. As a result, it not only strengthens 
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parliamentary oversight of the police, but also informs civil society at 
large about the functioning of the police. Committee P has independent 
staff that assist the committee in conducting the monitoring activities. 
In the Philippines, parliament has established by law the People’s Law 
Enforcement Board (PLEB), which is an independent and local body that 
is empowered to receive, investigate and resolve complaints against 
the police. It is duly organised in all cities and municipalities and 
participatory in its membership. Normally, its members are those active 
in the city or municipality council. The law prescribes that at least one 
member of the PLEB is a woman. The PLEB is a quasi-judicial body on 
administrative cases filed by citizens against erring police personnel. 
The decision of the PLEB is final and executory, except for those 
imposing a penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. 
In the United Kingdom, Parliament established by law the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission, which oversees the internal police 
complaints system. It undertakes independent investigations into the 
most serious cases of police misconduct, death and serious injuries 
as well as other breaches of human rights. It is also an appeal body 
for internally-handled (minor) complaints and issues guidance on 
complaints-handling to the police services. It is led by a chair and ten 
commissioners, who are supported by 380 staff. The Chair is appointed 
by the Minister of Home Affairs. The IPCC submits an annual report and 
statement of accounts to the Home Affairs Committee of Parliament, 
enabling members of parliament to be informed about the nature and 
amount of complaints against the police.
In all these states, independent police complaints mechanisms have 
in common that there is no hierarchical or institutional connection 
between the police officer under investigation and the investigator. 
Furthermore, the conduct of investigation is independent not only on 
paper (according to the law) but also in practice.5
For independent oversight bodies to be credible, effective and 
accountable, they need to have the following characteristics: 
• Oversight bodies are subject to close scrutiny and, for that matter, 
report to parliament and the public at large;
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• Oversight bodies have the capacity of gathering evidence if police 
behaviour was unlawful and have the power to identify, sanction and 
correct those responsible; 
• They are able to act promptly, as delays may lead to the loss of 
evidence; and
• They involve the complainant or victim in the complaints procedure. 
Civil society organisations in the United Kingdom have warned that 
police oversight bodies are vulnerable to capture by the police. In 
particular, capture can take place if oversight bodies overly rely on the 
use of former police officers in their investigations, leading to a situation 
in which they might need to investigate their former colleagues in the 
police.6 To minimise the danger of capture, in Belgium, the Philippines 
and the United Kingdom, civilian oversight bodies are chaired by a 
civilian who is not a current or former police officer. In addition, the 
staff of police oversight bodies is composed of civilians (not current 
police officers), and only a minority of the civilian staff are allowed to 
be former police officers.
National human rights and ombuds-institutions
Most case study countries have a national human rights institution and/
or an ombuds institution mandated to receive and investigate complaints 
about human rights violations and maladministration concerning the 
entire government, including the police. In most countries, citizens can 
issue a complaint to the ombuds or national human rights institution 
if they believe that the police did not handle their complaints properly.
An international point of reference for national human rights and 
ombuds institutions are the Paris Principles on “National Institutions 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights” adopted by the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly in its Resolution 48/134 of 1993. 
The UN Paris Principles stipulate that:
• The institution shall monitor any situation of human rights violation 
that it decides to take up;
• The institution shall be able to advise the government, parliament 
and any other competent body on specific violations, issues related 
to legislation and general compliance, and implementation of 
international human rights instruments;
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• The institution shall relate to regional and international organizations;
• The institution shall have a mandate to educate and inform in the 
field of human rights; and 
• Some institutions are given a quasi-judicial competence.
According to the UN Paris Principles, the key elements of the composition 
of a national institution are its independence and pluralism. In relation 
to the independence, the Paris Principles prescribe that the appointment 
of commissioners or other kinds of key personnel is regulated by 
statutory law (not a decree), establishing the specific duration of the 
mandate, which may be renewable.7 All case study countries are in line 
with the Paris Principles. 
In Indonesia, the Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM - 
National Human Rights Commission) was set up in 1993 and put on 
a statutory basis (enacted by parliament) in 1999, after the collapse 
of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. According to the law, Komnas HAM 
is an independent state body with the aim of performing analysis, 
research, campaign, monitoring and mediation of cases of human rights 
violations. In terms of monitoring, the commission is able to conduct 
investigation of all state officials. In 2012, the annual report of Komnas 
Ham mentions that the police as the worst human rights offender in 
Indonesia. Of the total of 5.422 complaints, the biggest share of 1.635 
complaints was against the police. The Komnas HAM was confronted 
with the following type of police misconduct in 2012:
• 893 reports referred to alleged discriminatory acts by police during 
investigations, 
• 134 reports on arrests and detentions of suspects, 
• 104 reports on shootings and other uses of violence, and 
• 39 reports of alleged torture during interrogations.  
However, apart from the massive number of reports, little can be done 
by Komnas HAM to perform follow-up investigations. The existing 
regulations on Komnas HAM reflect the commission dependency on 
police assistance during their investigation and beyond. In practice, the 
commission relies on the ‘good will’ of the police to provide information 
or have access to autopsy or any medical reports in terms of human rights 
violations involving police personnel. Furthermore, it does not possess 
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the power to submit its investigation report on ‘light’ human rights 
violation cases to the public prosecutor. The Komnas HAM has frequent 
contacts with the parliamentary Committee III on Human Rights, and it 
is frequently invited to attend hearings of the parliamentary committee 
and submits reports to parliament. 
Furthermore, Indonesia has a national ombudsman whose objectives are 
to monitor or investigate complaints of citizens against misconduct and 
corruption of government officials. The Indonesian ombudsman was set 
up in 2000 by presidential decree and put on a statutory basis in 2008. 
With regards to the police, most of the complaints about the police 
are related to driving license and license plate processes, indicating 
massive bribery practice from the side of the police. 
In the Netherlands, the minister appoints the chair, as well as the 
members, of the police complaints committees on the basis of a joint 
recommendation by the regional mayor and chief public prosecutor 
In case the complainant disagrees with the decisions of the police 
complaint commissions, he or she can submit a complaint to the national 
ombudsman. The ombudsman was created by a parliamentary act in 
1982 and is an impartial, independent intermediary between the citizen 
and the state. In 2013, the ombudsman received 2.958 complaints 
against the police (only the tax office and local municipalities scored 
higher), related to discrimination, destruction of citizen property, not 
accepting reports of crime  and accidents, and the use of excessive 
force. The ombudsman has the power to initiate his or her own thematic 
investigation into problems within the police (not related to a specific 
complaint), for example about the use of force by the police or alleged 
discriminatory practices in certain police services. The ombudsman 
submits annual reports to parliament and his or her reports are 
generally well covered by the national media. 
In Thailand, a national human rights commission and ombudsman are 
mandated to receive and investigate complaints of citizens against 
the police. Furthermore, the national ombudsman (enacted in the 
constitution) has set standards for all state agencies to have a code of 
ethics in place, including the Royal Thai Police (RTP).  
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In the Philippines, as well as in other countries, various independent 
bodies have jurisdiction over the police. Generally, the Philippine courts 
have jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by members of the 
police. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman is responsible 
for the prosecution of graft and corruption cases committed by 
senior civil servants, including the police, before the Sandiganbayan, 
the anti-graft court, or before any court of law. The Ombudsman is 
an independent constitutional body and it has a deputy Ombudsman 
specifically dealing with the military and police. To ensure speedy 
disposition of administrative cases against police officers and members 
and to avoid overlapping jurisdictions, the National police commission, 
the Philippines National Police and the Ombudsman concluded a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on September  25, 2012.  The MOA 
outlines the primary jurisdictions of the three aforementioned agencies 
in order to effectively dispose administrative and criminal cases against 
the police. This manifests the high level of cooperation among the tri-
partite agencies in an effort to effectively hold erring police accountable. 
The Philippines Congress maintains regular contact with the Ombudsman, 
in particular during budget hearings, in which Congress organises the 
approval of the annual budget of the Ombudsman. In addition to the 
Ombudsman, the Philippines has a Commission for Human Rights (CHR). 
The CHR receives and investigates complaints related to human rights 
violations by the government, including the police. Congress consults 
the CHR when it deliberates legislative proposals related to human 
rights.
In India, citizen’s movements forced Parliament recently to enact the 
2014 Lokpal and Lokayukts Act, setting up an institution similar to 
the Ombudsman to hold all public officials accountable, the police 
included. This new institution will be able to supervise and control the 
investigations of all police agencies and hence demand accountability.
In overview, it can be observed that ombuds-institutions:
• Function on the basis of the constitution or a parliamentary act 
rather than a presidential or governmental decree, which is important 
as a constitutional or a statutory framework contributes to the 
independence of the institution;
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• Submit annual public reports to parliament; and
• Conduct investigations that are independent from the police. 
Anti corruption bodies
Anti-corruption bodies in various countries have greatly contributed to 
the financial control and transparency of the police. They are normally 
independent bodies, enacted by parliament, and report to parliament 
about their audit activities. Parliaments benefit from their reporting 
and analyses of small and big corruption, abuse of office and dubious 
financial transaction involving state officers, including the police. 
Countries that have ratified the United Convention against Corruption 
are obliged to set up an independent anti-corruption body that can carry 
out its functions effectively and free from undue influence. Furthermore, 
states are obliged to endow the anti-corruption body with sufficient 
capacity, staff and other resources to carry out its duties.8 It goes beyond 
the scope of this study to discuss the causes and measures to combat 
police corruption, which are often rooted in long-term, systematic and 
structural factors. In this study, the focus is on giving a brief overview 
of anti-corruption and graft bodies mandated to deal with the police.
In Indonesia, the KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/Corruption 
Eradication Commission) and the PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan Analisis 
Transaksi Keuangan/Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Center) are mandated to investigate cases of corruption and 
dubious financial transactions involving police officers. Parliament 
established the anti-corruption body KPK by law in 2002. The KPK is an 
independent state body that is responsible to: coordinate and supervise 
corruption eradication authorities; prevent corruption; investigate and 
prosecute public corruption cases; and monitor the state administration. 
The KPK has extensive powers to investigate corruption, including the 
power to wiretap communication, impose overseas travel restrictions, 
and request financial statements and reports from police officers. In 
2012, the KPK made a breakthrough by arresting a two-star police 
general, who was the chief of the traffic police, on the charge of 
corruption causing the state a loss of approximately ten million USD. In 
spite of this and other breakthroughs, the impact of the KPK on police 
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corruption is still limited. For example, the KPK is allowed only to 
investigate corruption cases above 88’000 USD, leaving ‘small’ or ‘retail’ 
police corruption outside the scope of the anti-corruption commission. 
Due to the interactions and reporting between anti-corruption 
institutions and the parliament, the Indonesian Parliament has 
been better able to scrutinise and control the finances of the police. 
However, tensions exist between the KPK and the parliament in cases 
of investigations into corrupt practices of politicians. As a result, some 
parliamentarians, however, without success, have tried to weaken the 
legal basis of the KPK. 
In Thailand, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) is 
the constitutionally mandated independent agency tasked with 
preventing and combating corruption, as well as the designated centre 
for anti-corruption matters and, more specifically, for implementing 
international anti-corruption instruments, such as the UN Convention 
against Corruption. It was noted that the NACC would be more effective 
if police officers would be legally obliged to disclose and submit 
accounts relative to their properties to the NACC on a yearly basis. 
In the Philippines, as discussed above, the ombudsman is mandated 
to monitor the three branches of government, including the police, for 
graft and corruption practices of police officers. 
In India, the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG) plays 
an active role in promoting financial accountability and transparency of 
government, including the police. The CAG conducted various audits of 
police finances (e.g. the modernisation of the police in various states 
of India), as well as of the effectiveness of the police (e.g. the reporting 
time of police in cases of crimes and accidents). 
With regard to India, concerns were raised about the possible extent 
of criminalisation of politics and the potentiality that members of 
parliament are beholden to criminal elements. The cases of India as 
well as Indonesia demonstrate that the concern of possible corrupt 
practices within parliament needs to be addressed as well (e.g. 
through independent anti-corruption bodies, a code of ethics, and 
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special procedures to lift immunity, as well as legislation that requires 
parliamentarians to publicly declare annual statements of their asset). 
Good practices
1. For police to be accountable, it is subjected to independent 
oversight bodies, including independent police complaints bodies, 
ombuds and national human rights institutions, and anti-corruption/
financial audit bodies.
2. Independent oversight bodies are set up in accordance with 
internationally accepted and recognised conventions and principles, 
notably the UN Paris Principles on National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (UNGA 48/134, 1993) 
and the UN Convention Against Corruption (2003).
3. In addition to internal police complaints mechanisms, the police 
is subject to external and independent complaints mechanisms 
mandated to investigate citizen complaints about the police. These 
can be specific independent police complaints bodies or general-
purpose national ombuds and human rights institutions with 
jurisdiction over the police. 
4. For external oversight bodies to be independent their office and 
functioning is based on the constitution or statutory law; they 
have wide legal powers to investigate the police without undue 
influence, and the capacity (budget, staff, and expertise) to promptly 
investigate police misconduct.
5. Independent oversight bodies report regularly to parliament and 
have regular interactions with members of parliaments. 
6. Civil society is enhanced by public reporting of independent 
oversight bodies, as well as FoI laws that open up the police to the 
public. 
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Table 2. External oversight bodies: mandate and functions (at 
Federal/National level)9
Independent oversight 
bodies
Mandate
Belgium
Committee P
Standing Police 
 
Monitoring Committee
• Assists the legislature in oversight of the executive 
• Monitors police and officials involved in policing, inspection 
and monitoring activities
• Reports to parliament about its investigations and issues 
recommendations
Germany
Federal and State Data 
Protection Commissioner
• Exerts oversight functions for police data processing, 
independently from the executive and the police
Court of Auditors at State 
and Federal level
• Scrutinises police spending and reports to parliament
India
National Human Rights 
Commission
• Deals with citizen complaints against police officers and 
inquires suo motu into any human rights complaint
• Examines conditions of detainees, reviews factors that cause 
rights violations and recommends effective and remedial 
measures
Comptroller and Accountant 
General of India
• Scrutinises spending by police departments
Central Information 
Commission
• Implements the Right to Information Act 2005 and opens 
the operations and decisions of public administration for 
public inspection
• Demands accountability from police officers and exposes 
corruption in police stations and brings greater transparency 
to its functioning
Ombudsman • Will be able to supervise and oversee police investigations, 
promote accountability
Indonesia
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Independent oversight 
bodies
Mandate
Human Rights Commission
• These bodies are legally mandated by the law to oversee 
and investigate human rights issues, corruption, public 
service and suspicious financial transactions (respectively) 
involving state officers, in this case, the police
Corruption Eradication 
Commission
The National Ombudsman
Indonesian Financial 
Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Center
Netherlands
Council of State • Issues recommendations for parliamentary debates
Court of Audit • Scrutinises police spending
• Reports to Parliament on the use or misuse of government 
funds
National Ombudsman • Addresses complaints of human rights violations or 
maladministration relative to the police, among other 
government bodies
Philippines
Office of the Ombudsman • Addresses complaints of human rights violations or 
maladministration
• Promotes transparency and accountability
• Attends congressional deliberations or inquiries on police 
legislation, corruption and/or human rights violations
Commission on Audit • Scrutinises the use and/or misuse of government funds
• Attends congressional meetings and deliberations for 
legislation as a resource agency
Commission on Human 
Rights
• Promotes and defends human rights through effective 
measures
• Issues recommendations to Congress
Thailand
National Anti-Corruption 
Commission • Scrutinise the exercise of duties and powers by the police
• They have set standards for all state agencies to have a 
code of ethics in place, preventing and addressing issues of 
corruption, human rights and maladministration
National Human Rights 
Commission
Ombudsman
United Kingdom
National Audit Office (NAO) • Scrutinises public spending
Constabulary (HMIC) • Assesses police performance
College of Policing • Sets professional standards
Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC)
• Oversees the police complaints system
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Police-Parliament liaison mechanisms
Parliament has the mandate to pass laws pertaining to the police, 
approve and amend the budget of the police, and conduct oversight 
of police conduct. To fulfil these constitutional functions, parliament 
needs to have comprehensive and up-to-date information about 
the functioning of the police. For this reason, many states have set 
up parliament-police liaison mechanisms. The case studies show a 
wide variety of parliament-police liaison mechanisms in terms of 
the scope, organisation and existence of informal networks between 
parliamentarians and police personnel. 
Scope of parliament-police liaison 
In various countries, the liaison between parliament, minister and the 
police concerns the following types of requests for information and 
interactions:
• Data about the police budget, strength, performance, modernisation 
projects, training and resource availability, and crime statistics, 
notably crimes against women (India);
• Information about the government’s police policy, police priorities 
and performance goals, and the draft/final budget of the police, as 
well as detailed information about the differences between the police 
budget and realization (Netherlands); and
• Requests for police officers to testify in a hearing and answer written 
questions, as well as motion and consultation requests (Thailand).
Organisation of parliament-police liaison mechanism
In some countries (e.g. Belgium, Philippines and Thailand), the executive 
has established special units to deal with requests from parliament. In 
Belgium, as part of their oversight function, each member of parliament 
has the right to submit parliamentary questions on the functioning of 
the federal and local police. To answer these questions, the minister of 
interior and the minister of justice are each advised by a ministerial 
Technical-Administerial Secretariat. These secretariats are composed 
of police officers and mandated to provide a liaison between the 
police, the minister and parliament. In the Philippines, the Presidential 
Legislative Liaison Office and the Office of the Presidential Advisor on 
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Political Affairs are tasked with interactions and increasing cooperation 
and coordination between parliament and the executive, including the 
police. In Thailand, the parliamentary committees dealing with the 
police have the right to directly contact any agency overseeing the RTP 
with requests for police officers to deliver documents or appear before 
parliament to testify. To this end, the RTP has established a Parliament 
Coordination Group within the RTP’s Legal Affairs Division. It is tasked 
with a) coordinating communication between parliament and the police, 
including organising field visits, and b) providing guidelines to police 
officers concerning testifying in parliamentary hearings in order to 
answer written questions, as well as motion and consultation requests. 
In case a police officer fails to comply with a request of parliament, he or 
she would be subject to criminal procedure and disciplinary measures, 
as prescribed by law.
In another group of countries (i.e. Germany, India, Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom), parliament-police liaison is part of the normal 
functioning of parliament, the minister and the police. No additional 
or special units are established within the parliament, executive or the 
police to support liaison between them. Therefore, contacts between 
parliament, the minister and the police occur on the basis of a legal 
framework that regulates the three parliamentary functions: law-making, 
budget control and oversight. Within the context of these functions, 
parliament-police interaction takes place (e.g. hearings, questions to 
parliament, field visits to police units, requests for information, and 
discussion about police priorities and budget). 
Informal parliament-police liaison
In Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, informal networks 
between parliamentarians, members of the executive and the police play 
a substantial role in police governance. In these countries, members of 
parliament maintain wide network contacts with police officers that are 
members of a political party or police union. These informal contacts 
are important, as members of parliament take decisions that impact the 
functioning of the police, all the way down to the work floor level.
Good practices  
1. Parliament-police liaison takes place in order to assure that 
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parliament receives all information it needs to fulfil its constitutional 
duties. 
2. Parliament-police liaison pertains to:
• Data about police strength, performance and budget; 
• Crime statistics, in particular crimes against women; 
• Policies and priorities of the police; and 
• Other requests from parliament to the police, including requests 
to police personnel to testify before parliament, answer written 
questions, visit police stations, and address motions and 
consultation requests. 
3.  Parliament-police liaison may occur via any or all of the following 
mechanisms:
• Special dedicated units within the executive or the police;
• Normal parliamentary procedures, for example, hearings, 
parliamentary question hour, written questions; and
• Informal contacts between parliament and the police.
Concluding thoughts
The case studies show that the governance and structure of the police 
is a complex matter, with a great variety of governance models between 
states, due to contextual matters, such as the legal framework, political 
system and other factors discussed in the introduction. Nevertheless, 
invariably in all states the executive, parliament, judiciary and 
independent oversight bodies play a role in police governance. In all 
case study countries, the police is accountable to the law rather than to 
the government of the day. This is achieved by setting up a system of 
checks and balances that limits and details the tasking and reporting of 
the police by the executive. The parliament plays an important role in 
the system of checks and balances and, in particular, parliament fulfils 
three generic functions that are applied to police governance. These 
generic functions are law-making, oversight and budget control. 
The findings of the cases studies, as presented in this concluding 
chapter, can be taken into account when answering the question of who 
is policing the police and for exploring the role of parliament in police 
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governance. However, it must be emphasised that the good practices 
always need to be adapted to the exigencies of the local context. 
For future research projects, it would be worthwhile to consider the 
role of civil society in police governance, which was not the central 
focus of this research project due to its focus on the role of parliament. 
The evaluation of independent oversight bodies, including assessing 
the factors leading to their success or failure, would be a second subject 
for further research. A third important topic for research would be an 
assessment of police reform projects conducted in the recent past in 
various countries and how these reforms have affected the oversight 
and accountability of the police. 
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